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Determining the semantic content of sentences, and uncovering regularities
between linguistic form and meaning, requires attending to both morphological and
syntactic properties of a language with an eye to the notional categories that the
various pieces of form express. In this dissertation, I investigate the morphosyntactic
devices that English speakers (and speakers of other languages) can use to talk about
comparisons between things: comparative sentences with, in English, more... than,
as... as, too, enough, and others. I argue that a core component of all of these
constructions is a unitary element expressing the concept of measurement.
The theory that I develop departs from the standard degree-theoretic analysis
of the semantics of comparatives in three crucial respects: first, gradable adjectives
do not (partially or wholly) denote measure functions; second, degrees are intro-
duced compositionally; and three, the introduction of degrees arises uniformly from
the semantics of the expression much. These ideas mark a return to the classic mor-
phosyntactic analysis of comparatives found in Bresnan (1973), while incorporating
and extending semantic insights of Schwarzschild (2002, 2006). Of major interest
is how the dimensions for comparison observed across the panoply of comparative
constructions vary, and these are analyzed as a consequence of what is measured
(individuals, events, states, etc.), rather than which expressions invoke the measure-
ment.
This shift in perspective leads to the observation of a number of regularities
in the mapping between form and meaning that could not otherwise have been
seen. First, the notion of measurement expressed across comparative constructions
is familiar from some explications of that concept in measurement theory (e.g. Berka
1983). Second, the distinction between gradable and non-gradable adjectives is
formally on a par with that between mass and count nouns, and between atelic and
telic verb phrases. Third, comparatives are perceived to be acceptable if the domain
for measurement is structured, and to be anamolous otherwise. Finally, elaborations
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Chapter 1: Introduction & overview
This dissertation is about measurement in natural language, in particular as
it is expressed in sentences with more, as, too and enough, and others. Canonical
examples of comparative sentences contain adjectives like tall and intelligent, as in
(1). Adjectives like these are said to be ‘gradable’ since their application is not an
all-or-nothing affair: for an individual to have the property expressed by a gradable
adjective is for the individual to have it to an extent or to a degree. Words expressing
properties like these are prototypical elements of comparative sentences.
(1) a. Al is taller/more intelligent than Bill is.
b. Al is as tall/intelligent as Bill is.
c. Al is too tall/intelligent to date Bill.
d. Al is tall/intelligent enough to date Bill.
e. How tall/intelligent is Al?
f. Al is that/so tall/intelligent.
On one major theory of the semantics of comparatives, tall and intelligent
are analyzed as expressing relations between individuals and degrees, themselves
understood as representations of measures along various dimensions (e.g., height,
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intelligence). Comparative morphemes like as, too, etc., on such accounts, express
relations between degrees: we can say that one degree is greater than (1a) or (at
least) equal to another (1b), one can be excessive (1c) or sufficient for some state of
affairs (1d). Degrees can also be inquired about (1e) and demonstrated (1f).
A ‘degree predicate’ on this view is one that maps individuals to scales, which
are understood to be total orders on sets of various sorts of degrees: tall associates
individuals with degrees in an ordering on degrees-of-height, and intelligent with
an ordering on degrees-of-intelligence. I outline the motivations and details of the
degree-theoretic analysis of gradable adjectives (GAs1) and extend it to adverbs in
Chapter 2, contrasting it with prominent alternative, vagueness-based approaches.
Degree-based analyses have been applied most widely to canonical cases like
the sentences in (1); however, my major interest will be in its extension to non-
canonical cases such as comparatives with nouns (2) and verbs (3). Such sentences
show the same range of degree-relational interpretations (greater-than, excessive-for,
etc.), but differ in that the comparative morphemes appear either morphologically
different (in the case of more) or somewhat at a distance from the nouns or verbs
targeted for comparison (e.g. as much soup).
(2) a. Al ate more soup than Bill did.
b. Al ate as much soup as Bill did.
c. Al ate too much soup to feel comfortable.
d. Al ate enough soup to feel comfortable.
1I often use ‘GA’ as a label for both gradable adjectives and gradable adverbs.
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e. How much soup did Al eat?
f. Al ate that/so much soup.
(3) a. Al ran more than Bill did.
b. Al ran as much as Bill did.
c. Al ran too much to feel refreshed now.
d. Al ran enough to feel refreshed now.
e. How much did Al run?
f. Al ran that/so much.
These differences suggest one widely-adopted hypothesis, namely that nouns
and verbs interact compositionally with comparative morphemes in a fundamentally
different way than do GAs. On such accounts, instead of expressing relations be-
tween individuals and degrees, they express properties, and degrees are introduced
in (2) and (3) by an expression like much.2 Indeed, such an expression must appear
between comparative morphemes and the noun or verb, contrast (2)-(3) with (4)-
(5). Furthermore, if both GAs and much introduce degrees, this can help explain
why GAs cannot “double up” with much, contrast (1) with (6).
(4) a. * Al ate as soup as Bill did.
b. * Al ate too soup to feel comfortable.
(5) a. * Al as ran as Bill did.
b. * Al too ran to feel refreshed now.
2It is traditionally thought that more in (2a) and (3a) has two parts underlyingly, much and
-er (Bresnan 1973).
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(6) a. * Al is as much tall/intelligent as Bill is.
b. * Al is too much tall/intelligent to date Bill.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the strongest semantic evidence I know of for main-
taining this distinction between GAs (degree-theoretic relations), on the one hand,
and nouns and verbs (properties) on the other. The major data pertains to a
“monotonicity constraint” (Schwarzschild 2002, 2006, Nakanishi 2007) on the in-
terpretation of comparatives with nouns and verbs that is not obviously evidenced
by GA comparatives. In brief, a restriction to monotonic measures explains the
fact that while the same “stuff”—portions of soup in (7a,b), running in (8a,b)—is
measured, only dimensions that respect part-whole relations are available to nom-
inal and verbal comparatives. For example, larger portions of soup have greater
measures by volume or weight than do smaller portions, which is not generally the
case with measures by temperature. To express comparisons along non-monotonic
dimensions, a GA like hot (7b) or quickly (8b) must be used.
(7) a. Al bought as much soup as Bill did. *temp, volume, weight
b. Al bought as hot (of) soup as Bill did. temp, *volume, *weight
(8) a. Al ran as much as Bill did. *speed, time, distance
b. Al ran as quickly as Bill did. speed, *time, *distance
The differences between the (a) and (b) pairs in (7) and (8) can be explained
by positing that much is neutral with respect to a range of degree predicates,
but that it is interestingly constrained: it is limited to expressing mappings that
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are homomorphic (or, structure-preserving) on the measured domain, e.g. the
part-whole structures of JcoffeeK and JrunK. In contrast, GAs like hot and quickly
lexically incorporate specific degree predicates—ones that need not (and often do
not) preserve such structure.
Nevertheless, that the semantics of much is variable but constrained in these
ways raises the question of whether that expression couldn’t introduce degrees in
GA comparatives as well. I argue for precisely this re-envisioning of the standard
degree-theoretic analysis in Chapter 4. The argument is based, in part, on a classic
syntactic account in which an expression like much is, overtly or covertly, present in
all comparatives, whether adjectival, nominal, or verbal (Bresnan 1973; cf. Corver
1997). Coupled with the semantic analysis of GAs as expressing properties of states
(Landman 2000, Fults 2006), I suggest that their extensions are measurable in the
same sense as those of coffee and run are. Building on a distinction drawn by
Champollion (2010), I posit that even GA comparatives involve monotonic mappings
to degrees.
Thus, this dissertation is an attempt to depart fairly radically from the usual
understanding of the logical form of comparative constructions. Instead of hard-
wiring the semantics of degree into the interpretations of GAs, it is uniformly in-
troduced compositionally by much. This, I argue, is the only way degrees may be
elaborated upon by comparative morphemes like more, as, too, and others.
Defending this view, Chapters 5 and 6 address potential challenges to the idea
that the semantics is so uniform in this domain.
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Chapter 5 discusses grammatical effects on the dimensions that are available
for measurement in a comparative. In (9), the presence or absence of the plural
morpheme radically changes which dimensions for measurement are available for
comparison: where (9a) is intuitively judged true where measures by volume or
weight are understood, (9b) is only intuitively judged true if the number of coffees
Al drank exceeds the number of coffees Bill drank (Bale & Barner 2009, Barner
et al. 2009). I show that parallel facts obtain in the verbal and adjectival domains,
once the effects of grammatical aspect and word order are taken into consideration.
(9) a. Al drank more coffee than Bill did. vol, weight, *number
b. Al drank more coffees than Bill did. *vol, *weight, number
These effects are, I argue, a consequence of the semantics of much: it is
uniquely sensitive to grammatical manipulations like that displayed in (9) and others
that I explore in Chapter 5. On the theory I propose, the dimensions for measure-
ment that are possible in a given construction are determined in large part by the
nature of what is measured—e.g., individuals, events, or states of different sorts.
When much measures pluralities of individuals or events, only measurement by
number is possible. This chapter also addresses the idea that such interpretations
arise due to the presence of the morpheme many, and argues that many is not a
distinct lexical primitive but rather a suppletive form of much.
Chapter 6 examines claims that more in English is systematically ambiguous
between an expression with a ‘direct’, ‘indirect’ (e.g. Bale 2006, 20083), ‘metalinguis-
3Unlike the other authors noted in the text, Bale does not claim that more is ambiguous. He
derives the apparent differences between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ comparatives by manipulating how
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tic’ (e.g. Giannakidou & Stavrou 2009, Morzycki 2011), and ‘deviation’ semantics
(e.g. Bartsch & Vennemann 1972, Kennedy 1999). In each of these cases, a distinct
analysis of (non-decomposed) more has been developed to account for the differences
in interpretation that are there detected.
(10) a. Al is taller than Bill is (wide). ‘direct’
b. Esme is more intelligent than Einstein is clever. ‘indirect’
c. Your problems are more financial than legal. ‘metalinguistic’
d. Team A is more legitimate than Team B is fraudulent. ‘deviation’
I begin that chapter by imagining that there are two classes of comparatives:
‘commensurating’, those expressing a comparison of two measures along a common
dimension, and ‘categorizing’, those that express a comparison roughly along the
lines of how apt a given predication is. I then suggest that each of the proposed
types in (10) can be assimilated to one or the other of these classes. After re-
viewing proposals for ‘metalinguistic’ comparatives as candidates for the analysis
of the categorizing comparatives, I present an alternative in which the same much
and -er are used for both varieties—in effect, that there is one type of comparative
construction in English. To derive the differences in interpretation between these
apparent types, I combine a version of the morphosyntactic analysis of ‘metalin-
guistic’ comparatives by Embick (2007) with semantic-pragmatic elements of Davis
et al. (2008). Just as with plural comparisons, the properties of categorizing com-
paratives are derived based on how the semantics of much interacts with the domain
scales are constructed; I discuss this theory in detail in Chapter 4.
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for measurement—in this case, credence states of the speaker.
Concluding in Chapter 7, I address a number of questions raised by the pro-
posed theory. First, I consider how it could extend to the explanation of other
phenomena where lexical measure functions have been hypothesized (e.g., verbal
‘degree achievements’; Dowty 1979, Hay et al. 1999, Kennedy & Levin 2008, and
Husband 2012). Next, I consider the question of how proposals about cross-linguistic
variation fit in: it has been claimed (in different respects by Beck et al. 2010, and
Bochnak 2013) that languages vary with respect to whether and to what extent
they employ a degree-based semantics. On the account I offer, this can perhaps be
understood as the presence/absence of an expression with the semantics of much.
Closing the thesis, I consider the question of why it is that English should
‘package’ the semantics of comparison and measurement into distinct pieces, much
and e.g. -er. If the interpretation of -er, as, too and enough, etc., require a predicate
to introduce measures, why not do it themselves? After all, this is how some other
languages appear to do it, at least on the surface (e.g. Spanish has the univocal
form más: más alto ‘taller’, más cerveza ‘more beer’). These questions are especially
pertinent in light of recent decompositional approaches to negative antonyms and
less (Büring 2007, Heim 2006, 2008). There, I discuss a possibility familiar from
Distributed Morphology and, earlier, Generative Semantics, namely that semantic
primitives must correspond one-to-one with syntactic primitives.
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Chapter 2: The standard theory
This chapter presents distributional and interpretive data on comparative con-
structions based on the comparative morphemes more/-er, as, too, enough, -est, etc.,
when they occur with adjectives and adverbs. While I introduce the so-called ‘pos-
itive’ construction (e.g. Al is tall) and its standard semantics, I do not discuss it
again until almost the end of Chapter 4. The major reason for this delay is that
this construction has properties that markedly distinguish it from the comparatives
that I otherwise focus on here.
On the degree-theoretic analysis of gradable adjectives (GAs), they express re-
lations between individuals and degrees on a scale. Comparative morphemes express
relations between such degrees. This analysis has been fruitfully applied to a range
of data, some of which is presented below; primary here is the generalization that
GAs are directly interpretable with comparative morphemes, while non-gradable
adjectives are not. More precisely, comparative constructions are environments in
which an adjective must be read as expressing a gradable, rather than an absolute
property.
I first outline the motivating data and technology the theory employs for GA
comparatives, and show how it may be straightforwardly extended to comparatives
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with gradable adverbs. This allows me to set up an interplay between event- and
degree-based semantics that will be useful when I turn to comparatives with verbs in
Chapter 3. Note that, while the present discussion will include illustrative contrasts
between GA and nominal/verbal comparatives, I do not discuss the latter directly
until the next chapter.
2.1. Basic data
In this section, I introduce the major data that contemporary degree-theoretic
approaches are concerned with. The vast majority of the literature on comparative
constructions has focused on adjectives, however, I suggest, its machinery easily
extends to comparatives with adverbs. The major contrast introduced is between
how the lexical semantics of gradable (tall, intelligent, and fast, loudly) and non-
gradable adjectives and adverbs (wooden, pregnant, and twice, hourly) interact with
that of comparative morphemes.
2.1.1. Adjectives
Gradable adjectives in English are those that appear with -er and as without
any apparent mediation. Intuitively, (11a)-(11b) express that Al’s height/intelligence
exceeds that of Bill, whereas (11c)-(11d) express that Al’s height/intelligence meets
or exceeds that of Bill.1
(11) a. Al is taller than Bill is. comparative
1See Schwarzschild 2008 and references therein for discussion of = versus ≥ in the semantics of
equatives.
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b. Al is more intelligent than Bill is.
c. Al is as tall as Bill is. equative
d. Al is as intelligent as Bill is.
This dissertation mainly discusses sentences like those in (11), although the
same remarks will apply to sentences like those in (12), mutatis mutandis. (12a)-
(12b) express that Al’s height/intelligence is excessive, (12c)-(12d) express that Al’s
height/intelligence is sufficient, and (12e)-(12f) express that Al’s height/intelligence
is of the highest extent with respect to a given context.
(12) a. Al is too tall to get on this ride. excessive
b. Al is too intelligent to date Bill.
c. Al is tall enough to get on this ride. assetive2
d. Al is intelligent enough to solve this puzzle.
e. Al is the tallest girl in her class. superlative
f. Al is the most intelligent girl in her class.
GAs appear to represent a distinguished class in this respect. Observe that
substituting for a noun like coffee in such contexts is ungrammatical, (13). Nouns,
as opposed to adjectives, do not meet the syntactic criteria for combination with
comparative words. Substituting a non-gradable adjective like wooden (14) seems
grammatical, but these sentences are perceived as a kind of category error: a piece
2The constructions with enough have gone long enough without their own label. This term
was coined by J. Foulks (p.c.), in response to my request for naming ideas during a talk at Stony
Brook University on April 4th, 2014. He cites the OED etymology for inspiration: asset, n., “Legal
Anglo-Norman as(s)etz from Old French asez (modern assez = enough), ultimately from Latin ad
to + satis enough, sufficiency”.
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of wood seems just to be wooden, the question of what it would be for one piece to
be determinately “more wooden” than another is wanting.3
(13) a. * That is coffee-er than this is.
b. * That is as coffee as this is.
(14) a. ? This piece of wood is more wooden than that piece.
b. ? This piece of wood is as wooden as that piece.
GAs also appear bare in copular constructions, and modified by very. (15) in-
tuitively express that Al’s height/intelligence exceeds some standard measure along
the relevant dimensions, and (16), roughly, that it is an exceptional exceeding of
such standards.
(15) a. Al is tall. bare occurrence
b. Al is intelligent.
(16) a. Al is very tall. very+Adj
b. Al is very intelligent.
Again to contrast, nouns like coffee and non-gradable adjectives like wooden
do not appear to appeal to standards in the copular construction in the same way,
(17): some demonstrated thing just is (or is not) coffee, or is (or is not) wooden,
3It is of no small interest that the comparative construction encourages us to consider adjectives
normally thought to denote absolute properties ‘as though’ they denote gradable properties, a
consideration that is more or less difficult depending on the adjective in question. Throughout the
dissertation, I talk as though gradability is a property of lexical items, although it is more likely a
property of the concepts we ‘most naturally’ associate with some lexical items. Nonetheless, the
intuitive contrast between tall and wooden should be clear; we have stable intuitions about when
the taller-than relation is true of a pair of entities, but we do not appear to know this about the
putative more-wooden-than relation. The same caution will be necessary when I turn to adverbs
below, as well as the (fraught) mass-count distinction in Chapter 3.
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regardless of the context. With very, the same ungrammaticality (18a) or sense of
category error (18b) is evident.
(17) a. That is coffee.
b. That piece of furniture is wooden.
(18) a. * That coffee is very coffee.
b. ? That piece of furniture is very wooden.
In sum, gradable adjectives are a distinct class in that they appear to combine
directly with comparative morphemes (distinguishing them syntactically from e.g.
nouns) and that they are interpretable there (distinguishing them semantically from
non-gradable adjectives). The next section discusses the properties of a parallel class
of expressions in the verbal domain: gradable adverbs.
2.1.2. Adverbs
There are adverbs that pattern much like gradable adjectives, both with re-
spect to their distribution and interpretation. (19a)-(19b) express that Al’s speed/loudness
exceeds that of Bill, whereas (19c)-(19d) express that Al’s speed/loudness meets that
of Bill.
(19) a. Al ran faster than Bill did. comparative
b. Al talked more loudly than Bill did.
c. Al ran as fast as Bill did. equative
d. Al talked as loudly as Bill did.
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Similarly, (20a)-(20b) express that Al’s speed/loudness is excessive, (20c)-
(20d) express that Al’s speed/loudness is sufficient for a given state of affairs, and
(20e)-(20f) express that Al’s speed/loudness is of the highest extent in a given con-
text.
(20) a. Al ran too fast to get caught. excessive
b. Al talked too loudly to be understood.
c. Al ran fast enough to catch him. assetive
d. Al talked loudly enough to be heard.
e. Al ran the fastest of the group. superlative
f. Al talked the most loudly of the group.
In addition to acting as the pivot for these comparative morphemes, gradable
adverbs appear bare modifying verbs (21), and modified by very (22).
(21) a. Al ran fast. bare occurrence
b. Al talked loudly.
(22) a. Al ran very fast. very+adv
b. Al talked very loudly.
Gradable adverbs are distinguished from verbs syntactically, and from non-
gradable adverbs semantically. Parallel to what we have seen with nouns and non-
gradable adjectives, verbs like run are ungrammatical combined with -er (23a) and
very (23b). Adverbs like hourly seem to represent a similar sort of category mistake
as wooden in this environment (24); normally, we think of work as being hourly or
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not being hourly, and thus attempting to grade the notion with more or very does
not immediately lend itself to a determinate thought.4
(23) a. * Al ran-er than Bill did.
b. * Al very ran.
(24) a. ? Al works more hourly than Bill does.
b. ? Al works very hourly.
In sum, gradable adverbs, like their nominal counterparts gradable adjectives,
are distinguished in that they too appear to combine directly with comparative
morphemes (distinguishing them from verbs) and in that sentences containing them
seem to have definite truth conditions (unlike non-gradable adverbs).
The next section introduces the formal apparatus that I use to characterize
the semantics of comparatives in this dissertation; and, following that, I show how
it is applied in the standard analysis of comparatives with GAs.
2.2. Degrees and scales
The differences in distribution and interpretation between GAs, on the one
hand, and non-gradable adjectives, non-gradable adverbs, nouns, and verbs, on the
other, is standardly modeled by appealing to degrees and scales associated with the
denotations of GAs to the exclusion of the others. This section reviews some of the
motivations of such an appeal, and then introduces the formal properties of degree
4The intended sense of work hourly here is to work ‘by the hour’ or ‘for an hour at a time’ as
opposed to ‘full time’ (daily, monthly, yearly).
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scales.5 The following section provides the compositional details for comparatives
with adjectives and adverbs on what I will refer to as the standard theory.
2.2.1. Why degrees?
Degree-based analyses of GAs contrast primarily with vagueness-based anal-
yses. Degree-based approaches may be found in various forms in Bartsch &
Vennemann (1972), Seuren (1973), Cresswell (1976), Hellan (1981), von Stechow
1984, Bierwisch (1989), Heim (1985, 2000), Kennedy (1999, 2001b), and Bale (2006,
2008), among others. Vagueness-based approaches may be found in Wheeler
(1972), Klein (1980, 1982, 1991), Larson (1988b), and Burnett (2012), among oth-
ers.
On the degree analysis, a GA like tall expresses a relation between individuals
and degrees (primarily Cresswell 1976, von Stechow von Stechow 1984, Heim 1985,
2000), or, a function from individuals to degrees (primarily Bartsch & Venneman
1972, Kennedy 1999, Bale 2006, 2008). The relevant degrees are, as we will see,
objects of a particular sort ordered on a ‘scale’ associated with the GA. On this
approach, comparisons between individuals are represented linguistically as com-
parisons between degrees. In contrast, on vagueness-based approaches, a GA like
tall denotes a vague property that is precisified relative to contexts and compari-
son classes. There, comparisons between individuals are made by establishing that
5This discussion will be couched in a point-based system, where degrees are primitive entities.
A major alternative understands degrees as intervals, which can be understood as (convex) sets
of degrees. Since the major argument of this thesis is how degrees are introduced into the com-
positional semantics, this choice will not affect anything I have to say, as far as I can see. See
Kennedy 2001b (citing Seuren 1984, von Stechow 1984), Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002, Büring
2007, Heim 2008 for relevant discussion.
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there is a context and comparison class in which one individual falls into the positive
extension of tall, and the other falls into its anti-extension.
The crucial difference between the two kinds of approaches is that degree-
based approaches refer to ordered ‘measurements’ in the semantics of comparatives,
a notion that will be important for this dissertation, whereas vagueness-based ap-
proaches do not. Presently, I discuss what work this appeal does apart from what I
will use it to do.
Kennedy (1999) emphasizes ‘(in)commensurable’ comparisons (25) and ‘cross-
polar anomalies’ (26) as phenomena that support degree-based approaches. On
that style of account, comparatives are interpretable just in case the degrees to be
compared are ordered with respect to one another. If two GAs in a comparative
relate to degrees from disjoint sets (as those associated with, e.g., tall and punctual
intuitively will be), then such comparisons are predicted to be semantically anoma-
lous. Because vagueness-based approaches do not refer to ordered measurements,
it is more difficult on such accounts to explain why tallness and punctualness are,
intuitively, incomparable.
(25) ? Al is taller than Bill is punctual.
The same kind of reasoning is available to the degree-theorist to explain the
oddity of sentences like (26), where the compared GAs stand in an antonymy re-
lationship. On Kennedy’s (1999, 2001c) account, such data can be explained by
positing that comparative morphemes cannot establish an ordering between ‘posi-
tive’ and ‘negative’ degrees. Positive degrees are there conceived of as intervals that
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begin at the bottom of a scale and extend up to a point, whereas negative degrees
begin at a non-zero point and extend to infinity; such do not stand in a subset re-
lationship as required by interval-based theories of comparative constructions. On
vagueness-based approaches, tall and short are just (vague) predicates, and there is
seemingly no reason why (26) shouldn’t be perfectly interpretable.
(26) ? Al is taller than Bill is short.
Kennedy also discusses measure phrase constructions (27a) and ‘comparisons
of deviation’ (27b) in support of degree-based approaches. There, 6 feet is analyzed
as denoting a degree on the scale associated with tall. The intuitive interpretation
of (27b) can, Kennedy writes, be easily paraphrased in ways that refer to scale
calculations like deviation from some standard degree, e.g.: (27b) is predicted to
be judged true just in case the degree to which Team A exceeds the standard for
legitimacy in the context is greater than the degree to which Team B exceeds the
standard for fraudulent in the context. Sentences like these ones play a fairly minor
role in this dissertation; however, I discuss measure phrase constructions in Chapter
4 and comparisons of deviation in Chapter 6.
(27) a. Al is 6 feet tall.
b. Team A is more legitimate than Team B is fraudulent.
Bale emphasizes comparatives like (28a) as phenomena in support of degree-
based approaches. (28a) is most naturally interpreted as a direct comparison of Al’s
width and height (and is hence, for most individuals, probably false). However, the
fact that (28a) can be judged false while (28b) can be judged true is a problem for
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vagueness-based accounts like that of Klein (1980). For Klein, comparisons proceed
via existential quantification over ‘delineators’ like very: a sentence like (28a) is
predicted to be judged true just in case a paraphrase like the following is true: there
is a delineator that applies to ‘wide’ which is true of Al that does not apply to ‘tall’
that is true of Al. Such accounts predict that any context in which a sentence like
(28b) is judged true, a sentence like (28a) will be judged true as well, contrary to
fact.
(28) a. Al is wider than he is tall.
b. Al is very wide but he is not very tall.
Appeal to degrees and the scales that order them are thus argued to provide
a rich enough ontology to model interpretable and anomalous comparatives, and
which vagueness-based approaches find less natural. Following Kennedy and Bale,
I assume that the evidence in support of degree-based approaches to the semantics
of comparatives is good, and henceforth its appropriateness for the present project.
The question that I address in this dissertation is how measurements, modeled
as degrees, are introduced into the compositional semantics of comparatives.
2.2.2. Scales
The degree-theoretic, relational analysis of comparatives was first formalized
in Bartsch & Vennemann (1972) and Cresswell (1976). On Cresswell’s account,
degrees are ordered pairs, 〈dx ,x〉, where dx represents a measurement value in
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the domain of the ordering x.6 More contemporaneously, such orderings are called
scales. Seuren (1973) provides earlier discussion in terms of ‘extents’, wherein the
role played is formally distinct: the interpretations of comparative morphemes do
not express relations between the extents, as they do on modern accounts. Rather,
Seuren analyzes a comparative like Al is taller than Bill in terms paraphrasable as
there is an extent to which Al is tall and Bill is not tall to that extent.7
Contemporary degree-based analyses of gradable adjectives hold that GAs are
lexically associated with total orderings on degrees. Total orders are relations with
particular properties: they are reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric, and connected
relations.
These relations are, in set-theoretic terms, just sets of ordered pairs. We refer
to the elements occurring in those pairs as the domain DR for the relation R, and
I notate the structure as a whole 〈DR, R〉. A relation can have some or none of
the properties reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, antisymmetry, and connectivity. I
briefly walk through each of these properties, and give intuitive examples of relations
that have them.
Reflexivity is the property a relation has just in case each element in its domain
is paired with itself in the relation, (29). The relation “be self-identical to” is
reflexive: each individual is indeed self-identical to themselves. The relation “be a
sibling of” is not reflexive: no individual is one’s own sibling.
(29) A relation R is reflexive iff for all x ∈ DR, 〈x, x〉 ∈ R.
6I use <and 4 instead of ≥ and ≤ so as not to suggest that numbers are ordered by this relation.
7Schwarzschild 2008 discusses Seuren’s ‘A-not-A’ analysis in the modern context; see also
Kennedy to-appear and Beck 2011 for overviews of the area.
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A relation is transitive just in case, if an individual x bears the relation to
individual y, and in turn y bears the relation to individual z, then x must also
bear the relation to z, (30). The relation “be a compatriot of” is transitive: for
example, if Al is Betty’s compatriot, and Betty is Carla’s compatriot, then Al is
Carla’s compatriot, too.
(30) A relation R is transitive iff for all x, y, z ∈ DR,
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ R and 〈y, z〉 ∈ R, then 〈x, z〉 ∈ R.
Symmetric relations are those for which it doesn’t matter what order the
individuals in the pair occur in, (31). If x bears the relation to y, then y also bears
the relation to x. The relation “be a sister of” is symmetric, so is “cousin of”. The
relation “mother of” is not symmetric, since if Al is Betty’s mother, it is not the
case that Betty is Al’s mother.
(31) A relation R is symmetric iff for all x, y ∈ DR,
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ R then 〈y, x〉 ∈ R.
Rather, “mother of” is asymmetric (32), as is “father of”, “grandparent of”,
etc. Note that any relation that is asymmetric cannot be reflexive.
(32) A relation R is asymmetric iff for all x, y ∈ DR,
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ R then it is not the case that 〈y, x〉 ∈ R.
Anti-symmetry (33) differs from asymmetry in that anti-symmetric relations
allow for individuals to be related to themselves. The relation ≥ on the natural
21
numbers N is anti-symmetric: for any numbers n, m ∈ N, if n ≥ m and m ≥ n,
then m = n.
(33) A relation R is anti-symmetric iff for all x, y ∈ DR,
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ R and 〈y, x〉 ∈ R, then x = y.
Lastly, relations may be connected, (34). ≥ is connected: for any numbers n,
m, it is the case that either n ≥ m or m ≥ n.
(34) A relation R is connected iff for all x, y ∈ DR,
either 〈x, y〉 ∈ R or 〈y, x〉 ∈ R.
Now we can see why it is said that e.g. tall, associates with a total ordering
on degrees, where the relevant degrees are understood as measures of heights. First,
a total order is defined as in (35).
(35) A total order is a binary relation that is reflexive, anti-symmetric, tran-
sitive, and connected.
Consider the relation “be at least as much height as”, or H. Clearly, anyone’s
height is at least as much as their height, so H is reflexive. Moreover, any two
heights are such that, if the first is as at least as great as the second, and the second
is as great as the first, then the two heights are equal; so H is anti-symmetric.
Similarly, if one height is at least as great as a second, and the second is at least as
great as a third, then the first is at least as great as the third; so, H is transitive.
Finally, for any two heights, either one bears H to the other or vice versa; so, H is
connected.
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The notion of a scale in linguistic semantics is an encoding of relations like
this. Thus, scales are defined as in (36).
(36) A scale S is a structure, 〈D<Deg ,<Deg〉, where D<Deg is a set of degrees
(i.e., entities of type d) and <Deg is a total order on D<Deg .
I leave it to the reader to verify that relations like “is at least as much speed
as”, where speeds are represented by degrees, meet the definition of a scale, as well.
2.3. Formal preliminaries
I now outline the standard framework for interpretation in semantics generally,
and that of degree-based approaches to comparatives more specifically.
2.3.1. Framework
I assume a framework in which the semantic values of expressions are type-
theoretic objects, i.e. basic entities or n-place functions. In this framework, func-
tions are named by λ-terms with the basic shape in (37). Here, ζ represents the
function’s argument, φ its domain condition, and γ its value description.
Functions may have more than one argument ζ, ζ ′, etc.; each of these arguments
is called by its own λ. Domain conditions specify what types of things the func-
tion ranges over. Value descriptions represent the range of the function, given an
argument ζ of the appropriate type.
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(37) Schema for λ-terms
λζ : φ . γ
I assume a model theory with at least the subdomains of entities in (38).
Proper names like Al and Bill are interpreted as entities of type e, elements of
domain De. Verbs like run denote (the characteristic functions of) sets of events of
type Dv. Degrees are entities in Dd.
8 The two truth values comprise the domain
Dt. Complex types like that in (38v) indicate functions from one particular type to
another; I do not represent the domains of all possible functions that are believed
relevant in linguistics.
(38) Domains in the model
i. De = {x : x is an individual}
ii. Dv = {e : e is an event}
iii. Dd = {d : d is a degree}
iv. Dt = {>,⊥}
v. D〈e,t〉 = {f : f is a function from De to Dt}
The denotations of expressions are given by the interpretation function, no-
tated J·K, relative to the assignment function A that assigns values to variables; I
omit reference to A unless it is explicitly pertinent. Expressions are semantically
composed via the standard set of rules laid out in Heim & Kratzer (1998) in (39)-
(42), unless otherwise noted. In that text, many of the rules are stated explicitly
8I noted above that on Cresswell’s approach ‘degrees’ were properly understood as ordered
pairs, of a degree value and the ordering it occurs in.
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over the domain of individuals, De. To allow the rules to apply to eventive deno-
tations as well, I use the variable name η to indicate neutrality with respect to the
primitive types e and v.
(39) Terminal Nodes (TN)
If σ is a terminal node, JσK is specified in the lexicon.
(40) Functional Application (FA)
If σ is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of σ’s daughters, and JβK is a
function whose domain contains JγK, then JσK = JβK(JγK).
(41) λ-conversion (λc)
For some value description φ, type τ and entity y ∈ Dτ ,
a formula like [λx : x ∈ Dτ .φ(x)](y) rewrites as φ(y).
(42) Predicate Modification (PM)
If σ is a branching node, {β, γ} the set of σ’s daughters, and JβK and JγK
are both in D〈η,t〉, then:
JσK = λx : x ∈ Dη.JβK(x) & JγK(x)
(43) Predicate Abstraction (PA)9
If σ is a branching node, {β, γ} the set of σ’s daughters, and γ is an
operator bearing index i, then:
JσKA = λx : x ∈ Dη. JβKA:Ai→x
9 The use of ‘operator’ in this rule definition refers to syncategorematic nodes in trees labeled
op with a subscripted index. op is to be interpreted as a syncategorematic element, just like ‘∃x’ is
interpreted in the standard semantics for predicate logic. In the present system, its only function
is to trigger the PA rule for interpreting its sister as an A-variant, and appears in this dissertation
in than/as-clauses (see below).
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(44) Indexed Expression Rule (IR)10
If σ is an expression bearing index i, then JσiKA = A(i).
In addition to these rules, I posit two more, both of which are required for the
neodavidsonian analysis of verbal denotations that I will assume. Davidson (1967;
Filip 2011 cites Ramsey 1927 for precedence) proposed to augment the traditional
analysis of verbs (see Table 2.1) with an event argument.11 Shortly afterwards,
Castañeda proposed that the denotations of the subject and object expressions could
be linked to the verb meaning via thematic predicates (1967; see also discussion in
Fillmore 1970, Bach 1981, 1986, Carlson 1984, Taylor 1985, Dowty 1989, Krifka
1989, 1992, Parsons 1990, and Landman 2000). Schein (1993) further proposed that
thematic conjuncts should be explicit in the logical syntax (see also Pietroski 2005,
2011, Landman 2000, and Champollion 2010 for defense of this position). Kratzer
(2000) argues that, while separation of the Agent role is well-motivated, there is
not yet convincing evidence for a separation hypothesis for internal arguments (see
also Marantz 1984, Pylkkänen 2002).12 Since I do not address the question of total
thematic separation, I assume with Kratzer that, while the Agent role is introduced
separately, object denotations combine with the verb denotation directly.
Kratzer (1996) suggests that the Agent role is introduced by a v head in the
syntax (here, ‘little-v’; see Chomsky 1995 a.o.) and a special rule called Event
10I use ‘Indexed Expression’ rather than e.g. ‘Traces and pronouns’, as it is more general; this
level of generality becomes pertinent in Chapter 5.
11Higginbotham 1985, 2000 offers a yet more radical approach, in which every V, N, A, and P
have a davidsonian argument.
12Schein 2003, 2011 has offered further arguments for separation of Theme; see also Williams
2008, 2009, Laterza 2011, and others.
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Table 2.1: Possible verb and sentence logical forms for Al kicked Bill, with initial
proponents and the hypothesized status of thematic conjuncts.
verb sentence proposed by thematic roles
λyλx.kick(x, y) kick(Al,Bill) traditional -
λyλxλe.kick(e, x, y) ∃e[kick(e,Al,Bill)] Davidson 1967 -
λyλxλe.kick(e) &
∃e[Agent(e, x) & Patient(e, y)
∃e[kick(e) &
Agent(e, x) & Patient(e, y)]
Castañeda 1967 lexical
λe.kick(e) ∃e[kick(e) &
Agent(e, x) & Patient(e, y)]
Schein 1993 total separation
λyλe.kick(e, y) ∃e[Agent(e,Al) & kick(e,Bill)]Kratzer 1996 separation of Agent
Identification, given in (45).13
(45) Event Identification (EI)
If σ is a branching node, {β, γ} the set of σ’s daughters, and JβK is in
D〈e,〈v,t〉〉 and JγK is in D〈v,t〉, then:
JσK = λx : x ∈ Deλe : e ∈ Dv.JβK(e)(x) & JγK(e).
It is standard on event-based analyses to assume a default rule of existential
closure that applies at the top of a clause if that clause denotes a predicate of
events. In a more articulated theory of the left periphery, the function of binding
verb phrase event variables is performed by Aspect (see Kratzer 1998, Ferreira 2005
and Hacquard 2006 for discussion and references). In derivations, I mark this step
with ∃.
Finally, I adopt the notational conveniences in (46). Given adherence to these,
I generally omit reference to domain conditions, unless they become necessary for
clarity.
13Alternatives to this mode of introducing Agent include type-shifting (Landman 2000, Cham-
pollion 2010) or encoding the thematic relation as part of the interpretation of a silent head in the
syntax (Lin 2001, Schein 2003, Borer 2005c, Bowers 2010, Lohndal 2011).
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(46) Notational conveniences
i. x, y, z... range over elements of De.
ii. e, e′, e′′... range over elements of Dv.
iii. d, d′, d′′... range over elements of Dd.
iv. α, α′, α′′, ... are neutral with respect to De and Dv.
2.3.2. Composition: adjectives I
I assume the degree-theoretic analysis of gradable adjectives proposed by
Bartsch & Vennemann (1972), Kennedy (1999), Bale (2008), a.o., in which they
are represented as measure functions of type 〈e, d〉. A prominent alternative rep-
resents them as relations between individuals and degrees, type 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 (Cresswell
1976, Heim 2000, Bhatt & Pancheva 2004, a.o.). At the end of this chapter, I provide
a sketch of the differences between these proposals for completeness.
The denotations of gradable adjectives from this perspective are as in (47):
they are functions from individuals x to degrees d, d a representation of the measure
of Al’s height or her intelligence.14
(47) Gradable adjectives (standard)
i. JtallK = λx.tall(x) 〈e, d〉
ii. JintelligentK = λx.intelligent(x)
14One may wish to put very explicit domain conditions in the λ-terms given in (47). Perhaps
along the lines of Cresswell’s lexical specification for JtallK: “[its] domain contains only physical
objects”, and further, here, “> is the relation whose field is the set of all v such that v is a spatial
distance, and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ > iff v1 is a greater distance than v2, and u is the distance between a’s
extremities..., and... this distance will typically be vertical” (1976:267). I return to the question
about the particular status of degrees and ordering relations specifically in Chapter 4.
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The ranges of such functions are elements of scales associated with the GAs.
For instance, the scale associated with JtallK can be represented as in (48i), and the
scale associated with JintelligentK can be represented as in (48ii), building on the
formulation given in Kennedy & McNally (2005).
(48) i. 〈D<length ,<length〉
ii. 〈D<intelligence ,<intelligence〉
In this case, the two adjectives associate with different scales: the sets of
degrees that they order are disjoint. For instance, the domain of a length scale
Dlength consists in degrees representing length measures, and Dintelligence in degrees
representing intelligence measures. These degrees may be such that it is sensible
to say, of some d ∈ Dtall, that it equals 6 feet, or of some d ∈ Dintelligent, that it
equals 120 IQ points. The ‘<’s, of course, are total orderings over the respective
sorts of degrees. Other pairs of adjectives may associate with the same scale: for
example, the domain of the scale of length can be the range of the mapping denoted
by JtallK and JwideK, just the mappings themselves will usually differ (see Kennedy
1999, 2001b).
In contrast, non-gradable adjectives like wooden are assigned denotations like
that in (49): they are functions from individuals x to truth values t. These denota-
tions do not involve reference to scales.
(49) Non-gradable adjectives
JwoodenK = λx.wooden(x) 〈e, t〉
The denotations of the comparative morphemes -er and as are given with
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the type of gradable adjectives in mind, (50): each combines with their respective
comparative clauses (headed by than or as, of type d; more on this below) then with
an expression of measure function type 〈e, d〉 to deliver a property of individuals
(type 〈e, t〉). As is standard, I assume that  and < in (50) are polymorphic, i.e.,
they do not express any particular ordering relation, but take on a particular value
based on the grammatical context—in particular, that of the scale from which d and
g(x) are drawn. I return to this in Chapter 4.
(50) Comparative morphemes (first version)
i. J-er/moreK = λgλdλx.g(x)  d 〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
ii. JasK = λdλgλx.g(x) < d
Bare occurrences of GAs, e.g. Al is tall, do not seem to mean ‘Al has some
degree of height’, but rather, that she has some significant degree of height. On
this theory, such readings are posited to be the result of combining the GA with a
covert expression that introduces a context-sensitive ‘standard’ degree on the scale
associated with tall (Bartsch & Venneman 1972, Cresswell 1976, and many since).
Its (simplified) semantics are as in (51).15 Thus, the interpretation of a sentence like
Al is tall will be represented along the lines of Al is (at least) as tall as the standard
for tallness.
15The simplification is that I have omitted reference to the ‘comparison property’ P discussed
in Kennedy 1999. P is said to be filled by a for-phrase when present (e.g. Al is tall for a jockey)
and otherwise provided by context.
i. JposK = λgλPλx.abs(G(x))(standard(G)(P )]
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(51) Positive morpheme
JposK = λgλx.g(x) < standard(g)
The given denotations of -er and as require that than/as map their complement
clauses of type 〈d, t〉 to the greatest element in those sets, which I will formalize with
the ι operator in (52) (Heim 1985; cf. von Stechow 1984 and Rullmann 1995 for a
formulation using max16,17). Putting the pieces together, the (simplified) structure
with the types of the various elements for an -er comparative is as in (53).
(52) than/as heads










〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
thanP
d
Turning to the internals of than/as clauses, Chomsky (1977) argues (build-
ing on observations by Bresnan 1973) that they display evidence suggestive of wh-
movement; this is now generally assumed to be the syntactic counterpart of a λ-
abstraction over degrees (Izvorski 1995, Kennedy 1999, Bhatt & Pancheva 2004,
16The max operator is more appropriate for comparatives in modal contexts, as in Al can jump
higher than Bill can. That is, if Bill can jump 6 feet high, he can also jump 5 feet high, etc. Thus,
there is no unique degree d such that Bill can jump d-high. max is then defined in terms of ι
(Heim 2000) and with reference to a degree scale:
i. max(D) = ιd[D(d) & ∀d′[D(d′)⇒ d′ 4 d]]
17See Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002 for problems with ι and max in a point-based system,
when interpreting quantificational noun phrases in the than-clause.
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a.o.; though cf. Grimshaw 1987, Corver 1993). On this view, the internal struc-
ture of the than/as-clause is as in (54), ignoring the (uninterpreted) copular verb,
and using category labels of convenience. The function of opi, raised to the higher
position, is to trigger the rule of Predicate Abstraction (PA).18 Following Kennedy
(1999) and Bale (2008), the degree-trace is related to the GA tall (elided in the























〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
abs has a semantics identical to as, or to pos without the standard degree; it
is interpreted as in (55). Kennedy (1999) suggests that, without such a morpheme,
the identity conditions on ellipsis for than-clauses such as occurs in Al is taller than
Bill is (tall) in (54) would not be licensed.
(55) Absolute morpheme (Kennedy) (first version)
JabsK = λgλdλx.g(x) < d 〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
18Kennedy 1999, 1998 ultimately rejects the analysis of constructions like Al as taller than Bill
(as opposed to Al is taller than Bill is wide) as involving ellipsis in the than-clause; I revisit his
alternative analysis in Chapter 3.
19Note that op is syncategorematic; it does not have a type. See footnote 9.
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Again ignoring the copular verb, (11a), repeated here as (56), has the structure
in (57). The labels for the maximal projections are not theoretically important here,
and, for the most part throughout, are merely provided for reference.











The interpretation of this structure is composed as in (58), with the com-
positional steps indicated on the right-hand side. I give this and all subsequent
derivations in a bottom-up fashion. Note that, throughout the dissertation, I omit
reference to the rule Terminal Nodes (TN). The result of the derivation in (58) is
that an utterance of (56) is predicted to be judged true just in case the degree
representing Al’s height exceeds that representing Bill’s height.
(58) i. JDeg1’KA = λdλx.tall(x) < d FA
ii. JDeg1PKA = λx.tall(x) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
iii. JS1KA = > iff tall(Bill) < A(i) (ii),FA
iv. JopPKA:Ai→d = λd.tall(Bill) < d (iii),PA
v. JthanPKA = ιd[tall(Bill) < d] (iv),FA
vi. JDeg2’KA = λd′λy.tall(y)  d′ FA
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vii. JDeg2PKA = λy.tall(y)  ιd[tall(Bill) < d] (v),(vi),FA
viii. JS2KA = > iff tall(Al)  ιd[tall(Bill) < d] (vii),FA
In light of this derivation, we can see why non-gradable adjectives and nouns
are predicted to be judged anomalous in comparatives: attempting to combine -er
or abs with JwoodenK would result in a type mismatch (cf. JDeg2’K in (58vi)).
Before turning to the composition of comparatives with gradable adverbs, a
brief digression into a comparison of the measure function analysis adopted here,
and theanalysis of GAs as denoting ‘individual-degree relations’. I show that either
choice comes with benefits and drawbacks.
2.3.3. Comparison with the relational analysis
The earlier degree-theoretic approach to GAs analyzes e.g. tall as a measure
function type, 〈e, d〉 (cf. Bartsch & Vennemann 1972, Kennedy 1999, Bale 2008,
a.o.). The later alternative analyzes it as of individual-degree relation type,
〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 (Cresswell 1976, Heim 1985, 2000, von Stechow 1984, Bhatt & Pancheva
2004, a.o.). The differences between the accounts start with the (surface) word order
of comparatives, and in how applicable they are in the analysis of apparent scope
interaction phenomena.
The measure function analysis in (59i) differs from the individual-degree rela-
tion analysis in (59ii) in that the latter introduces a λ-abstract over degrees, those
that a measure function maps individuals to. The individual-degree relation analy-
sis, in effect, properly contains the measure function analysis. That is to say, the
function tall embedded in (59ii) is identical to that in (59i): both map individuals
to their (unique) heights. By introducing ‘<’, one is able to quantify over all of the
degrees on the relevant scale that are ordered below the individual’s height.
(59) i. JtallmfK = λx.tall(x) 〈e, d〉
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ii. JtallidrK = λdλx.tall(x) < d 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉
The two analyses are often paired with different assumptions about the syntax
of degree phrases, although they are in principle independent. The first relevant
distinction concerns whether a comparative morpheme like -er or as first combines
with the than or as clause, or first with the adjective. Bhatt & Pancheva (2004)
contrast the classical constituency analysis (citing Chomsky 1965, Selkirk 1970,
Bresnan 1973, and Heim 2000), and the non-classical constituency analysis
(citing Abney 1987, Larson 1988a, Corver 1990, 1993, and Kennedy 1999, 2002).
The classical constituency is typically paired with the semantics in (59ii), while the
non-classical is typically paired with (59i). I return to the “independence” remark
shortly.










They are also usually paired with different assumptions about the interpre-
tation of the comparative morpheme, e.g. -er in (60). The denotation in (60i)
combines with a measure function-denoting expression, then with the interpretation
of the than-clause (type 〈d〉). That in (60ii) combines with a function of type 〈d, t〉,
the interpretation of the than-clause on this account, and that of the matrix clause.
(60) i. J-ermfK = λgλdλx.g(x)  d 〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
ii. J-eridrK = λDλD′.max(D′)  max(D) 〈〈d, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉
Creating the matrix clause 〈d, t〉 predicate marks the second important dis-
tinction: whether expressions like -er or as undergo Quantifier Raising (QR; Lakoff
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1970, May 1977, Heim & Kratzer 1998) in the matrix clause. Kennedy (1999) shows
that, unlike existentially quantified noun phrases (e.g. a recent supernova) and dis-
tributive quantifiers (e.g. every student in Semantics 1), comparative morphemes
do not show scope ambiguities with respect to negation. He concludes that there is
not sufficient evidence for treating them as scopally mobile expressions.
Heim (2000) argues that the facts may be more subtle than Kennedy supposes.
She offers examples like those in (61a) and (61b) (crediting Stateva 2000 for the
latter). The sentence in (61a) can be understood as expressing that the relevant
paper is not allowed to be longer than 15 pages (so it could be less than 15 pages
long), or that the shortest it’s allowed to be is 15 pages (so it is allowed to be 15
pages or longer). A similar pair of readings are possible for (61b): on one reading,
the paper is not allowed to be longer than 10 pages, and on another, it is equivalent
to “the paper is not required to be as long as that” (Heim 2000:10).20
(61) Context: The draft of the paper is 10 pages long.
a. The paper is required to be exactly 5 pages longer than that.
b. The paper is required to be less long than that.
As Heim points out, such ambiguities are expected if the comparative mor-
pheme is able to take scope under or above the intensional verb require. That can
be made possible by positing that expressions like -er can QR: if there are landing
sites both below and above the matrix verb, then these expressions can take scope
accordingly.
Considering scope issues, the QR approach would appear to overgenerate (it
predicts scopal ambiguities that are not observed; Kennedy 1999) while the non-QR
approach would appear to undergenerate (it predicts no scopal ambiguities, which
appear to have been observed, depending on how the explanation of the facts in (61)
20See also Heim 2006, 2008 for discussion of less and negative adjectives like short in such
contexts. I discuss antonymy and less briefly in Chapter 7.
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ultimately works out). Separately from this question, since this dissertation does
not deal with matters of scope, choosing between a QR and non-QR approach will
have little effect.
With respect to constituency, each analysis succeeds in some places and not in
others. The QR approach to -er is incompatible with the non-classical constituency
analysis; by favoring the non-classical analysis, it does not need to posit a rule
of obligatory extraposition (Bresnan 1973) to explain the necessary linear distance
between -er and the than-clause, contrast (62a) and (62b). Establishing the semantic
relationship between those two expressions can be captured by a rule of covert late
merger (Bhatt & Pancheva 2004; though see Grosu & Horvath 2006 and Larson &
Wellwood under review for critical discussion).
(62) a. Al is more intelligent than Bill is.
b. * Al is more than Bill is intelligent.
In contrast, the measure function approach is compatible with either con-
stituency analysis; the denotation for -er on this approach can be given with the
degree argument first or second, as maintained so far here. Regardless of that
choice, the measure function-based analysis of GAs in concert with the interpre-
tation it posits for -er will have to posit obligatory extraposition in some cases.
Consider the comparative in (63) with an attributive (i.e., prenominal) adjective. If
the than-clause is to be even the second argument of -er, it must be local to that
expression at some stage of the derivation; however, on the surface, it is dislocated
to the right of the noun.21,22
21Alternatives are possible; Alrenga et al. 2012 QRs the than-clause, Larson & Wellwood under
review offer an account in which the than-clause is always base generated at a distance.
22R. Schwarzschild (p.c.) points out that it is more standard to say that -er combines with
hot coffee, motivated by the fact that (i) is odd, because it entails (ii) (he notes that Chomsky
1965:234, fn.36 cites Brandon Qualls for this point). The contrasting data point is that, with more
and clever postposed with respect to the nominal (iii), the same implication does not obtain.
i. I’ve never met a more clever man than Mary.
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(63) Al drank hotter coffee than Bill did.
i. [ [ [ hot -er ] thanP ] coffee ] base generation
ii. [ [ [ hot -er ] coffee ] thanP ] surface order
Finally, there is a further difference between the two accounts, regarding
whether they posit an additional morpheme, i.e. the one Kennedy calls abs, in
the than-clause. On the individual-degree relation analysis, the covert wh-operator
feeds a degree-interpreted trace to the GA directly. Since the measure function anal-
ysis fails to syntactically-represent degree variable that can be abstracted over by
the null operator in such clauses, some other expression must introduce it. As noted
above, it is likely that this expression can be motivated based on ellipsis licensing
considerations.
At the level of sentential complexity that will be involved in this dissertation,
the two accounts are effectively interchangeable. To see this, consider a derivation
of the sentence in (65) on the individual-degree relation analysis.
(64) Al is taller than Bill is.
(64) has the structure in (65) on e.g. Bhatt & Pancheva’s (2004) theory. There
are two important features that differentiate this representation from that we saw
in the preceding section: (i) there is no abs in the than-clause, (ii) the than head is
uninterpreted, and (iii) -er has raised from its position in the matrix clause, leaving
an index i that is interpreted as a trigger for Predicate Abstraction.23
ii. Mary is a man.
iii. I’ve never met a man more clever than Mary.
The present text places -er directly next to the GA uniformly, so that they may semantically
combine without issue given the assumptions laid out in this chapter: only this will guarantee a
comparison by temperature for hotter coffee, excluding unattested readings e.g. by volume; see
Chapter 3. This raises the question of the entailment from (i) to (ii), which I am not able to resolve
here.
23Note that, with this representation, an op-less index triggers the rule of Predicate Abstraction.













The interpretation is derived as in (66). The result is that an utterance of a
sentence like (65) is predicted to be judged true just in case the greatest degree to
which Al is tall is greater than the greatest degree to which Bill is tall; i.e., just
in case the degree representing Al’s height is greater than that representing Bill’s
height. By design, in such simple cases the two accounts are truth-conditionally
equivalent.
(66) i. JA1PKA = λx.tall(x) < d FA
ii. JS1KA = > iff tall(Bill) < A(i) (i),FA
iii. JopPKA:Ai→d = λd.tall(Bill) < d (ii),PA
iv. JDegPKA = λD.max(D)  max(λd.tall(Bill) < d) (iii),FA
v. JA2PKA = λx.tall(x) < A(j) FA
vi. JS2PKA = > iff tall(x) < A(j) (vi),FA
vii. JXPKA:Aj→d′ = λd′.tall(Al) < d′ (vii),PA
viii. JS3KA = > iff max(λd′.tall(Al) < d′)  max(λd.tall(Bill) < d)
Despite this, there are non-trivial differences between the two approaches. In
terms of appeal to distinct lexical primitives, the individual-degree relation approach
posits less. In terms of interpreting the morphemes that are present in the sentence,
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the measure function approach interprets more. The accounts make different pre-
dictions when it comes to matters of scope and word order. The explanation of
these phenomena are, however, neither settled, nor will they play a role in this dis-
sertation. Consequently, I continue to make use of the measure function analysis.
My major reason for this choice is aesthetic: it keeps the syntactic structures that
I interpret closer to the surface syntax. Moreover, since this analysis is typically
paired with the non-classical constituency analysis, I assume that syntax as well.
In the next section, I introduce my assumptions about the denotations of
verbs and their arguments. This will lead us to see how the standard theory as
I have drawn it can be extended to comparatives with gradable adverbs and with
attributive adjectives.
2.3.4. Composition: adverbs
The derivation of adverbial comparatives is parallel to that of comparatives
with gradable adjectives once certain assumptions are made about the denotations
of verbs. As stated above, I assume the neodavidsonian framework for verbs, in
which they denote predicates of events. However, for simplicity, I do not assume
total separation, in which the denotations of subjects and objects are related to the
verb meaning separately.
One advantage of incorporating the neodavidsonian framework is that it allows
the interpretation of comparative morphemes to remain relatively unchanged from
their adjectival occurrences. They require only the generalization in (67), in which
the individual arguments labeled x in (50) have been replaced with α to indicate
neutrality with respect to individuals and events. abs is similarly generalized, (68).
(67) Comparative morphemes (final version)
i. J-er/moreK = λgλdλα.g(α)  d
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ii. JasK = λdλgλα.g(α) < d
(68) Absolute morpheme (final version)
JabsK = λgλdλα.g(α) < d
Gradable adverbs are assigned the denotations in (69). Like gradable adjec-
tives, they denote functions whose range is (some subset of) the domain of degrees
Dd, the only difference is that they take event arguments of type v.
24
(69) Gradable adverbs (‘standard’)
i. JfastK = λe.fast(e) 〈v, d〉
ii. JloudlyK = λe.loudly(e)
The ranges of these functions are elements of the scales associated with the
GAs, as before. For instance, the scale associated with JfastK can be represented
as in (70i), and the scale associated with JloudlyK can be represented as in (70ii).
Dspeed consists in degrees representing measures of speed, and Dloudly in degrees
representing measures of loudness. These degrees are such that it is sensible to say,
of some d ∈ Dspeed, that it is 6 mph, or of some d ∈ Dloudness, that it 88 dB. The
‘<’s are total orderings over the respective sorts of degrees.
(70) i. 〈D<speed ,<speed〉
ii. 〈D<loudness ,<loudness〉
In contrast, non-gradable adverbs like hourly are assigned denotations like
those in (71): they are functions from events e to truth values. Their denotations
do not reference scales.
(71) Non-gradable adverbs
JhourlyK = λe.hourly(e) 〈v, t〉
24The semantics of adverbs is potentially much more complex; see relevant discussion in Taylor
1977a, Ernst 1984, 2000, Tenny & Pustejovsky 2000, Piñón 2005, and Rawlins 2013. However, as
I focus only on gradability in this dissertation, I adopt the given minimal representations.
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Thus, I assume that the (simplified) syntax in (73) underlies the matrix clause
of the adverbial comparative in (19a), repeated here as (72). The v head projected
between the verb and the subject relates events with their Agents (Marantz 1984,
Chomsky 1995, Kratzer 1996, Pylkkänen 2002, a.o.), and interpreted here as in (74).











The interpretation of (73) is derived as in (75), ignoring tense, and abbreviating
the contribution of the than clause using δ.
(75) i. JDeg2’K = λd′λe′.fast(e′)  d′ FA
ii. JDeg2PK = λe′.fast(e′)  δ (i),FA
iii. JVPK = λe′.run(e′) & fast(e′)  δ (ii),PM
iv. JvPK = λxλe′.Agent(e′)(x) & run(e′) & fast(e′)  δ (iii),EI
v. JS2K = λe′.Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & fast(e′)  δ (iv),FA
vi. = > iff ∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & fast(e′)  δ (v),∃
The structure of the than-clause of (73) is as in (76), and its interpretation is










(77) i. JDeg1’KA = λdλe.fast(e) < d FA
ii. JDeg1PKA = λe.fast(e) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
iii. JVPKA = λe.run(e) & fast(e) < A(i) (ii),PM
iv. JvPKA = λxλe.Agent(e)(x) & run(e) & fast(e) < A(i) (iii),EI
v. JS1KA = λe.Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < A(i) (iv),FI
vi. = > iff ∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < A(i)] (v),∃
vii. JopPKA:Ai→d = λd.∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < d] (vi),PA
viii. JthanPKA = ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < d]] (vii),FA
Putting the two together, the result is as in (78). This logical form encodes
the prediction that an utterance of (73) will be judged true just in case there is an
event of Al running, the speed-measure of which is greater than the speed-measure
of Bill’s running. This accords with intuition.25
(78) JAl ran faster than Bill didKA =
> iff ∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & fast(e′) 
25There is some question that the condition in (78) (and ones below) may be too weak. Without
maximizing on the events picked out by the matrix clause, (78) might be predicted to be judged
true in a context where, for only a very small portion of the (relevant) event under discussion, did
John run faster than Bill, etc. Ultimately, one may want to include reference to a maximization
function of perfective aspect (see e.g.Filip 2008; Filip & Rothstein 2005).
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ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < d]]]
Deriving the interpretation of comparatives with gradable adverbs differs from
those with gradable adjectives so far in that they combine conjunctively with the
predicate denoting the events they measure. However, there is a construction where
it appears that gradable adjectives so combine as well: attributive adjectival con-
structions. To sketch their structure and interpretation, I first need to establish how
mass and plural nouns combine with verbs.
2.4. Verbs and objects
The question of how mass and plural nouns are interpreted is not a trivial or
easy one. Above, I discussed the general approach adopted here for how objects
combine with verbs: namely, by function application. I assumed that the Agent role
of a verbal predicate like run is introduced by the v head in combination with the rule
of Event Identification (and see Chapter 4 for an extension to stative predicates),
while maintaining the non-separation analysis of internal arguments. The goal of
this section will be to establish a good foundation for the interpretation of sentences
like that in (79), where the internal argument is an apparently bare mass or plural
noun.
(79) Al drank hotter coffee/s than Bill did.
To set up the issue, consider the hypothesized interpretation of the transi-
tive verb drink in (80): it expresses a relation between drinking events e involving




Table 2.3: Different options for linking bare plurals and mass nouns to verbs de-
pending on basic denotative type (referring or predicative).
mass or bare plural interpretation major proponents
referring expressions, type e
kinds Parsons 1970, Carlson 1977
mode: type shift Chierchia 1998b, 2010
fusions Higginbotham 1994
predicates, type 〈e, t〉
properties Cartwright 1975, Pelletier 1974
mode: covert indefinite determiner Gillon 1992
mode: existential closure
by the verb van Geenhoven 1996, McNally 1995
by type shift Krifka 2003 (building on Partee 1987)
Now consider drink in the context of the sentences in (81a) and (81b). There
are a number of traditional ways of analyzing the definite description in (81a),
all of which, even when combined with the event analysis, will ultimately deliver
something of type e to saturate the y variable of drink in (80). (81a) may be
paraphrased as there is some definite quantity of coffee/s that Al drank. (81b) is
not definite in the same way, seemingly paraphrasable as there is some quantity of
coffee/s that Al drank.
(81) a. Al drank the coffee/coffees (that I prepared for him).
b. Al drank coffee/coffees (all day yesterday).
But then what about the analysis of the mass noun/bare plural occurrences like
those in (81b)? An array of semantic options are presented in Table 2.3, arranged
by the basic contrast between whether they are, lexically, referring expressions of
type e, or whether they denote predicates of type 〈e, t〉.
For the purposes of this dissertation, coffee must be of predicative type before
it is of type e. That is, in (79), the measure function denoted by hot needs access to
what is coffee in the context, not merely the (abstract) kind coffee. This prevents
me from adopting Chierchia’s (1998, 2010) kind-based theory (building on, but
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departing from Carlson 1977). On Chierchia’s theory, instances of the kind can be
made accessible once the verb combines with the kind-denoting expression, via the
rule of Derived Kind Predication. This rule applies in case a verb is looking for an
entity of type e but receives a kind of type k instead.26
Krifka (2003) argues that we needn’t decide, once and for all, whether bare
plurals and mass nouns are covert indefinites/quantifiers or kind-denoting terms. He
hypothesizes that they just denote properties of type 〈e, t〉, and employs type-shifters
to lift them to the appropriate type (indefinite/quantificational or kind-denoting)
as required by the linguistic context. For present purposes, the relevant type shift
is Partee’s ∃ (82). On the Krifkean view, the noun starts out life as type 〈e, t〉,
but in existential contexts is lifted to take the verb (of type 〈e, t〉) as an argument,
simultaneously binding its own individual variable. Such a solution is elegant, but
it has not yet been extended to the context of event semantics.
(82) Partee’s ∃ type-shift
If a noun phrase denotes a formula like [λx : x ∈ De.X(x)] of type 〈e, t〉, it
may be rewritten as:
λP : P ∈ D〈e,t〉.∃y[X(y) & P (y)].
Alternatively, Cartwright (1975), Link (1983), Higginbotham (1994), and Land-
man (2000) offer different forms of ‘fusion’ or ‘sum’ operators that combine with a
predicate, just in case that predicate denotes in a (partially ordered) set. These
operators share that they return the least upper bound, or supremum of such sets.
However, such approaches don’t straightforwardly work in non-generic contexts,
such as the case of hotter coffee than Bill drank. If the coffee that Al drank and
the coffee that Bill drank are both represented as “the sum/fusion of coffee in the
context”, then they should have drunk (i) the same coffee and (ii) all the coffee,
26There is a further question, namely how Derived Kind Predication applies in the case of the
event analysis. I am not sure if this framework has been extended in that direction.
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which is going to be false for most utterances, contrary to intuitions.
The remaining option is the silent determiner approach, and this is what I will
adopt. There are (at least) two ways this silent determiner could be interpreted: as
a quantifier equivalent to the denotation of some (i.e., undergoing QR from its base
position, leaving a trace of type e that can act as the internal argument of the verb)
or as a choice function (i.e., a choice of an entity of type e from the extension of a
predicate of type 〈e, t〉). I believe that either of these will get the meaning right,
though I will opt for a choice function-like interpretation.
In (83), I use the character ε to suggest Hilbert’s (1921[1922]) operator. ε is
the indefinite counterpart of ι, the definite description operator, which differs in that
it doesn’t presuppose uniqueness of the entity chosen in a context of utterance.27
More along the lines suggested by Hintikka (1974), and followed up in discourse
representation theories (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982), ‘εx’ prefixed to an expression of
type 〈e, t〉 over x is a term of type e. εx[P (x)] is read as ‘some x such that P (x)’, with
εx[coffee(x)] read as ‘some x such that x is a portion of coffee’, and abbreviated
‘some portion of coffee x’.28
(83) little-e
JeK = λP ∈ D〈e,t〉.εx[P (x)] type 〈〈e, t〉, e〉
Apart from the modifications that may be required to accommodate measure
functions and events, linking the interpretation of mass and bare plural arguments
to verbs can in principle be carried out in any of the ways discussed in this section.
27The formulation in the text is like that of Bierwisch 1989, for whom ε is understood as equiv-
alent to an existential quantifier. According to von Heusinger 1997, Schröter 1956 proposed the
interpretation of Hilbert’s ε as a choice function, and Asser 1957 formulated this in detail; Slater
1988 argued that the interpretation of Hilbert’s ε as an indefinite as opposed to definite operator
is misguided. Von Heusinger 1997 uses ε for a definitely-interpreted choice function operator, and
η for the indefinitely-interpreted. In all other respects, my discussion follows that of von Heusinger
1997.
28Note, in what follows I abstract away from two problems: that of empty domains, and the
issues that motivate a quantificational analysis of some, e.g. negation: If Al says Bill drank some
coffee and Sue says That is false, Sue is committed to Bill’s having drunk no coffee. Thanks to A.
Williams (p.c.) for clarifying these points.
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Adopting the last approach in terms of an operator like ε requires the fewest modi-
fications to the original formulation to be suitable for present purposes. With these
pieces in place, we can see one way of deriving the interpretation of comparative
constructions with attributive adjectives.
2.4.1. Composition: attributive adjectives
While the syntax of comparatives with attributive adjectives has been inves-
tigated to some extent (Kennedy 2000, and references therein), less has been said
about their semantics. However, I believe that they can be easily accommodated
within the present system, given the assumptions just laid out about how verbs and
objects compose. The relevant example from the beginning of the preceding section
is reproduced in (84). It expresses a comparison between the temperature of the
coffee Al drank with the temperature of the coffee Bill drank.
(84) Al drank hotter coffee than Bill did.
I assume with the predicate analysis of mass nouns that coffee denotes a pred-
icate of type 〈e, t〉, as in (85). For now, I continue to assume that hot denotes a
measure function of type 〈e, d〉.
(85) JcoffeeK = λx.coffee(x) type 〈e, t〉
As discussed above, the surface syntax of sentences like (84) belies an under-
lying structure wherein the than-clause is actually base generated next to hotter.
Let’s assume that this underlying structure is what is compositionally interpreted
(though see fn. 22 for important discussion).29 Thus, I posit the underlying syntax
29Bresnan 1973 has a structure like that reported in the text, as noted above; she posits oblig-
atory extraposition of than and as clauses universally. See also the discussion in Heim 2000. If
the underlying syntax were in fact primarily (as opposed to derivatively) like that in (i), the se-
mantics given in Alrenga et al. 2012 and Larson & Wellwood under review can accommodate such
structures, while that in the text cannot, without modification.
i. [ [ [ hot -er ] coffee ] thanP ]
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of the matrix clause of (84) is as in (86), and derive its interpretation as in (87),











(87) i. JDeg2’K = λdλx.hot(x)  d FA
ii. JDeg2PK = λx.hot(x)  δ (i),FA
iii. JN2PK = λx.coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ (ii),PM
iv. Je2PK = εx[coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ] (iii),FA
v. JV2PK = λe.drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ]) (iv),FA
vi. Jv2PK = λxλe.Agent(e)(x) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ]) (v),EI
vii. JS2PK = λe.Agent(e)(Al) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ])
(vi),FA
viii. = > iff ∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x)  δ])]
(vii),∃
Noteworthy in this derivation is that hotterδ combines with coffee via Predicate
Modification. In comparative constructions with copular adjectives, the measurand
(i.e., the denotation of a subject like Al) combines with the measure function via
Functional Application. The interpretation derived in (87viii) is an existential state-
ment about drinking events involving some quantity of coffee whose temperature-
measure is greater than δ, and whose Agent is Al.
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The structure of the than-clause that I assume is as in (88), and its corre-
sponding interpretation derived in (89). The interpretation in (89j) is a definite











(89) a. JDeg1’KA = λdλx′.hot(x′) < d FA
b. JDeg1PKA = λx′.hot(x′) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
c. JN1PKA = λx′.coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i) (ii),PM
d. Js1PKA = εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i)] (iii),FA
e. JV1PKA = λe′.drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i)]) (iv),FA
f. Jv1PKA = λy′λe′.Agent(e′)(y′) & drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i)])
(v),EI
g. JS1KA =
λe′.Agent(e′)(Bill) & drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i)]) (vi),FA
h. =
> iff ∃e′[Agent(e′)(Bill) & drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < A(i)])] (vii),∃
i. JopPKA:Ai→d =
λd.∃e[Agent(e′)(Bill) & drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < d])] (viii),PA
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j. JthanPKA =
ιd[∃e′[Agent(e′)(Bill) & drink(e′)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < d])] (xi),FA
Putting the two together, the result is as in (90). This logical form encodes
the prediction that an utterance of (84) will be judged true in a context just in case
Al was the agent of a drinking event involving coffee whose temperature-measure
was greater than that of the coffee involved in a drinking event by Bill.
(90) JAl drank hotter coffee than Bill didK = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & drink(e′)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx′[coffee(x′) & hot(x′) < d])]])]
2.5. Taking stock
The derivation of comparatives with adjectives and adverbs are perfectly par-
allel, once certain assumptions are made about the interpretations of verb phrases.
GAs are uniformly assigned the type 〈η, d〉, where η is used to indicate neutrality
between entities in De and Dv. Gradable adjectives take the entity denoted by
the subject of a copular predication as an argument, or combine conjunctively with
noun phrases in attributive adjectival comparatives, measuring those entities along
various dimensions. Gradable adverbs combine conjunctively with (the characteris-
tic function of) a set of events, once the Agent role is separated, measuring those
events along various dimensions.
The theory outlined in this chapter represents an extension of the standard
theory in one of its manifestations (i.e., the measure function analysis), though it was
shown how to intertranslate this version with its alternatives. The theory accounts
for interpretable comparatives by assigning a measure function-type to GAs, and a
measure function-taking-type to comparative morphemes. Anomalous comparatives
are accounted for by a type mismatch between the type of comparative morphemes
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and that of non-gradable adjectives and adverbs. Those expressions denote simple
properties of individuals or events.
What we have not yet seen so far is comparative constructions like more coffee
and run more, where there does not appear to be a GA mediating the relationship
between the comparative morpheme and the noun or verb. Normally, it is said
that such constructions contain an expression, much, that has the semantics of
a GA, whether it is pronounced or not (e.g., contrast more coffee and as much
coffee). If this expression contributes a measure function in comparatives with
nouns and verbs, then, expressions of such categories are non-gradable, simpliciter.
They denote measurands, not measurers.
In the next chapter, I explore the interpretation of comparatives with nouns
and verbs, further extending the theory developed in this chapter to account for
them. I show that such constructions have surprising properties that render them,
at least superficially, quite different from comparatives with GAs.
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Chapter 3: Nominal and verbal comparatives
On the standard account, mass nouns like coffee and atelic verbs like sleep
do not denote measure functions (or individual-degree relations). This hypothesis
finds support in the morphosyntactic asymmetry evidenced between the comparative
constructions in (91) and those in (92): with coffee and run, the expression much
appears, while with tall and fast, it cannot. A natural hypothesis to account for
such data is that much itself denotes a measure function of some sort. This chapter1
offers an account of much along these lines.
(91) a. Al drank as much coffee as Bill did.
b. Al ran as much as Bill did.
(92) a. * Al is as much tall as Bill is.
b. * Al ran as much fast as Bill did.
As we will see, however, the interpretation of much is interestingly different
from that of GAs: it routinely invokes variable measure functions, so long as the
measured domain meets certain conditions.
I first discuss the interpretation of nominal and verbal comparatives, offering
an account of their semantics that combines ideas from the standard theory with an
explicit account of the conditions on the interpretation of much. I conclude with a
discussion of the wider distribution of much in English, and alternative proposals for
its semantics. This will provide a nice segue into the reevaluation of the standard
1Developing ideas found in Wellwood et al. 2012 and Wellwood 2012a.
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theory that follows in Chapter 4.
3.1. Basic data
This section introduces the basic properties of comparative constructions with
nouns and verbs. I emphasize their distribution and interpretation, detailing in
particular the relevance of the mass/count and telicity distinctions in comparative
constructions: only mass or atelic expressions are compatible with the semantics of
comparative morphemes. Following this discussion, I posit that this pattern is the
result of how much interacts with the denotational domains of such expressions.
3.1.1. Noun phrases
Unlike gradable adjectives, nouns in English appear with -er and as only via
the mediation of much.2 Intuitively, (93a)-(93b) express that the amount of coffee
Al drank/rock she found strictly exceeds that of Bill’s coffee/rock, and (93c)-(93d)
express that Al’s amount meets or exceeds Bill’s amount.
(93) a. Al drank more coffee than Bill did. comparative
b. Al found more rock than Bill did.
c. Al drank as much coffee as Bill did. equative
d. Al found as much rock as Bill did.
As before, I present the other comparative constructions, although they will
not be addressed in detail here; the points I make will extend to these cases.
(94) a. Al drank too much coffee to be ready to sleep. excessive
b. Al found too much rock to carry home.
2Again, more is assumed to be much+-er (Bresnan 1973); Chapter 4 breaks this assumption
down.
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c. Al drank enough coffee to stay awake. assetive
d. Al found enough rock to be able to share.
e. Al drank the most coffee of any of the students. superlative
f. Al found the most rock of any of the girls.
Such is the behavior of mass nouns like coffee and rock. This behavior contrasts
with that of nouns like idea and traffic cone. While it is intuitively clear that
more/as much idea in (95a)-(95b) could in principle express something about ‘an
idea of greater profundity’, such readings are not available. This is not just a
problem with abstract nouns, as (95c)-(95d) serve to illustrate: these examples are
sensical only to the extent that traffic cone can be understood as denoting a kind
of stuff. It appears at first blush that this is a similar distinction to that between
gradable and non-gradable adjectives: some expressions are perfectly natural and
interpretable in the comparative, while others are odd, and coercive at best. The
comparative disallows characteristically ‘count’ noun interpretations as it disallows
characteristically ‘absolute’ adjective interpretations.
(95) a. ? Al has more idea than Bill does.
b. ? Al has as much idea as Bill does.
c. ? This street has more traffic cone than that one does.
d. ? This street has as much traffic cone as that one does.
Importantly, count nouns like idea and traffic cone are perfectly natural in
nominal comparative constructions if they are plural-marked, (96). I discuss such
cases in detail in Chapter 5.
(96) a. Al has more ideas than Bill does.
b. This street has more traffic cones than that one does.
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Semantically, what appears to distinguish (interpretable) nominal comparative
constructions from GA comparative constructions is the existence of what has been
dubbed a monotonicity constraint on their interpretation.
Schwarzschild (2002, 2006) identified this constraint in his consideration of a
wide variety of constructions, among which are much with a partitive NP (97a) and
the excessive (too much) with mass nouns (97b).3 He observed two major patterns:
(i) such constructions allow for variable dimensions for measurement, and (ii) this
variability is interestingly constrained. For example, (97a) and (97b) can express
comparisons of amounts of coffee weight or by volume, but neither can express
comparisons by temperature.
(97) a. Al didn’t buy much of our coffee.
b. Al bought too much coffee.
Schwarzschild suggests that part of the meaning of the nominals in (97a)-
(97b) is a contextually-determined measure function, selected from among just those
whose dimensions for measurement respect the part-whole structure of e.g. JcoffeeK
(Cartwright 1975, Link 1983, Chierchia 1998a, among many others, discuss the
relevance of part-whole relations in the nominal domain in detail). I will first discuss
the work captured by this appeal to ontology in the semantics of mass and count
nouns, and then return to Schwarzschild’s monotonicity generalization.
A popular way of capturing the felt difference between mass and count nouns
is by positing structural differences in their domains of application. Mass nouns
tend to show cumulative reference: if JcoffeeK applies to two portions of matter,
then it also applies to the mereological sum of those portions, (98a).4 In contrast,
(singularly-interpreted) count nouns tend to show quantized reference: if Ja cupK
3He mainly focuses on pseudopartitives (20 ounces of water) and attributive measure phrase
constructions (20 degree water), which I do not discuss here.
4They also tend to show the property of divisiveness/homogeneity, e.g. if JcoffeeK applies to a
portion of stuff, it also applies to a proper part of that stuff. See Zucchi & White 2001 for critical
discussion, including counterexamples like twig, sequence, etc.
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applies to a given object, it fails to apply to any of its (relevant) proper parts, (99a).5
Expressions displaying cumulative reference are thus often modeled as having a
domain structured by the part-of relation, while those displaying quantized reference
are said to lack such structure.
(98) Nominal cumulativity
a. > If this is coffee and that is coffee, their sum is coffee.
b. ⊥ If this is a cup, and that is a cup, their sum is a cup.
(99) Nominal quantization
a. ⊥ If this is water, then no proper subpart of it is water.
b. > If this is a cup, then no proper subpart of it is a cup.
Now, a given measure function µ is “monotonic” in Schwarzschild’s sense just
in case, for any two things that are (properly) ordered in a part-of relation, their
measurements are similarly ordered. Krifka (1989) discusses similar patterns in
terms of a restriction to “extensive” measure functions; Higginbotham (1994) gives
a semantics (for e.g., Much water spilled) with appeal to additive measure functions.
Nakanishi’s (2007) discussion of measurement in the nominal and verbal domains
in Japanese follows Schwarzschild’s formulation, as I will here,6 although reference
to binary relations or operations will ultimately be important for how we formalize
measurement in semantics (see Klein 1991 for extensive discussion).
Schwarzschild’s monotonicity condition can be stated as in (100). For reasons
that will become clear below, I state monotonicity relative to the domain of an or-
dering, rather than to a predicate. Observe that the relation that must be preserved
5Crucially, for these tests it is imperative that nouns be presented in a mass or count context,
since otherwise coercive effects intrude on the judgments. Also, there is always an idealization
made for quantization, e.g. we have to imagine a “normal” cup, since a cup made out of cups
would fail quantization.
6Champollion 2010 offers an alternative account of Schwarzschild’s generalizations in terms of
his Stratified Reference theory.
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here is the strict ordering, ≺: if we required only that 4 was preserved, mappings
from JcoffeeK to degrees of temperature would be incorrectly permitted (e.g., for
two portions of coffee, a and b, it may be that a 4 b and a 6= b, while nonetheless
temperature(a) = temperature(b)).7
(100) Monotonicity (first version)
A measure function µ : D4Part 7→ D≤Deg is monotonic iff:
for all x, y ∈ D4Part , if x ≺Part y, then µ(x) ≺Deg µ(y).
To see what this restriction amounts to, consider a portion of coffee, a, and
two of its proper subparts, a′, a′′. All of a, a′ and a′′ necessarily measure some degree
e.g. of volume, weight, and temperature, but only degrees of volume or weight can
be invoked by (101). Importantly, the sum a necessarily measures a greater degree
of volume or weight than that of the parts a′ and a′′; they (normally) have the same
degree of temperature. The temperature dimension thus represents non-monotonic
measurement on such a domain.
(101) a. Al has more coffee than Bill does. *temp, vol
b. Al has as much coffee as Bill does. *temp, vol
To express a comparison of portions of coffee along a dimension like tempera-
ture, one must use a GA like hot as in (102).
(102) a. Al has hotter coffee than Bill does. temp, *vol
b. Al has as hot (of) coffee as Bill does. temp, *vol
Part of the meaning of nominal comparative constructions is something that
ensures only monotonic dimensions for measurement are available for a given com-
parison. This generalization can be naturally captured on accounts that appeal to
7Nakanishi (2007), citing an anonymous reviewer of her paper, notes a further requirement for
conditions like (100) to be sufficient, namely that there be two distinct elements that are so ordered.
58
mereological structure in the domain of application for expressions like coffee: this
provides just the structures that monotonicity can be stated over. Furthermore,
nominal comparatives (at least those we have seen so far) are not compatible with
singularly-interpreted count nouns, whose domains are often understood to lack such
structure.
Ultimately, I will propose that these properties (the naturalness of mass nouns
in comparatives, the unnaturalness of count nouns here) are the result of the inter-
pretation of much. After discussing what I will suggest are analogous patterns in
the verbal domain, I formalize the mereological interpretation of mass and count
nouns, which sets us up for a formalization of the interpretation of much.
3.1.2. Verb phrases
It has often been argued that the distinction between atelic and telic verb
phrases closely parallels that between mass and count nouns (Mourelatos 1978,
Hoepelman & Rohrer 1980, Bach 1986, Krifka 1989, Rothstein 2004, Borer 2005a,
a.o.).8 Telic verb phrases like run to the park or eat two apples include informa-
tion about the termination of their expressed events: namely, when the runner has
arrived at the park, or when the two apples are eaten. In contrast, atelic verb
phrases like run in the park or eat apples do not include information about their
events’ termination. As we will see, this distinction affects how measurement and
comparison are understood in the verbal domain.
The semantic difference between the two types of verb phrases can be seen
in how they are interpreted in the context of temporal modifiers. With run in the
park or eat apples as in (103), the modifier can be used to express that an event
of a certain type occurred over the course of 5 minutes, and says nothing about
8See Ryle 1949, Kenny 1963, Vendler 1957, Verkuyl 1972, Mourelatos 1978, Dowty 1979, Parsons
1990, Filip 2004, 2011 for discussion of telicity. Borer 1998, 2005b, Ritter & Rosen 1998, Ramchand
1997, 2003, van Hout 2000, and Kratzer 2004 discuss structural factors in determining telicity.
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whether that duration marks completion of the event. In contrast, with run to the
park or eat two apples, such an interpretation is odd: (104) rather seem to express
that an event of a certain type iterated over the course of 5 minutes, with pauses
in between the (completed) events. Atelic event descriptions show the interpretive
pattern in (103) and telic event descriptions that in (104).
(103) a. Al ran in the park for 5 minutes.
b. Al ate apples for 5 minutes.
(104) a. ? Al ran to the park for 5 minutes.
b. ? Al ate two apples for 5 minutes.
In contrast, a modifier like in 5 minutes combined with telic verb phrases as
in (105) can express that an event of a certain sort lasted the course of 5 minutes.
The corresponding examples with atelic verb phrases are odd, (106).
(105) a. Al ran to the park in 5 minutes.
b. Al ate two apples in 5 minutes.
(106) a. ? Al ran in the park in 5 minutes.
b. ? Al ate apples in 5 minutes.
Atelic verb phrases appear with -er and as along with an expression like much.
(107a)-(107b) express that the amount Al ran/slept strictly exceeds that of Bill, and
(107c)-(107d) express that Al’s amount meets or exceeds Bill’s amount.
(107) a. Al ran more than Bill did. comparative
b. Al slept more than Bill did.
c. Al ran as much as Bill did. equative
d. Al slept as much as Bill did.
The other comparative constructions are similar, as can be seen in (108).
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(108) a. Al ran too much to feel refreshed. excessive
b. Al slept too much to feel refreshed.
c. Al ran enough to feel refreshed. assetive
d. Al slept enough to feel refreshed.
e. Al ran the most of the team. superlative
f. Al slept the most of her family members.
Telic verb phrases, however, pattern differently. While (107)-(108) can express
comparisons of measures between single events, those in (109) cannot. Conceptually,
one could imagine (109a)-(109b) to express something about e.g. how long the
ceremony lasted, or the students’ GPAs, yet such readings are not available. The
sentences in (109) are only interpretable if they are conceived in terms of comparisons
of numbers of events, which is odd given what we normally think about events like
graduating high school and eating one’s first cupcake.
(109) a. ? Al graduated high school more than Bill did.
b. ? Al graduated high school as much as Bill did.
c. ? Al ate her first cupcake more than Bill did.
d. ? Al ate her first cupcake as much as Bill did.
Some suggestive evidence as to what might underly the variety of ‘coercive’
interpretations of sentences like those in (109) is provided by languages that have
a richer system of aspectual morphology than English. With perfective aspect, an
atelic verb phrase like play is perfectly acceptable in the comparative in Bulgar-
ian, and is interpreted as a comparison of amounts of playing-activity. In contrast,
forming the verbal comparative with a perfective-marked telic verb phrase is un-
grammatical, (111); i.e., such sentences have no interpretation.9
9The Bulgarian data is reported in Wellwood et al. 2012.
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‘Last week, Ivan played more than Maria.’



















‘Last week, Ivan climbed Musala more than Maria.’
In Bulgarian, perfective-marking on a telic verb phrase indicates that the
(bounded) event it expresses is relevantly singular (or at least, non-plural). Impor-
tantly, telic verb phrases with imperfective morphology are grammatical in verbal
comparatives in Bulgarian, (112), and the result interpreted as a comparison of num-
bers of events. Ferreira (2005) has argued that such interpretations of imperfective-
marked verb phrases indicate that the verb phrase is covertly plural-marked; I pick
up on this idea in Chapter 5.





















‘In those days, Ivan climbed Musala more than Maria.’
For present purposes, my interest is in the fact that singularly-interpreted verb
phrases are uninterpretable in the verbal comparative. In English, I showed this by
contrasting comparatives over atelic verb phrases like run in the park, with those
comparing ‘once-only’, telic verb phrases like eat one’s first cupcake. In languages
like Bulgarian, the effect of telicity on the verbal comparative was seen most starkly
by manipulating perfective morphology: here, atelic verb phrases are acceptable, and
interpreted as comparisons of amounts of the given events, and telic verb phrases
are unacceptable.
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Just as the felt difference between mass and count nouns is often encoded as
a difference in their domains of application, so have researchers tended to locate
the felt difference between atelic and telic predicates here—the major difference
being that verbal predicates range over events (entities of type v) as opposed to
individuals (type e; Taylor 1977b, Mourelatos 1978, Hoepelman & Rohrer 1980,
Bach 1986, Link 1987, Krifka 1989, Landman 2000, Rothstein 2004, Borer 2005a,
a.o.). Indeed, like mass nouns, atelic predicates tend to show cumulative reference:
if Jeat applesK applies to two stretches of an event, it also applies to the sum of
those stretches, (113a).10 In contrast, (singularly-interpreted) telic predicates tend
to show quantized reference: if Jeat two applesK applies to a given event, it fails to
apply to any of its (relevant) subparts, (114). In light of this, atelic verb phrases
are analyzed as predicates whose domains are structured by the part-of relation on
events, while the domains of telic predicates lack such structure.
(113) Verbal cumulativity
a. > If this is eat apples and that is eat apples, their sum is eat apples.
b. ⊥ If this is eat two apples and that is eat two apples, their sum is eat
two apples.
(114) Verbal quantization
a. ⊥ If this eat apples, then no proper subpart of it is eat apples.
b. > If this is eat two apples, then no proper subpart of it is eat two apples.
In light of these parallels, the interpretative properties of licit verbal com-
paratives is perhaps more interesting: that is, they manifest their own version of
Schwarzschild’s monotonicity restriction. Recall that, in the nominal domain, only
10It is difficult to show this pattern just with verb phrases like run in the park and run to the
park, because of the difficulty of controlling for aspectual intepretation in English. In Spanish, for
example, the same points about cumulativity and quantization hold if we use such descriptions
with perfective aspect (S. Lago, p.c.).
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dimensions for measurement that tracked part-whole relations on the extension of a
noun like coffee were permitted for comparison: more coffee can express comparisons
by volume or weight, but not by temperature. Larger portions of coffee have larger
measures along monotonic dimensions, this is not necessarily or even likely so when
they are measured along non-monotonic dimensions.
To see monotonicity in the event domain, consider a stretch of some running
event, e, and two of its proper subparts, e′ and e′′. All of e, e′, and e′′ necessarily
measure some degree by e.g. temporal duration, spatial distance, and speed, yet the
sentences in (115) invoke only measures by duration or distance (Nakanishi 2007,
Wellwood et al. 2012). Along such dimensions, the sum e necessarily measures a
greater degree by temporal duration or distance than that of the parts e′ and e′′;
however, arbitrary subparts of a running event may measure the same, a lesser,
or even a greater degree of speed. The speed dimension thus represents a non-
monotonic dimension on events.11
(115) a. Al ran more than Bill did. *speed, dur
b. Al ran as much as Bill did. *speed, dur
To express a comparison of stretches of an event along the speed dimension,
one must use an adverb like fast, as in (116).
(116) a. Al ran faster than Bill did. speed, *dur
b. Al ran as fast as Bill did. speed, *dur
Monotonicity in the verbal domain means that, for any two events that are
(properly) ordered in a part-of relation, their measurements are similarly ordered.
We can thus generalize the statement of the monotonicity condition so that it is
neutral with respect to the type of (at least) individuals and events.
11Importantly, with atelic play in the Bulgarian sentence in (110), the comparison expressed can
only be by temporal duration. It can’t be interpreted as a comparison by e.g. energy expended.
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(117) Monotonicity (final version)
A measure function µ : D4Part 7→ D≤Deg is monotonic iff:
for all α, β ∈ D4Part , if α ≺Part β, then µ(α) ≺Deg µ(β).
The data discussed in this section suggest that part of the meaning of (verbal)
more is something ensuring that only monotonic dimensions for measurement are
available for comparison. Furthermore, verbal comparatives are not compatible
with singularly-interpreted telic VPs. This can be seen, for example, with non-
repeatable predicates like graduate high school in (109) in English. After formalizing
the mereology-based analysis of atelic and telic verb phrases, I give a semantics for
much in §3.3 that captures these patterns.
3.2. Formal preliminaries
This section formalizes the referential properties of noun and verb phrases that
I will assume in this dissertation. Mereology-based approaches are designed to cap-
ture the fact that the domains of some nominal and verbal predicates are cumulative,
while others are quantized. Meanwhile, I will suggest that much combines only with
cumulative predicates. Here, cumulativity is modeled by appeal to structures called
join semi-lattices, and quantization by appeal to a lack of such structures.
3.2.1. Operations
The major distinction to be encoded is that some expressions are most natu-
rally interpreted as cumulative (coffee), and others as quantized (idea). A popular
approach to modeling these interpretations is to posit that the domains of cumu-
lative predicates have the structure of a join semi-lattices (and atomic or anti-
atomic subsets thereof) whereas the domains of quantized predicates have no such
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structure.12
Join semi-lattices are, in set-theoretic terms, just operations (functions that
map ordered pairs of entities to entities) with certain properties. The elements so
paired are members of D◦ for an operation ◦, and the structure as a whole is notated
〈D◦, ◦〉.
An operation can have some or none of the properties idempotence, commu-
tativity, associativity, and closure, among others. I briefly review each of these
properties, giving intuitive examples where possible for illustration.
Idempotence is the property an operation has just in case each element x in
its domain is such that 〈x, x〉 is mapped to x, (118). The operation max on a pair
of numbers is idempotent, since for any n, max(n, n) = n. The operation + on the
domain of natural numbers N is not idempotent—a counter-example is: 1 + 1 6= 1.
(118) An operation ◦ is idempotent iff for all x ∈ D◦, x ◦ x = x.
An operation is commutative just in case switching the order of the elements in
the input pair fails to affect the value under the operation, (119). + is commutative,
since for every n,m ∈ N, m+n = n+m. The operation − on the domain of integers
I is not commutative: a counter-example is 1− 2 6= 2− 1.
(119) An operation ◦ is commutative iff for all x, y ∈ D◦, x ◦ y = y ◦ x.
Associative operations are those for which application of the same operator in
the first or second position of the input pair results in the same output, (120). + is
associative, since for all m,n, p ∈ N, m+(n+p) = (m+n)+p. − is not associative:
a counter-example is 5− (3− 2) 6= 5− (3− 2).
(120) An operation ◦ is associative iff for all x, y, z ∈ D◦, x◦(y◦z) = (x◦y)◦z.
Finally, an operation can have the closure property: for any two elements
12This section owes a great debt to Gillon in prep.
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in the domain of the operation, the pair of those elements has a value under the
operation, (121). + and − are both closed on N and I.
(121) A structure 〈D◦, ◦〉 is closed iff for all x, y ∈ D◦, there is a z ∈ D◦ such that
x ◦ y = z.
Now we can see how to encode the domain of application for coffee as forming
a join semi-lattice. Join semi-lattices are operations that are idempotent, com-
mutative, associative, and closed; such operations are often notated ∨, and called
‘join’. Intuitively, join can be understood in terms of mereological summation (see
esp. Simons 1987), often notated ⊕. ∨ on a set of portions of coffee is idempotent:
taking a portion of coffee x with itself gives you no more, no less than x. It is
commutative, since x taken together with an arbitrary portion of coffee y is the
same whether x or y is taken first. It is also associative, by the same reasoning.
And finally, it is closed, since one can take any two portions of coffee together to
get their sum, which is itself a portion of coffee.
(122) A structure 〈D∨,∨〉 is a join semi-lattice iff it is idempotent, commu-
tative, associative, and closed.
This is how I will model cumulative reference. Previously, we talked about
the denotations of expressions like coffee in terms of the part-of relation. Part-of
relations are binary orders that are reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.13 In
fact, any domain that is so ordered defines a join semi-lattice, given the equivalence
in (123). To see this, consider the two relevant cases: for any portions of coffee a
and b, if a ≺ b then a ∨ b = b, and if a = b then a ∨ b = b, and vice versa.
(123) Equivalence between 4 and ∨
For all x, y ∈ D4Part , x 4Part y iff x ∨ y = y.
13Part-of structures differ from the scale structures discussed in Chapter 2 only in that part-of
relations are not connected. An equivalence ordering on a part-of structure is connected, however.
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3.2.2. Nominal reference
We can use the notions just introduced to formalize the felt difference between
mass and count noun denotations, in a manner consistent with the appeal to part-
whole structures in their domains of application.14 Mass nouns like coffee denote in
domains with the structure of an anti-atomic join semi lattice and (singularly-
interpreted) count nouns denote in domains of (unstructured) atomic entities.
An entity is atomic if, in a given domain (here, just the domain of individuals
De) has no proper parts in the same domain, (124).
(124) Atomicity (first version)
For all x ∈ De, x is an atom iff there is no y ∈ De such that y ≺Part x.
A noun like idea is most naturally understood as applying to atomic entities.
Thus, quantization of a predicate like this one can be modeled by appeal to a domain
containing only atoms, (125). From this perspective, any entity satisfying Jtraffic
coneK has no proper parts that also satisfy that predicate.
(125) Quantization (first version)
A predicate P is quantized iff for all x ∈ DP , x is an atom.
The question of mass noun denotations is more subtle, turning essentially on
whether they denote in domains that have atomic parts, (126). Here, x 4Part y is
read as ‘x is a subpart of y’. Atomic join semi-lattices are join semi-lattices that
have minimal parts that are also atoms, (127).
(126) Atomic parthood (first version)
For all x, y ∈ De, x is an atomic part of y iff x 4Part y and x is an atom.
(127) Atomic join semi-lattice (first version)
A predicate P denotes an atomic join semi-lattice iff:
14This section owes a great debt to Champollion 2010 and Gillon 2012.
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for all x ∈ DP , there is a y ∈ DP such that y is an atomic part of x.
Anti-atomic join semi-lattices are join semi-lattices that do not have minimal
parts, let alone atoms, (128). For any x in such lattices, there is always some y that
is a proper subpart of x.
(128) Anti-atomic join semi-lattice (first version)
A predicate P denotes an anti-atomic join semi-lattice iff:
for all x ∈ DP , there is a y ∈ DP such that y ≺Part x.
The anti-atomic theory of mass nouns holds that all mass nouns denote
anti-atomic join semi-lattices (Ter Meulen 1981, Link 1983, Roeper 1983, Bunt
1985, Lønning 1987, Landman 1989, Eschenbach 1992, Ojeda 1993, Higginbotham
1994, a.o.). The atomic theory holds that all mass nouns denote atomic join semi-
lattices (Chierchia 1998a, 2010).15 The neutral theory holds that mass nouns are
neutral with respect to atomicity (Gillon 1992, Fox & Grodzinsky 1998, Fox 2000,
Nicolas 2002, 2008, Bale & Barner 2009, Pelletier 1974).
As Gillon (2012) discusses, both the anti-atomic theory and the atomic theory
arguably make incorrect predictions. Consider that ‘mass noun’ is a distributional
label: it applies to those nouns that appear with much (as opposed to many), that
are awkward with the plural morpheme, show singular subject-verb agreement, etc.
The anti-atomic theory expects no mass noun to behave as if it has atoms in its
denotation, whereas the atomic theory expects mass nouns to behave as though they
do. The neutral theory expects mass nouns to sometimes behave as though they
have atoms, and sometimes not.
The atomic theory has difficulty with nouns like food, which do not behave as
though they have atoms, while the anti-atomic theory has a problem with nouns like
furniture, which behave as though they do. First, observe that, by the traditional
15There are subtleties to Chierchia’s account with respect to the ‘vagueness’ of the atoms, but
we can set these aside.
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distributional tests, e.g. (129), food and furniture are mass nouns.
(129) a. Al doesn’t have much food/furniture/?traffic cone in his house.
b. Al wishes he had ?foods/?furnitures/traffic cones.
However, JfoodK patterns as anti-atomic: all (relevant) parts of some food count
as food. If JfoodK was atomic, we should be able to detect the atoms in its domain
of application. Moreover, JfurnitureK patterns as atomic: while a chair counts as
furniture, e.g., the legs of that chair do not. If JfurnitureK was anti-atomic, prima
facie we should not be able to detect atoms. On the neutral theory, mass nouns
are underspecified for atomicity, and so can capture the fact that the syntactic
distribution in (129) does not determine the kind of join semi-lattice a given mass
noun denotes.
What mass nouns like furniture and food do share is cumulativity. Two por-
tions of food count as food, as does the sum of those portions; two chairs individually
count as furniture, as do two chairs together. Therefore, we can define a cumulative
predicate as one that denotes a join semi-lattice, (130).
(130) Cumulativity
A predicate P is cumulative iff P denotes a join semi-lattice.
Further restrictions on mass noun reference can, as on the neutral theory, be
determined by the kind of noun it is. A substance mass noun like coffee denotes
an anti-atomic join semi-lattice, while a superordinate mass noun like furniture
denotes an atomic join semi-lattice. The important thing is that, on mereology-
based approaches, a count noun like traffic cone fails to denote a semi-lattice, atomic
or otherwise. It denotes only a set of atoms.
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3.2.3. Verbal reference
We have seen that eventive verbal descriptions show a distinction that can be
seen as parallel to the mass/count distinction, that between atelic and telic verb
phrases. I briefly show how we can use the formalism just developed to model this
parallel.
The relevant notion for distinguishing atelic from telic VPs is that which we
used to distinguish mass from count noun phrases, namely, atomicity. Thus, we can
give a generalized version of this property as in (131), where η is used to indicate
neutrality with respect to types e and v.
(131) Atomicity (final version)
For all α ∈ Dη, x is an atom iff there is no α′ ∈ Dη such that α′ ≺Part α.
We have seen that telic VPs like eat one’s first cupcake are not cumulative.
Rather, they are quantized. The generalized version of that property can be given
as in (132). From this perspective, any event satisfying eat one’s first cupcake has
no proper parts that also count as instances of eat one’s first cupcake.
(132) Quantization (final version)
A predicate P is quantized iff for all α ∈ DP , α is an atom.
Correlatively, atelic verb phrases like run have the cumulativity property.
Thus, by the scheme laid out here, they are posited to denote join semi-lattices.
Parallel to the question for mass nouns, the question for these predicates is whether
being an atelic verb phrase entails denoting an atomic or anti-atomic semi-lattice.
I conjecture that the neutral theory applies here as it did in the nominal do-
main. Some evidence supporting this is the contrast between verb phrases appearing
with adverbial much. Atelic verb phrases like run and bounce are fine here, whereas
telic verb phrases like find a unicorn are awkward (133), as we would expect if they
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are parallel to count nouns (cf. Bach 1986). However, while JrunK patterns as anti-
atomic (i.e., all parts of a running count as running), JbounceK patterns as atomic:
while a single bounce counts as a bouncing, the parts of that bounce do not.
(133) Al didn’t run/bounce/?find a unicorn much last night.
An instance of wiggling is a back and forth motion, as an instance of bouncing
is a bodily motion upwards and back down; half of a single one of these motions
would not count as an instance of the predicate.16 In contrast, run and sleep have
no discernable atomic parts. The differences in their interpretation can readily be
seen when they combine with for-adverbials: while wiggle and bounce are interpreted
iteratively (i.e., as expressing a series of back-and-forth, or up-and-down motions),
run and sleep are interpreted duratively.
(134) a. Al wiggled/bounced for an hour.
b. Al ran/slept for an hour.
Such considerations suggest that, within the class of atelic VPs, there are
expressions that denote anti-atomic join semi-lattices, and expressions that denote
atomic join semi-lattices. Given this, we can generalize the earlier definitions of
atomicity to include event predicates, as in (135)-(137).
(135) Atomic parthood (final version)
For all α, α′ ∈ Dη, α is an atomic part of α′ iff α′ 4Part α and α is an
atom.
(136) Atomic join semi-lattice (final version)
A predicate P denotes an atomic join semi-lattice iff:
for all α ∈ DP , there is a α′ ∈ DP such that α′ is an atomic part of α.
16I am using semelfactive telic phrases here because they seem most like the verbal equivalent
to furniture nouns, involving multiple, discrete objects (or rather, in this case, events).
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(137) Anti-atomic join semi-lattice (final version)
A predicate P denotes an anti-atomic join semi-lattice iff:
for all α ∈ DP , there is a α′ ∈ DP such that α′ ≺Part α.
3.3. Measuring individuals and events
I have suggested that nominal and verbal comparative constructions are inter-
pretable just in case the nouns or verb phrases that form the basis for comparison
have cumulative reference. The previous section modeled cumulative predicates as
those that denote join semi-lattices, and quantized (i.e., non-cumulative) predicates
as those which are atomic. In this section, I present a compositional semantics that
captures both the variability and constraints observed for comparatives, tying it to
the interpretation of much.
Any analysis in this domain must capture that measurement in nominal and
verbal comparatives is monotonic: i.e., only permitting dimensions for comparison
that respect strict part-whole relations on the extension of the nominal or verbal
predicate. Yet, this mapping is not determinate: indeed, temperature is not
available with more coffee, but volume and weight are; and speed is not available
with run more, but temporal duration and spatial distance are. Given this,
I must first address the question of what sort of indeterminacy much represents.
3.3.1. What kind of indeterminacy?
In the framework adopted in this dissertation, the semantic value of an expres-
sion like coffee is a function: applied to some entity, it has a determinate output,
e.g. applied to some x of type e, JcoffeeK returns a truth value of type t. On
the degree-theoretic analysis, GAs like tall are functions of a slightly different sort:
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given an x, they return a degree of type d.17 However, much is not determinate in
the usual manner of functions. Cartwright (1975) demonstrated this indeterminacy
already with examples like (138).
(138) There is more water than sand in these buckets by volume,
but more sand than water by weight.
If much introduces introduces measure functions in comparatives, as I and
others have hypothesized it does, the question is: what sort of indeterminacy does
it involve? I explore three types, the similarities and differences amongst which
are explicated most lucidly by Gillon (2004), and ask how comparatives fair with
respect to the same tests.18
Prima facie, the felt relatedness of the various senses of ‘measure’ invoked
in comparatives speaks against an ambiguity hypothesis. Classic examples of lexi-
cal ambiguity involve sequences of sounds that associate with multiple, unrelated
senses. In (139), the sounds of ‘pen’ are used to refer both a kind of writing imple-
ment and to a kind of animal enclosure.
(139) I lost my pen (with blue ink) in the pen (where I keep my pigs).
With respect to the tests presented below, deixis patterns much like ambigu-
ity. Deixis typically involves pronominal expressions like him in (140), which require
context to fix the intended referent.
(140) I saw him (the man you met yesterday).
Polysemy is similar to ambiguity in involving a sequence of sounds associated
with more than one sense, yet differs in that there is a felt relatedness between those
17Some GAs are not so clear-cut. Kennedy & McNally 2010 diagnose ambiguity for red (i.e.,
in uses for talking about area versus intensity), yet there are perhaps further distinctions (see
Chapter 4).
18V. Hacquard and A. Williams, p.c., contributed immensely to the discussion in the remainder
of this section. Many of the examples are based on theirs, or on A. Williams’ lecture notes.
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senses: France, conceived of as a geographical region, can have the property of being
hexagonal, (141a). Conceived of as a political entity, it can have the property of
being a republic, (141b). These are distinct, while intuitively related, senses of the
word.
(141) a. France (the geographical region) is hexagonal.
b. France (the polis) is a republic.
Generality is similar to polysemy, but applies to expressions that are neutral
with respect to one or more specific senses, for instance teacher in (142). To be a
teacher, one must teach some or other specific subject; however, the term itself is
neutral with respect to the varieties of subject one might teach.
(142) Al is a teacher (of physics, or of math, or of linguistics, or...).
Broadly, tests for varieties of indeterminacy distinguish at least two main
groups: ambiguity and deixis, on the one hand, and generality/polysemy on the
other. I present just three of them (see others in Gillon 2004).
The first test is distribution over conjuncts. Sentences with ambiguous
expressions do not allow for a single instance of the expression to simultaneously in-
volve two of its senses, (143). Similarly, the entities referred to by deictic expressions
cannot simultaneously involve distinct referents, (144).
(143) * Al and Bill both like pens;
that is, Al likes writing implements, and Bill likes places to keep pigs.
(144) * Al and Bill both like her; that is, Al likes Susie, and Bill likes Mary.
In contrast, polysemous and general expressions allow for just this kind of
mixing and matching. It is possible to express that Al and Bill like different aspects
of France using the first sentence in (145). Similarly, it is possible to express that
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Al and Bill like teachers that cover different subjects in their classes with the first
sentence in (146).19
(145) Al and Bill both like France;
that is, Al likes its governance structure, and Bill likes its shape.
(146) Al and Bill both like teachers;
that is, Al likes the physics teacher, and Bill likes the linguistics teacher.
To investigate how comparatives fare with respect to this test, consider this
context (due to A. Williams, p.c.). Suppose that Al does landscaping, and Bill ships
freight. Susie does both. Al’s primary concern is covering space, and he has a large
volume of pumice (a light and porous rock). Bill’s primary concern is not sinking
his ship, and he has a small volume of iron ore (a heavy and dense rock). Susie has
medium amounts of both. This situation can be summarized as: Al’s rock measures
greater than Susie’s rock by volume, but not by weight, and Bill’s beats Susie’s by
weight, but not by volume. The question is: can (147) be true in such a context?
My own judgment leans towards ‘yes’; I have equally heard both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ from
informants with about the same level of confidence.
(147) ? Al and Bill both have more rock than Susie.
The absurd denials test checks whether it is required that a speaker have a
particular sense of an expression in mind. Making an assertion with ‘pen’, followed
by a claim of ignorance about which sense was intended is infelicitous, (148a).20 It
19Tests by pronominalization cut the space similarly; consider the contrasts in (i)-(iv).
i. * My penwriting implement has blue ink, and itthe place I keep my pigs is large.
ii. * I like himThiago Silva because heNeymar Jr is handsome.
iii. Francegeographical region is hexagonal, and itpolis is a republic.
iv. Al became a teacherof physics, and thatbecome a teacher, e.g. of math is what Bill wants to
do.
20With quotative stress on pen, this probably improves.
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seems crashingly bad to use a pronoun and then claim not to know the intended
referent, (148b). However, it is fine to be familiar with France without knowing the
shape of its geographical region, (148c), and to know that Al is a teacher without
knowing which subject he teaches, (148d).
(148) a. ? I know Al has a pen,
but I don’t know if it’s a writing implement or an animal enclosure.
b. ? I know him, but I don’t know who we are talking about.
c. I know France, but I don’t know what shape it is.
d. I know Al is a teacher, but I don’t know if he teaches physics.
Like the generality and polysemy examples, it seems fine to know that one
individual has a greater measure of rock than another individual, without knowing
which measure makes the comparison true, (149). If this judgment is robust, as I
suspect it is, this speaks to an analysis of much in terms of generality or polysemy.
(149) ? I know that Al has more rock than Sue,
but I don’t know if it’s by weight or by volume.
Negation differentiates the same groupings. With ‘pen’, it is possible to assert
of an entity that it is a writing implement but not a place to put pigs, using ‘pen’
twice without explicit elaboration, (150a). Similarly, with ‘him’, it is possible to
pick out one of two possible antecedents to avoid contradiction, (150b). However,
it is not possible to use ‘France’ to pick out the polis sense in one sentence, and the
geographical region sense in a continuation, (150c). Finally, one cannot assert that
an individual is not a teacher with the intention of asserting that they fail to teach
a certain subject, (150d).
(150) a. My prize penwriting implement is not a penplace to put pigs.
b. Al and Bill are both annoying. I really hate himAl, but I don’t hate Bill.
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c. * Francepolis doesn’t have a shape,
though as a matter of fact Francegeographical region is hexagonal.
d. * Al is not a teacherof math, though in fact he teaches physics.
Consider now the comparative with respect to this last test, (151). Suppose
Al has more pumice than Bill has iron ore by volume, yet the weight of the pumice
is far less than the weight of the iron ore. In such a context, asserting denial of a
true comparison by weight in the first sentence, is it fine to continue by asserting a
true comparison by volume, (151)? Judgments are again mixed here.
(151) ? Al doesn’t have moreby weight rock than Bill does,
though in fact Al’s rock takes up ten times as much space.
As noted, the results of the tests are mixed. Schwarzschild (2006) and Solt (to
appear) suggest an index-based account for how measure functions are introduced in
nominal comparatives, without quite spelling out the details. However, appealing
to indices would suggest that much is a type of deictical or pronominal element.
Indeed, this type of analysis is more consistent with widely-adopted techniques in
the formal semantics literature. Yet, in certain cases, the tests seem to suggest the
opposite conclusion; however, analysis of generality and polysemy have been far less
worked out in formal semantics.
Here are what I understand the options to look like, in (152), where again η
indicates neutrality with respect to individuals e and events v.
(152) a. Index-based account of much
JmuchµKA = A(µ) type 〈η, d〉
b. Polysemy-based account of much
JmuchKA = λα.µ(α) type 〈η, d〉
a. µ is a metavariable; or
b. µ is a polymorphic function (?)
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On the index-based account, much has an index µ that is assigned to a par-
ticular measure function by the assignment function A. Here, µ (or µ′, µ′′, etc.) is
a privileged variable name used to range only over functions of type 〈η, d〉. This
is straightforward technically, while potentially conceptually odd given that the in-
terpretation of more isn’t exactly sensitive to the same tests as other pronominal
expressions. Another difference is that a pronoun like he can potentially have a
greater range of values than much.
Only a polysemy-based account, there are downsides to either version of its
implementation. If µ is a metavariable, we need to now to know what an assign-
ment function for the metalanguage looks like. Standardly, we assign entities in the
model/world to variables directly; there is no infrastructure for an interpretation
like this. On the other hand, if µ is a polymorphic function (i.e., it has a specific in-
terpretation depending on the nature of its α argument), then expressions like coffee
will themselves have to be analyzed as ambiguous. This seems unreasonable. Yet,
if such expressions are not ambiguous, then there aren’t two ‘different things’ that
could lead a (even polymorphic) function to have two different measure functions
as outputs.
Precisely the way in which much is indeterminate remains a delicate matter
that I will not pretend to settle here. Given the difficulties just noted, however, for
ease of implementation I will provide an index-based account of its semantics.
3.3.2. The proposal
I retain the interpretations of morphemes like -er and as from Chapter 2 as
in (153). In light of the preceding discussion, I give an interpretation for much as
in (154).21 In (154), µ is an object language-level variable over functions of the
21My formulation builds on developments primarily in Schwarzschild 2002, 2006, Nakanishi 2007,
and Wellwood et al. 2012, and Wellwood 2012a. I discuss alternative proposals in the next section.
Wellwood 2012a in particular is much like the present approach, but differs in two ways: (i) JmuchK
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measure function type, taking its value from the assignment function A.
(153) Comparative morphemes
i. J-erK = λgλdλα.g(α)  d 〈〈η, d〉, 〈d, 〈η, t〉〉
ii. JasK = λgλdλα.g(α) < d
(154) Interpretation of much (with restrictions)
JmuchµKA = A(µ) 〈η, d〉
Some examples are given in (155), for some assignment A.
(155) a. A(µ) = volume
b. A(µ′) = temperature
c. A(µ′′) = temporal-duration
To capture the restrictions we’ve seen on nominal and verbal comparatives,
A(µ), in any context and for any assignment A, must be restricted in the following
ways: (i) the measured domain must be structured; (ii) the mapping to degrees
must be homomorphic; and finally, (iii) the mapping must be monotonic. I
discuss each of these properties in turn.
First, requiring that an α predicated of by A(µ) be structured amounts to the
claim that α is in the domain of an ordering, D<α . This ensures that (relevantly
singular) count nouns and telic verb phrases are uninterpretable in the comparative;
that is, if the domain of any expression is an unstructured, atomic subset of Dη, it
is not measurable.
Requiring that the mapping is homomorphic ensures that the mapping to
degrees preserves the structure of the measured domain. Homomorphic functions
can be defined relative to binary relations or operations: that is, for any binary
orders 4R and 4S, (156), or, for any two join semi-lattices ∨M and ∨N , (157).
has a 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 interpretation, and (ii) it is not relativized to the assignment function A.
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(156) A function h : D4R 7→ D4S is a relational homomorphism iff:
for all α, β ∈ D4R , α 4R β if and only if h(α) 4S h(β).
(157) A function h : D∨M 7→ D∨N is an operational homomorphism iff:
for all α, β ∈ D∨M , h(α ∨M β) = h(α) ∨N h(β).
Finally, requiring that the mapping be monotonic is just a restatement of
Schwarzschild’s condition: not only must A(µ) preserve structure, it must preserve
part-whole structure non-trivially. This captures the fact that volume, weight
and temporal duration, distance are permissible for the measure of JcoffeeK
and JrunK, respectively, but temperature and speed are not. Monotonicity is
repeated in (158).
(158) A measure function µ : D4Part 7→ D≤Deg is monotonic iff:
for all α, β ∈ D4Part , if α ≺Part β, then µ(α) ≺Deg µ(β).
There is one further factor that must be made explicit. The value of µ under-
stood in a given context of use depends not only on how entities are ordered, but
what sort of entity they are. For example, more coffee cannot express a measure by
(i) temperature, or (ii) temporal duration. (i) is ruled out by the monotonic-
ity condition, above. I submit that (ii) is ruled out because the relevant measure
function, temporal-duration, is a function from events to degrees, (159i); enti-
ties that JcoffeeK is true of are not in the domain of such functions. Similarly, run
(in the park) more cannot express measures by (i) speed, or (ii) volume. (i) is
ruled out by monotonicity; as above, I submit that (ii) is ruled out because volume
does not have events in its domain, (159ii). This seems intuitively correct.
(159) i. temporal-duration : Dv 7→ Dd
ii. volume : De 7→ Dd
I turn next to the compositional details.
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3.3.3. Composition: nouns
Comparatives with nouns are, at a surface-structural level, just like those
with attributive adjectival constructions. The only difference with respect to the
interpretation of those constructions that I posited in Chapter 2 is that much appears
in the place of e.g. hot. This section presents the composition with much, and
discusses how the result differs interpretively.
Consider the nominal comparative in (160), which I posit has the (simplified)
structure in (163).











The composition of (161) is as in (162), with the than-clause abbreviated as
δ. The result is an existential statement about events e of which Al was the agent,
where e is a drinking of a quantity of coffee whose assigned measure is greater than
δ.
(162) i. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
ii. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (i),FA
iii. JN2PKA = λy.coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  δ (ii),PM
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iv. Je2PKA = εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  ιδ] (iii),FA
v. JV2PKA = λe′.drink(e′)(εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  δ]) (iv),FA
vi. Jv2PKA =
λyλe′.Agent(e′)(y) & drink(e′)(εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  δ]) (v),EI
vii. JS2PKA =
λe′.Agent(e′)(Al) & drink(e′)(εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  δ]) (vi),FA
viii. = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & drink(e′)(εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y)  δ])] (vii),∃
The syntax I posit for the than-clause of (160) is as in (163). Note that, here
and below, I assign the same index µ to the matrix and than-clause occurrences of
much. The present system doesn’t preclude these indices from being different, but I












(164) i. JDeg1’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α) < d IR,FA
ii. JDeg1PKA = λα.A(µ)(α) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
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iii. JN1PKA = λx.coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i) (ii),PM
iv. Je1PKA = εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i)] (iii),FA
v. JV1PKA = λe.drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i)]) (iv),PM
vi. Jv1PKA =
λyλe.Agent(e)(y) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i)]) (v),EI
vii. JS1KA =
λe.Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i)]) (vi),FA
viii. = > iff
∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < A(i)])] (vii),∃
ix. JopPKA:Ai→d =
λd.∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < d])] (viii),PA
x. JthanPKA =
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < d])] (ix),FA
Combining (162) and (164), (160) has the logical form in (165). The resulting
interpretation is one that is predicted to be judged true just in case Al was the
agent of a drinking event involving a portion of coffee whose assigned measure is
greater than the assigned measure of some coffee Bill drank. In the context of drink,
the relevant measure will likely be understood in terms of volume, though weight
is possible; temperature, for the reasons discussed in the preceding section, is ruled
out.
(165) JAl drank more coffee than Bill didKA = > iff
∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & drink(e)(εy[coffee(y) & A(µ)(y) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & A(µ)(x) < d])]])]
This derivation (syntactic and semantic) is parallel to that of the attributive
adjectival construction discussed in Chapter 2, whose logical form is reproduced
in (166). The only difference between these logical forms is that A(µ) in (165)
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is replaced with hot in (166). These truth conditions invoke a specific measure
function, temperature, rather than a variable over measures.
(166) JAl drank hotter coffee than Bill didKA = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & drink(e′)(εy[coffee(y) & hot(y) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εx[coffee(x) & hot(x) < d])]])]
3.3.4. Composition: verb phrases
Comparatives with verb phrases are derived in a parallel fashion to those with
adverbs. Consider the verbal comparative in (167).
(167) Al ran more than Bill did.
I posit that the matrix clause of (167) has the underlying structure in (168),










(169) i. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
ii. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (i),FA
iii. JV2PKA = λe′.run(e′) & A(µ)(e′)  δ (ii),PM
iv. Jv2PKA = λxλe′.Agent(e′)(x) & run(e′) & A(µ)(e′)  δ (iii),EI
v. JS2KA = λe′.Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & A(µ)(e′)  δ (iv),FA
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vi. = > iff ∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & A(µ)(e′)  δ] (v),∃
The than-clause of (167) is posited to be like that in (170), and its interpreta-









(171) i. JDeg1’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α) < d IR,FA
ii. JDeg1PKA = λα.A(µ)(α) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
iii. JV1PKA = λe.run(e) & A(µ)(e) < A(i) (ii),PM
iv. Jv1PKA = λxλe.Agent(e)(x) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < A(i) (iii),EI
v. JS1KA = λe.Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < A(i) (iv),FA
vi. = > iff ∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < A(i)] (v),∃
vii. JopPKA:Ai→d = λd.∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < d] (vi),PA
viii. JthanPKA = ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < d]] (vii),FA
The resultant interpretation is given in (172), and is one that is predicted to be
judged true just in case Al is the agent of a running event whose assigned measure is
greater than the measure assigned to a running event by Bill. The relevant measure
here can be one of temporal duration or distance, but not speed.
(172) JAl ran more than Bill didKA = > iff
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∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & A(µ)(e′) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < d]]]
The interpretation of the comparative with gradable adverbs was derived in
Chapter 2; it is reproduced in (173). An utterance of (173) is predicted to be judged
true just in case Al is the agent of a running event whose measure by speed exceeds
that of a running event by Bill. As with comparatives with GAs like hot, here the
more specific measure—speed—is invoked via the GA fast.
(173) JAl ran faster than Bill didKA = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & run(e′) & fast(e′) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & run(e) & fast(e) < d]]]
This theory represents a natural extension of the standard so as to account for
nominal and verbal comparatives. It is formulated so that the restriction to mono-
tonic dimensions for measurement is a consequence of the meaning of much. The
definedness conditions on that expression ensure two things: it will be interpretable
only with predicates whose domains are ordered; and, the measure functions it can
be assigned by A must be homomorphic to such orderings. Which dimensions for
measurement are available, then, depends on the sort of thing that A(µ) applies
to. If its α argument is a portion of coffee, temperature is not a grammatical
dimension for measurement; if it is an event, speed is not.
In Schwarzschild (2006), the restriction to monotonic measures is tied to the
presence of a silent head that he called Mon◦. On that account, much denotes
a predicate of the degrees Mon◦ introduces. Similar proposals are compositionally




In this section, I point to other analyses of (the string) much found in the
literature. Some of them I will not examine in too much detail as the linguistic
environments they focus on are too far removed from those that are the focus of
this dissertation, and the consequent analyses quite different from that I propose.
This is not to indicate that, if a univocal account of much is desired, these accounts
could not be modified to fit the cases I focus on as well. I sketch these details as
necessary.
Kennedy & McNally (2005) focus mainly on degree modifier occurrences of
much, contrasted with e.g. very, (174). Their goal was to determine which proper-
ties of deverbal adjectives like acquainted, needed, and surprised could explain why
these modifiers seem acceptable with some and not with others. Ultimately, they
propose that such modifiers are sensitive to different properties of the adjective’s
scale structure, which, they suggest, are intimately related to the event structure
denoted by their verbal root.
(174) a. The vacation was much/?very needed.
b. The congressman was ?much/very surprised by the election results.
As for much, Kennedy & McNally suggest that this expression only combines
with adjectives associated with bottom-closed scales (for details of such scalar prop-
erties, I refer the reader to their paper; see also Rotstein & Winter 2004), assigning
it the interpretation in (175). This is very much like the interpretation standardly
assigned to the pos morpheme, but different in that the standard it invokes is the
minimal element of the scale associated with its GA argument, Sg. If a GA fails to
have a minimal element, then it will not combine with much.22
22I have modified Kennedy & McNally’s denotation in (175) somewhat, which was given in
the 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 type of GAs assumed in their paper. It is reproduced here for completeness:
λg〈d,〈e,t〉〉λx.∃d[d > !!min(SG) & G(d)(x)].
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(175) JmuchKMK = λgλx.g(x)  !!min(SG)
I have not built on this interpretation for much in the preceding section as,
as can readily be seen, it will not compose with the denotations I have assumed
for coffee or run—those expressions denote properties of individuals/events, not
measure functions. If (175) was the meaning of much needed for nominal and verbal
comparatives, there would have to be some other expression that introduces degrees
in these constructions.
Moreover, there are empirical issues with Kennedy & McNally’s proposal as
it stands. By the test of interpretability with slightly, wet and closed are associated
with bottom-closed scales (e.g. slightly wet, slightly closed). If that’s so, both should
be acceptable with much; yet, they are anomalous here, (176).
(176) a. ? The towel is much wet.
b. ? The door is much closed.
Rett (2008) and Solt (to appear) propose a semantics in which expressions
like much are not predicates of individuals (or events), but of scalar intervals (i.e.,
a (convex) set of degrees; this interpretation of much is suggested by Schwarzschild
2006). Both accounts share with Kennedy & McNally’s that when much appears in
nominal and verbal comparatives, degrees are introduced by a separate head. I now
discuss how and why the present proposal departs from these accounts.23
Rett (2008) is primarily motivated to provide a unified account of determiner
and comparative-question occurrences of much. She suggests that much/many has
a fairly bleached semantics, mapping a scalar interval to a set of degrees, i.e. the
singleton set representing the length of the input interval, (177i). A null head,
Quantity (177ii), maps nominal meanings to the requisite degrees. The µ predicate
23I do not discuss yet other alternatives, e.g. those found in Svenonius & Kennedy 2006, or
Grano & Kennedy 2012, as their motivating data, and resultant analyses, are yet more distant
from the present discussion.
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here is assumed to function much like the interpretation of Schwarzschild’s Mon◦.24
(177) i. Jmuch/manyRK = λDλd′[length(D) = d′] 〈〈d, t〉, 〈d, t〉〉
ii. JQuantityK = λPλdλQ.∃x[P (x) & Q(x) & µ(x) = d]
The present chapter has not been concerned with so-called determiner occur-
rences of much (e.g. much soup spilled); in this, I would assume a modified version
of von Stechow’s (1984) account of such occurrences, which features a pos mor-
pheme along with much. The combination much coffee would denote a predicate of
individuals that measure to a significant extent (see Chapter 2), and this in turn
would combine with little-e before composing with the verb or Voice head. (On von
Stechow’s account, this pos itself has a determiner sematics; I would not assume
this outright, if the same pos is to be used for verbal occurrences of much).
For now, note that (177) cannot be used in an account of the data I have
discussed in this chapter. To see why, consider that something must introduce a
measure function for -er/as with nouns in English. We have overt evidence in such
contexts that much/many is present; however, given Rett’s proposal, it can’t be
that much/many performs that function: it does not introduce measures. The type
of Quantity could be adjusted so that it basically just encodes for µ; then the
question is whether both much/many and Quantity are required; I return to this
question below.
Solt (to appear) offers an account very much like mine, but with a crucial
difference. Like Rett, she also interprets much/many as a map between degrees
and intervals. Her account differs in that the null head she posits to introduce
degrees with nominals, Meas, has a simpler compositional interpretation than that
Rett posits for Quantity. In fact, it is practically identical to the interpretation I
assign to much.25
24These denotations presuppose the GQ analysis of -er/as discussed at the end of Chapter 2.
That difference will not affect what I say below.
25Again, the order of λs, and the overt λ for the degree argument do not matter for present
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(178) a. Much soup was spilled.
b. The many books fell.
c. John is generous, perhaps too much so.
d. John read as many books as Bill did.
(179) i. Jmuch/manySK = λdλI.I(d) 〈d, 〈〈d, t〉, t〉〉
ii. JMeasK = λxλd.µ(x) ≥ d 〈e, 〈d, t〉〉
As Solt discusses, an account like the one I advocate is flexible enough to
handle the cases hers does; this is due to the fact that the interpretation she assigns
to much/many has little compositional consequence, and my much and her Meas
are practically identical. The question, then, is, for Solt and Rett: why not appeal
to a single expression, much, as opposed to two?
Solt suggests that appeal to a single head cannot explain (180a)-(180b). With-
out going into detail, I will simply suggest that the asymmetry between (180a) is
likely independent of the interpretation of much. This pattern could relate more
generally to how mass (vegetation) versus count terms (amount) interact with ver-
bal predicates. Lønning (1987) and Higginbotham (1994) discuss cases like those in
(181a)-(181b), exploring the idea that mass terms require homogeneous predicates,
which weighed two grams is not. In this regard, consider that the same unaccept-
ability persists in (181b) whether much is present or not.26
purposes. Our accounts of much/Meas otherwise differ in that Solt seems to assume that µ is a
metavariable, see the indeterminacy discussion above.
26Interestingly, whatever is wrong with (181b) is fixed by prefixing the definite article to water,
(i), yet this doesn’t salvage much water (ii). My own judgments are unclear about whether (180b)
improves with the definite article, (iii). It is not obvious that either of Solt’s or my account can
capture these patterns, thus it remains an open question whether data like (180a)-(180b) can be
used to argue for her approach.
i. The water weighed two grams.
ii. * The much water weighed two grams.
iii. ? The vegetation that survived the draught wasn’t much.
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(180) a. * Vegetation that survived the draught wasn’t much.
b. The amount of vegetation that survived the draught wasn’t much.
(181) a. (Much) water boiled.
b. * (Much) water weighed two grams.
More importantly, a major motivation for a two-head analysis in nominal com-
parative constructions is the assumption that gradable adjectives denote measure
functions, as maintained by the standard theory. Consider an example from Corver
(1997) that Solt discusses, (182). Corver, like Bresnan (1973), posits the existence of
a head that uniformly appears between too and its complement XP, for any lexical
category X. Here, the semantics of so is said to be identical to generous, but its
syntax different enough that much must be ‘inserted’ to support that null head.27
(182) John is generous, perhaps too much so.
Indeed, how could much appear with an expression with the same semantics as
a GA, if both much and GAs denote measure functions? A reasonable hypothesis,
precisely that of Rett and Solt, is that the semantics of much amounts to little
more than interpretation as the identity predicate. Correspondingly, preserving the
type-theoretic distinction between GAs and nouns requires a distinct null head to
introduce degrees in nominal comparatives.
It turns out, then, that if GAs do not denote measure functions (as I will
argue in the next chapter), the important difference between the account I offer and
those advocated by Rett and Solt effectively disappears: instead of being uniformly
(relatively) uninterpreted, much can act as a general purpose measure function,
regardless of the syntactic category of expression targeted for measurement, no
additional null heads required.
27I discuss these data in more detail in the next chapter.
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3.5. Overgeneration?
Before continuing, one may wonder, if the interpretations of much, and ex-
pressions like -er and as are as general as I have suggested they are, why certain
intuitively unacceptable comparatives are in fact unacceptable. For example, why
not mix and match nominal and verbal loci of comparison, if both can be measured
by, e.g., temporal duration, (183)? As given, the theory I have developed might be
thought to overgenerate.28
(183) Al has more time than Bill ran.
To see why, consider first the sentences in (184), with a simplified represen-
tation of the underlying syntax that I have assumed is elided represented in paren-
theses. (184a) expresses a comparison by temporal duration, as does (184b); the
only difference is that the former is a nominal comparative and the latter is a verbal
comparative.
(184) a. Al has more time than Bill does (have time).
b. Al ran more than Bill did (run).
In (185), the matrix and than-clauses of (184) are mixed and matched. The
result of such mixing and matching seems, on the face of it, odd. The question
is, why? If both JtimeK and JranK can be measured by something like temporal-
duration, the results of this mixing and matching should be straightforwardly
interpretable, just like the sentences in (184). Nothing I have said so far rules that
out.
(185) a. ? Al has more time than Bill ran.
b. ? Al ran more than Bill has time.
28This potential issue arises for any theory that attempts to account for both nominal and verbal
comparatives in terms of a univocal much and -er.
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Conducting an informal survey of judgments on Twitter for the sentence in
(185a), responses ranged from “totally out” to “totally fine”, with L. Velleman and
L. Ackerman suggesting that they improve with contrastive focus on the verbs.
L. Velleman, in particular, provided the contextual support in (186), offering the
intuition that sentences like (185) in such contexts are in fact straightforwardly
interpretable as expressing comparisons by temporal duration.
(186) Context: There’s a race where the goal is to get as far as possible in a limited
time, and you’re required to spend some of that time running and some of
that time walking. But the referee screwed up, and gave Al way too much
running time, and [the sports announcer—AW] says:
“Al had more time than Bill ran, so he [Al] can still go a little further.”
But is this just a matter of “we can make sense of it”, meanwhile the sentences
are in fact ungrammatical or uninterpretable? Regardless, there is definitely some
oddity surrounding (185).29 The issue would be with the very general meaning I
have assigned to the comparative morpheme, repeated in (187i), wherein α is neutral
with respect to entities in De and events in Dv. Since the than-clause delivers only
a degree, denoting the function in (187ii), the type of entities compared in the two
clauses should be allowed to freely vary so long as the degrees are ordered with
respect to one another.
(187) i. J-erK = λgλdλα.g(α)  d
ii. JthanK = λD.ιd[D(d)]
There are three options that could explain the oddity: (i) something having
to do with syntax and the interactions between ellipsis and comparative clauses;
(ii) a kind of metaphysical issue with comparing measures of time with measure of
29The fact that prosodic prominence improves such examples could be suggestive; I discuss
related phenomena in Chapter 6.
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events; or (iii) we haven’t yet got the types right for expressions like -er. I will
briefly explore each of these possibilities in turn.
With respect to (i), it may be that, for reasons that are not well understood,
locality restrictions on ellipsis lead to ill-formed than-clauses in the examples in
(185). Such restrictions have been discussed extensively for comparatives Lechner
2001), gapping (Ross 1970; see Kennedy 2001a), sluicing (Fox & Lasnik 2003) and
e.g. either/or constructions (Schwarz 1999). If the syntax of comparatives conspires
to ensure that the than-clause of a sentence like (185a) is like that in (188),30 such
a than-clause would be, I presume, ill-formed for independent reasons.31
(188) Al has more time than Bill ran (time)
With respect to (ii), perhaps the examples in (185) are odd for the same
reason that comparisons like Al is taller than Bill is happy are: the outputs of the
measure functions in each of the clauses are not degrees that are ordered on the
same scale (see Chapter 4 for extensive discussion of this phenomenon). That is,
as A. Williams (p.c.) puts it, “time doesn’t take time”: while it is indeed possible
to measure running events in the than-clause by temporal duration, is it actually
possible to measure times by temporal duration? If it’s not, this would explain the
oddity of (185): it is an an issue with incommensurable scales.32
With respect to (iii), perhaps I have not yet assigned the right interpretation
to the comparative morphemes. Kennedy (1998) suggests an analysis (citing an-
tecedents in Klein’s 1980 GPSG and Larson’s 1988b GB implementations) which
assumes a higher type for comparative morphemes and the internals of the than-
clause which has the effect of ensuring that the same measure function from the
30Perhaps having to do with a phenomenon that has been called ‘scopal parallelism’ (e.g. Fox
2000, Fox & Lasnik 2003; thanks to M. Yoshida for discussion of this point.)
31However, see Kennedy 1998 for arguments that ‘comparative deletion’ constructions do not in
fact reflect deletion.
32R. Schwarzschild (p.c.) gives an example like Al gave more attention to Susie than Bill ran
that avoids this potential confound.
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matrix clause is reproduced in the than-clause. Kennedy’s motivations are different
from the present ones, so I will provide an account in the same spirit but that differs
in the details.
On such an account, the degree phrase in (183) would have the (simplified)
syntax in (189), and the alternative interpretations for more and than would be as
given in (190i) and (190ii). Here, op is an operator that raises and leaves a trace
of type 〈η, t〉. This trace will be abstracted over at opP to deliver a predicate of
type 〈〈η, t〉, t〉, which acts as the input to JthanK. Combined with that argument,
it returns a function of type 〈〈η, d〉, d〉—a function from measure function types to
degrees. J-erK takes such a type as its second argument, and feeds the interpretation










Considering the denotations in (190), I assume that these functions are such
that: if the type of an input argument is v, then the type of the output must be
interpreted relative to v. Only by typing -er so that it makes reference both to the
type measured in the matrix and the than-clause will a type-theoretic solution to
the matter work out. Note that C in (190ii) is the denotation of opP in (189).
(190) i. JmorealtKA = λg : g ∈ D〈η,d〉.λG : G ∈ D〈〈η,d〉,d〉.λx : x ∈ Dη. g(α)  G(g)
ii. JthanaltKA = λC : C ∈ D〈〈η,t〉,t〉.λg : g ∈ D〈η,d〉.ιd[C(λα.g(α) < d)]
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The interpretation of the thanP is derived as in (191). I have indicated FA in
(191i) because ti will be interpreted as a function of type 〈η, t〉; that is, A(i) in this
context is only interpretable if it is of predicate type. I have also broken down the
steps of λ-conversion at thanP so that it is more easily seen how that interpretation
is derived. The result for thanP is a property of measure functions that map Bill’s
running events to degrees, (191ix).
(191) i. JVPKA = λe.run(e) & A(i)(e) FA
ii. JvPKA = λxλe.Agent(e)(x) & run(e) & A(i)(e) (i),EI
iii. JSKA = λe.Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & A(i)(e) (ii),FA
iv. = > iff ∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & A(i)(e)] (iii),∃
v. JopPKA:Ai→P = λP.∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & P (e)] (iv),PA
vi. JthanPKA:Ai→P =
[λCλg.ιd[C(λα.g(α) = d)]] (λP.∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & P (e)]) (v),FA
vii. = λg.ιd[[λP.∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & P (e)]](λα.g(α) < d)]
(vi),λc
viii. = λg.ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & [λα.g(α) < d](e)]] (vii),λc
ix. = λg.ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & g(e) < d]] (viii),λc
The remainder of the derivation of the DegP would be as in (192). At Deg’,
the phrase is still neutral with respect to entities and events. However, let us assume
that, when a polymorphic function like -er combines with something of a type like v,
it resolves to ‘eventive’ more, and all of its αs now must come from the same domain
of basic entities. By assumption, then, when it combines with the than-phrase, its
remaining αs must be of type v. The result, then, is a property of events whose
measure exceeds the measure of Bill’s running event. Assuming that time expresses
a property of times, it will not now be possible to combine this DegP with it: even
if JtimeK and JrunK are in the domain of a measure function for temporal duration,
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since the two are not predicates of the same (primitive) type, the result will not be
interpretable.
(192) i. JDeg’KA = λGλα.A(µ)(α)  G(A(µ))
ii. JDegPKA =
[λGλα.A(µ)(α)  G(A(µ))](λg.ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & g(e) < d]])
(i),FA
iii. =
λe′.A(µ)(e′)  [λg.ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & g(e) < d]]](A(µ))
(ii),λ-calc
iv. =
λe′.A(µ)(e′)  ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Al) & run(e) & A(µ)(e) < d]] (iii),λc
Should this last option be the most adequate way of capturing the oddity of
sentences like (183), the higher-typed versions of the interpretation of -er and than
could be substituted as desired for the lower-typed versions I will continue to use.33
As these types and calculations are quite involved, as well as not very familiar to
the literature, the simplified presentation will be more appropriate in what follows.
3.6. Conclusion
The theory developed in this chapter extended the standard degree-theoretic
semantics of comparative constructions to the nominal and verbal domain. For all
the similarity between the compositional interpretation I assigned to much, and
that which the standard theory assigns to GAs, there are a number of important
differences.
First, muchµ does not express a particular measure function, but is assigned
33In fact, only for comparatives with a single adjective type. For ‘subcomparatives’ like those
discussed in the next chapter, one would have to retain a deletion-style analysis to get the inter-
pretations right.
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one from among a class that are monotonic with respect to the ordering relations
on its input argument. Second, it imposes a condition of ‘measurability’ on that
input. Neither of these conditions, monotonicity or measurability, are observed on
the standard account of gradable adjectives.
To see the lack of a monotonicity restriction with GA comparatives, consider
again Al drank hotter coffee than Bill did and Al ran faster than Bill did with the
relevant portions of logical form in (193a)-(193b), abbreviating the interpretation
of the than-clause with δ. What coffee is true of is also the input to the measure
function hot. The temperature dimension that hot involves is, as we’ve seen,
non-monotonic on the domain of entities that coffee applies to: it represents non-
monotonic measurement on such a domain. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for
fast with respect to running events.
(193) a. ...hot(x)  δ & coffee(x)...
b. ...fast(e)  δ & run(e)...
To see the lack of a measurability distinction, consider that comparatives with
GAs like hot combine perfectly well with singular count nouns, (194a), as do those
with fast with singularly-interpreted telic verb phrases, (194b). GA measure func-
tions are apparently insensitive to whether the domain they measure is ordered or
not.
(194) a. Al ate a hotter sandwich than Bill did.
b. Al ran to the store faster than Bill did.
In contrast, anomalous comparative constructions with GAs are usually thought
to be the result of the lexical semantics of the relevant adjective or adverb. As we
saw in Chapter 2, non-gradable adjectives and adverbs represent a kind of category
mistake in comparative constructions because, so the standard theory holds, they
fail to denote measure functions, (195).
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(195) a. ? Al has a more wooden piece of wood than Bill does.
b. ? Al worked more hourly than Bill did.
Combining the standard theory of GAs with that just offered for nouns and
verbs entails that non-gradable adjectives, which are not interpretable in the com-
parative, and mass nouns, which do, are assigned the same logical type—that of
properties, whether of type 〈e, t〉 or 〈v, t〉. That is, on the face of it, we might have
expected that ruling out more wooden on the basis of semantic type would lead to
ruling out more water as well. Thus, while the theory provides a certain degree of
uniformity (i.e., the interpretation of degree words like -er and as remain constant),
it may not yet provide explanatory uniformity.
I argue in the next chapter that GAs are not really so different from nouns and
verbs as the standard theory suggests. I consider distributional, morphosyntactic,
compositional, and semantic evidence to the effect that GAs do not in fact denote
measure functions. Following Landman (2000) and Fults (2006), I determine that
GAs instead denote neodavidsonian predicates of states. Further, if GAs do so
denote, it will be possible for much to measure their domains of application.
The theory that I propose next is one in which there is only one way of in-
troducing degrees into the compositional semantics of sentences containing degree
words: via much. This idea, we will see, is supported by morphosyntactic evidence
discussed by Bresnan (1973) (cf. Corver 1990). Once we have seen how adjecti-
val domains might be structured, we have all the tools we need to advance this
alternative conception.
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Chapter 4: Revisiting the standard theory
Nominal and verbal comparatives can be given a uniform compositional se-
mantics that leaves the basic architecture of the standard theory intact: nouns and
verbs denote properties of individuals and events, respectively, while much and GAs
denote measure functions. More specifically, the interpretation of much is selected
from among a class of measure functions depending in part on what it takes as an
argument, while GAs lexically encode specific measure functions.
I now argue for a revision of that basic starting point of the standard theory,
the idea that GAs denote measure functions. I suggest instead that the semantics
of degree is, across syntactic categories, introduced by much. I consider four sets
of basic data across the GA, nominal, and verbal domains in constructing this
argument: the first pertains to the types of dimensions comparatives give rise to,
the second to the distribution of ‘incommensurable’ comparisons, and the third to
the wider distribution of GAs.
By imposing a monotonicity requirement on the meaning of much in Chapter
3, I in effect restricted measurement in comparative constructions with nouns and
verbs to “extensive” (or, “quantity”) dimensions. Rett’s (2008) label Quantity for
her nominal measuring predicate is suggestive in this connection (see also Bochnak
2010). If it is the same stuff measured in (196a) and (196b), namely, JcoffeeK, then
the monotonicity requirement hard-wires the fact that the former cannot express a
comparison by temperature (an intensive dimension) but the latter can. So GAs,
on this view, can give rise to intensive dimensions, whereas much cannot.
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(196) a. Al has more coffee than Bill does.
b. Al has hotter coffee than Bill does.
However, in this chapter I show that this distributional difference does not
hold up in the general case. Just as -er/more with GAs can give rise to what appear
to be intensive and extensive measures, so can more with nouns and verbs. Building
on insights in Champollion (2010), I ultimately suggest that measurement is in fact
always extensive, just we’re measuring different things in sentences like (196b) than
we thought.
The second set of data suggests what those “different things” might be. Pre-
senting and building on discussion in Landman (2000) and Fults (2006), I show that
GAs satisfy the various criteria that are often taken to implicate neodavidsonian
denotations. Interpreting GAs as predicates of states, it becomes no longer nec-
essary to interpret them also as predicates of degrees. This is of course plausible
only if something else introduces degrees in adjectival and adverbial comparative
constructions.
In this respect, ‘incommensurability’ phenomena are informative. On Kennedy’s
(1999) account, sentences like (197) are odd because the two adjectives map entities
to degrees on incomparable scales. This is one motivation for treating GAs as degree
predicates as opposed to merely vague predicates. Yet, the same phenomena can
be found for nominal (198a) and verbal comparatives (198b), where it arises due
to much. Then, if we have evidence that much occurs even in GA comparatives, a
uniform explanation for (197)-(198) is possible.
(197) ? The ladder is wider than the carpet is green.
(198) a. ? More blood spilled to the ground than sound poured from the speakers.
b. ? Last night Al sped up more than Bill slept.
Indeed, it appears that there is such evidence. The fourth set of data I consider
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is (an updated version of) Bresnan’s (1973) and Corver’s (1997) morphosyntax for
comparatives, which (despite their differences) agree that there is a syntactic head
that is sometimes pronounced much present even in GA comparatives. Combining
this with the idea that GAs like hot and quick denote one-place predicates of states,
as in (199), I suggest that here much measures states.
(199) a. JhotK = λs.hot(s) 〈v, t〉
b. JquickK = λs.quick(s) 〈v, t〉
The theory developed in the rest of the chapter has a number of interesting
features. Primary among these is that the monotonicity requirement discussed in
Chapter 3 is a general property of comparative constructions (rather than a proper
subset thereof), and “measurement” is understood uniformly in terms of extensive
mappings to degrees. Furthermore, the distinction between gradable/non-gradable
adjectives/adverbs is formally parallel to that between mass/count and telicity.
Along the way, I show how the theory improves on those that I see as its
closest antecedents, namely Reichenbach (1947), Cresswell (1976), and Bale (2006,
2008). The chapter concludes with a discussion of some consequences for the distri-
bution and interpretation of very, measure phrases (2 feet tall), and bare adjectival
occurrences (e.g. Al is tall, Al is a tall woman).
4.1. Data and arguments
4.1.1. ‘Intensive’/‘extensive’
So far, the nominal and verbal comparatives we have seen were restricted
to “extensive” dimensions for measurement, that is, dimensions that respect the
mereological structure of the measured domain. If it turns out that GA comparative
constructions alone can give rise to “intensive” dimensions, this could suggest that
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GAs are of a fundamentally different nature from nouns and verbs.
That is, to preserve the theoretical intuition that soup does not denote a
predicate of degrees, I said that much provides a mapping to degrees with that
predicate in comparative constructions. Moreover, since much gives rise to variable
but constrained measures, its interpretation had to be restricted in a particular
way so as to account for why more soup can’t mean what hotter soup means. The
restriction I adopted, following primarily Schwarzschild (2006), holds that much
only invokes monotonic measure functions. On this view, we should expect that all
nominal comparatives give rise to extensive dimensions for measurement. Yet, on
the face of it, this does not seem to be the case.
Before proceeding, a cautionary note. Often, the terms “intensive” and “ex-
tensive” are used in the degree semantics literature to indicate the kind of dimension
a measure function invokes. For instance, ‘volume’ is an extensive dimension, and
‘heat’ is an intensive dimension. I will proceed using the language this way, but
below turn to talking about the dimension relative to the measure domain.
Consider that adjectival comparatives can give rise to intensive dimensions
like temperature and hardness (200), whereas nominal comparatives with e.g. coffee
and plastic forbid them (201). On the theory in which much measures in nominal
comparatives, the sentences in (200) and (201) express measurements of the satisfiers
of JcoffeeK or JplasticK, which are ordered by the part-of relation; the absence of
the temperature and hardness dimensions is expected, as they do not track such
relations. These measures are intensive (/non-monotonic) on such domains—smaller
portions of the stuff do not necessarily correspond to smaller measures.
(200) a. This coffee is hotter than that coffee is. temp, *volume
b. This plastic is harder than that plastic is. hardness, *weight
(201) a. Al has more coffee than Bill does. *temp, volume
b. Al has more plastic than Bill does. *hardness, weight
104
However, the reverse also obtains: some GAs give rise to extensive dimensions
(202), and some nouns to intensive (203). To be clear, exactly the dimensions that
were ruled out in (201) are possible in (203), simply by changing the noun that
appears following more, (202).
(202) a. This glass is fuller than that glass is. *temp, volume
b. This plastic is heavier than that plastic is. *hardness, weight
(203) a. This rock has more heat than that one does. temp, *volume
b. This mattress has more firmness than that one does. hardness,
*weight
A similar pattern obtains with verbal comparatives. Gradable adverbs give rise
to the intensive dimensions speed and loudness (204), whereas the atelic verbs drive
and sing forbid them (205). That is, the sentences in (204) express comparisons
of measures of JdriveK or JsingK, which, I have said, denote predicates of events
that are ordered by the part-of relation. On such domains, speed and loudness are
intensive—smaller parts of the relevant events do not necessarily give rise to smaller
measures along these dimensions.
(204) a. Al drove faster than Peter did. speed, *distance
b. Al sang louder than Peter did. loudness, *duration
(205) a. Al drove more than Peter did. *speed, distance
b. Al sang more than Peter did. *loudness, duration
Yet, again, this pattern reverses: comparatives with adverbs can invoke ex-
tensive dimensions for measurement (206), and more with verbs can give rise to
intensive (207). As above, all we have to do is change the verb, and the dimensions
for measurement are correspondingly different.
(206) a. Al drove farther than Peter did. *speed, distance
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b. Al’s singing thundered longer than Peter’s did. *loudness, duration
(207) a. Al sped up more than Peter did. speed, *distance
b. Al’s singing thundered more than Peter’s did. loudness, *duration
Such data are puzzling. In order to explain the restrictions for dimensions
on as much coffee and run as much, I said that much must measure extensively
(/monotonically). Yet, much appears with heat and speed up as well (as much heat,
speed up as much), where here it appears to be measuring intensively. A natural
recourse would be to say that the predicates that give rise to intensive measures
themselves denote specific measure functions.1
If so, then we have a few options, none of which are, in my view, appealing.
One option would be to say that (i) in some cases much goes uninterpreted, another
is to say that, contra Chapter 3, (ii) it is uniformly interpreted essentially as the
identity predicate. If (i), we are tasked with saying precisely when much will be
interpreted, and when not. (ii) is essentially the proposal of Cresswell (1976), which
I discuss later in this chapter.
Here is why (i) is unappealing. The distinction between intensive/extensive
measures is not, as we’ve seen, predictable by syntactic category. It’s not clear what
else it would be predictable from. For instance, it should be that the differences in
meaning between rock/gold and walk/run would be of just the sort that would give
rise to the second of each pair permitting a different dimension for comparison than
the first. After all, what differentiates some rock from some gold but a measure of
purity (208), and what differentiates a walking from a running but the agent’s speed
(209)? Yet, such predications resist the conceptually plausible intensive dimensions.2
1Indeed, when the literature detects “intensive” (or, “quality”) dimensions in the nominal and
verbal domains, the question of whether to extend the measure function analysis to the relevant
predicates is immediately raised. Morzycki (2005) (following discussion in Bolinger 1972) suggests
that intensive nouns like fool do not denote measure functions, whereas Villalta (2008) and Lassiter
(2011a) suggest that verbs like want do. I discuss such cases and others directly in Chapter 7.
2It turns out that there is something of a debate surrounding (208). Schwarzschild 2006 agrees
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(208) a. Al has more rock than Bill does. *purity, weight
b. Al has more gold than Bill does. *purity, weight
(209) a. Al walked more than Bill did. *speed, distance
b. Al ran more than Bill did. *speed, distance
We do not yet know when we’ll observe intensive versus extensive measures, yet
it seems importantly tied to the meaning of the predicate, whatever its syntactic
category. Tying observation of intensive dimensions to a lexical item’s semantic
type seems arbitrary, as it doesn’t track independent facts about the language, in
particular the distribution of much. Since it does not seem that GAs are “freer”
than nouns and verbs in this respect, this cannot be used as an argument that GAs
should be assigned a different type.
These considerations raise a number of questions. If GAs are not assigned a
different type, i.e. if they are not interpreted as denoting functions from individuals
and degrees, how are they interpreted? And what would introduce measures in
comparatives?
4.1.2. Adjectival phrases
A wealth of data suggests that GAs should have a davidsonian argument, in
this case most naturally thought of as a variable over states. They appear with
various modifiers, thematic and non-thematic, many of which appear to have the
spatio-temporal profile that is normally taken to indicate (potentially complex) prop-
erties of eventualities. Moreover, these modifiers can appear within the scope of the
comparative, suggesting they contribute to what is measured in a way that cannot
be captured if they lack such an argument.
with the judgment reported, whereas Bale & Barner 2009 disagree. The relevant point could be
made by contrasting e.g. more coffee versus more [hot coffee]; modifying the noun by hot doesn’t
suddenly allow for a comparison by temperature.
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Note that this discussion should be read as suggesting that GAs have a state
variable, but not yet as furthermore suggesting that GAs lack an individual or a
degree argument. Those steps will be taken in the next two sections.
Fults (2006) observes that a battery of modifiers can appear with GAs in
comparatives, and, crucially, that they must be interpreted within the scope of the
comparative morpheme: (210) cannot be understood as comparing Al’s degree of
patience directed at Mary, spatially located in a certain way, with Bill’s degree of
patience simpliciter. This minimally suggests that the modifiers combine with the
GA before it combines with the comparative morpheme.
(210) Al is more patient with Mary on the playground than Bill is.
This point is made more striking when the modifiers appear following the
than-clause (211): to the extent that (211) is interpretable, the modifiers are con-
tained within the scope of the than-clause alone.3 The contrast between (210) and
(211) further suggests that the modifiers in (210) compose with the GA prior to its
combining with -er.
(211) Al is more patient than Bill is with Mary on the playground.
A matrix constituent like patient with Mary on the playground must be avail-
able for ellipsis resolution separately from the subject Al; but, what are these mod-
ifiers modifying? They do not appear to be modifying predicates of individuals; at
least, not if such modification is conjunctive. None of the examples in (212) seem
to be interpreted in such a way as paraphrases like Al is happier than the standard
for happiness & Al is when Carl does well suggest, which is what we would expect
if GAs and modifiers denote predicates of individuals.
(212) a. Al is happy in the morning.
3I ignore the irrelevant interpretation of (211) that obtains with a large prosodic break after
than Bill is.
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b. Al is happy with Carl.
c. Al is happy because Carl won the lottery.
d. Al is happy when Carl does well.
e. Al is happy in the country but not the city.
Moreover, the same types of modifiers regularly show up with verbal predicates
like the “fake” stative sit (213) and eventive run. The simplest hypothesis is that
such phrases are uniformly interpreted as predicates of eventualities.
(213) Al sat/ran with Mary on the playground.
I would add the observation that, if more is post-posed with respect to the
GA and its satellites, the comparison can only be in terms of how often a certain
sort of state-of-affairs obtains, (214), just like what we have been calling a verbal
comparative. This indicates that there may be more structure to the adjectival
phrase than is normally posited; I return to data like (214) in Chapter 5.
(214) Al is patient with Mary on the playground more than Bill is.
The first set of Fults’ examples suggest that GAs have something like a state
argument. The second set support an argument against analyzing them as mere
properties of individuals.
As Landman (2000) stresses, GA nominalizations appear to involve explicit
reference to states, which is distinct from referring to, for example, the fact that
a particular property is instantiated. For example, it in the last clause of (215)
can’t refer to the fact that Oedipus was in love with Jocasta, since in that case the
dialogue should sound contradictory, contrary to fact. Rather, Landman writes, the
pronoun here must refer to “the state of Oedipus being in love with Jocasta”. This
argument can be reproduced with a GA as in (216).
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(215) Oedipus was in love with Jocasta. Though the fact that he was in
love with her was a burden on his conscience, he had to admit that it
felt good.
(216) Mary was very happy when John failed his defense. Though the fact
that she was happy was a burden on her conscience, still she had to
admit that it felt good.
Landman (2000) further provides the type of arguments that originally moti-
vated Davidson (1967) himself, applied to GAs. Davidson argued, based on data
like that in (217), that eventive verbs like stab have an additional argument slot
that can be used as a pivot for adverbial modification. The alternative, expanding
the valence of an expression to treat each of a set of modifiers in sentences like
(217a) as optional arguments, is to be dispreferred on the grounds that it fails to
capture logical relationships between sentences. Positing arbitrarily many rules to
guarantee entailment relationships between such hypothetical predicates would fail
to capture the productive generality of the fact that (217a) and (a permutation of
(217a)) (217b) are truth-conditionally equivalent, both entail (217c) and (217d),
and all, in turn, entail (217e), but not the other way around.
(217) a. Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife.
b. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife in the back.
c. Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back.
d. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife.
e. Brutus stabbed Caesar.
Such inference patterns are neatly captured by supposing that they reflect
a rule of conjunction reduction; as Davidson suggested, this can be accomplished
by treating verbs like stab as predicates of events, and its modifiers as conjunct
predicates of the same variable.
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Landman reproduces this pattern with the GA small. Since the interpretation
of GAs depends on a comparison class in the positive form, this has to be controlled
for before we can see the diamond-shaped pattern of entailments. In (218), an
explicit standard-degree descriptor for a pink elephant is provided, and, according
to Landman, (218a) and a permutation of it, (218b), are equivalent. Moreover, both
(218a) and (218b) entail (218c), and all, in turn, entail (218d), but not the other
way around.
(218) a. Jumbo is a small (for a pink elephant) pink elephant.
b. Jumbo is a pink small (for a pink elephant) elephant.
c. Jumbo is a small (for a pink elephant) elephant.
d. Jumbo is a pink elephant.
e. Jumbo is an elephant.
These considerations suggest that GA interpretations have a Davidsonian ar-
gument,4 but do not speak to the question of how they compose in comparative
constructions. Landman (2000) was not concerned with the use of predicates like
small in comparative contexts, and so did not offer an opinion on this. Fults did of
course consider the context of comparative constructions, positing that degrees are
introduced in adjectival comparatives by a covert relational predicate deg, but did
not specify where this predicate came from.
In the next section, I consider whether an argument that has been made for
the analysis of GAs as measure functions can in fact be used against that analysis.
Following this, I present Bresnan’s (1973) hypothesis that much in fact appears
underlyingly in GA comparative constructions.
4Parsons 1990 proposed a neodavidsonian analysis for so-called “fake stative” predicates like
sit, and lie down; see also Kratzer 1989 for relevant discussion. Moltmann 2009 analyzes adjectives
as state predicates so as to eliminate degrees, which is not the course pursued here, for the reasons
discussed in Chapter 2.
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4.1.3. Incommensurability
I noted in the introduction to this dissertation that Kennedy (1999) used
‘incommensurability’ phenomena to argue against vagueness-based approaches to
the semantics of gradable adjectives (although see Doetjes 2009 and Van Rooij
2011). This reasoning there was that, without appeal to the notion of ‘degree’ and
‘ordering’ (or, ‘scale’), such phenomena were unexpected. This argument ultimately
served to interpret gradable adjectives as measure functions. However, if the same
phenomena are found with nominal and verbal comparatives as well, this suggests
that the argument is not about GAs, as opposed to about comparative constructions
more generally.
Licit cases of so-called “subcomparatives”, as in (219a), feature adjectives
like wide and tall, and pose no difficulty to the understanding: (219a) expresses
a comparison of the width of a ladder and the height of a doorway, in which the
measure of the former is greater than that of the latter. Similarly, (219b) expresses a
comparison of something like the relative saturation of the redness of some curtains
and the greenness of a carpet.5
(219) a. This ladder is wider than the doorway is tall.
b. The curtains are redder than the carpet is green.
In contrast, pairing adjectives that do not traffic in the same dimensions for
measurement are odd. It is not clear what (220a) should mean, i.e., it is not obvious
how we should understand a comparison of measures of width and greenness, and
similarly for measures of redness and height, (220b).6
5One alternative reading concerns the relative extents of their red- or green-cover; see Kennedy
& McNally 2010 for discussion of the potential ambiguity of color terms. It is also not totally
clear to me that redder than invokes ‘saturation’ as opposed to something more properly multi-
dimensional.
6There are plausible alternative interpretations in the vicinity, namely “comparisons of devi-
ation” (Kennedy 1999) or perhaps even “indirect comparisons” (Bale 2008; see also Van Rooij
2011). I discuss these apparent subvarieties of comparatives in Chapter 6.
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(220) a. ? This ladder is wider than the carpet is green.
b. ? The curtains are redder than that doorway is tall.
Consider the analogous cases in the nominal domain. It is reasonable to com-
pare booze and chocolate in terms of the volume of each that went into a cake,
(221a). But now imagine that what Al in fact did was dot the cake with chocolate
hearts. (222a) isn’t a good way of talking about a comparison of measures by volume
of booze and chocolate. Why should it matter if we talk about the stuff, chocolate,
versus the objects, chocolate hearts? Put another way, if booze and chocolate are fine
to compare, so should booze and chocolate hearts be.
(221) a. Al put more booze in the cake than she did chocolate. vol
b. Al bought more greeting cards than Bill did crystals. num
(222) a. ? Al put more booze in the cake than she did chocolate hearts.
b. ? Al bought more greeting cards than Bill bought crystal.
Perhaps (222a) and (227b) are odd because there is something like a category
mismatch between the expressions to be compared, in which we attempt to compare
a mass expression with a plural one.7 However, it is clear that such an explanation
will not work in the general case. Imagine we are describing the aftermath of a
particularly raucous heavy metal concert. First, blood and sound are both mass
nouns by the test of compatibility with much (223), as are carpeting and light, by
the test of requiring singular agreement on the verb (224).
(223) a. Much blood remained on the ground a week later.
b. Much sound poured from the speakers.
(224) a. The carpeting is/*are red.
b. The light in this room is/*are bright.
7This is actually expected on the theory of plural comparisons that I develop in Chapter 5.
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Yet, blood/sound and carpeting/light are not comparable one to the other in
terms of e.g. volume (225a) or area/brightness (225b).
(225) a. ? More blood spilled to the ground than sound poured from the speakers.
b. ? Al asked for a room that has more carpeting than it has light.
Similar patterns obtain in the verbal domain. While it is natural to com-
pare how much one individual hates or loves another in terms of the extent of the
emotional intensity involved (226a), or to compare numbers of events of acting on
those devotions (226b), we can’t mix and match: we don’t know how to compare
how much one individual hates another with how much an individual acts on their
devotions, (227).
(226) a. Susie hated her mother more than Bill loved his. intens
b. Susie visited her mother more than Bill called his father. num
(227) a. ? Susie hated her mother more than Bill called his father.
b. ? Susie hated her mother more than Bill visited his.
In a similar vein, drive, speed up, and sleep are all verbs that combine with so
much, yet the drive/sleep pair is comparable (229a), while the speed up/sleep pair is
not (229b)—at least on the hypothetical interpretation expressing a comparison by
speed.
(228) a. Al drove so much yesterday that her back became sore.
b. Al sped up so much that she overtook the first four competitors.
c. Al slept so much that for once she doesn’t need a nap today.
(229) a. Last night Bill drove more than Al slept. dur
b. ? Last night Bill sped up more than Al slept.
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These data show that, whatever the syntactic category of expression targeted
by a comparative construction, intuitions of incommensurability can be evinced.
Incommensurability does not distinguish GAs from nouns and verbs. This pattern
makes sense if J-erK expresses a greater-than relation between degrees, if and only
if the degrees to be compared are on the same scale, as argued by Kennedy (1999)
in the context of the standard theory.
On that theory, the explanation for adjectival, on the one hand, and nominal
and verbal patterns, on the other, would differ depending on the syntactic category.
Adjectives denote specific measure functions, and so it has to be that the measure
functions the compared adjectives denote have the same range. With nominal and
verbal comparatives, it has to be that the ranges of the two measure functions
that value µ in each clause are the same. If, in contrast, GAs denote predicates
of measurables (i.e., states) as opposed to measurers, the explanation could, in
principle, be the same across syntactic categories: it arises due to an interaction
between the semantic properties of much and -er/as.
For such a theory to work out, it would have to be that (something like) much
appears in the syntax of GA comparatives. I turn directly to the evidence that this
is in fact the case.
4.1.4. Morphosyntax
We have seen that invoking intensive versus extensive measures and incom-
mensurability do not distinguish GAs from nominal and verbal predicates, and we
have seen evidence suggesting that GAs, like verb phrases, are predicates of eventu-
alities. If that is so, then it is possible that they are not also predicates of degrees.
It would have to be that something else introduces degrees for quantification by
comparative morphemes. In this section, I present morphosyntactic data suggesting
that much is there, and so can perform that function.
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Bresnan (1973) argues that the underlying syntax of degree phrases is more
uniform across syntactic categories than is generally thought in contemporary degree-
theoretic analyses. I present a sketch of her analysis, and suggest that, from an LF
perspective, it is indistinguishable from that of its apparent rival, Corver (1997;
cf. Neeleman et al. 2004). The net result is that something like much is present
even in GA comparative constructions, regardless of the particular implementation
(Bresnan or Corver) one adopts.
First, Bresnan considers the class of comparative morphemes in the nominal
domain, observing that all but one of them occurs with much, (230). She suggests
that this paradigm is explicable if the form more decomposes into two morphemes,
much and -er: whenever portions of a nominal’s extension are compared, much is
required.8
(230) a. as much soup
b. too much soup
c. so much soup
d. that much soup
e. * more much soup
Next, she notes that if more decomposes into much and -er, and given that
forms like (231a) are grammatical, the prediction should be that all of (231b)-
(231e) are possible, contrary to fact. Instead, the grammatical forms for combining
comparative morphemes with adjectives like delicious are as in (232).
(231) a. more delicious
b. * as much delicious
c. * too much delicious
d. * that much delicious
8Thanks to J. Lidz, p.c., for helping me present Bresnan’s arguments in a more readable form.
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e. * so much delicious




To maintain the analysis of more as a composite of much plus -er, Bresnan
posits the deletion rule in (233). Specifically, this rule deletes much before adjectives
(and adverbs), and applies after the rule that produces more. (If it applied in the
opposite order, it would bleed that rule.) As a result, what is underlyingly as much
intelligent surfaces as as intelligent.
(233) much Deletion:
much → ∅ / A
Providing supporting evidence for the hypothesis that there is such a rule of
much-deletion before adjectives, Bresnan considers the properties of than-clauses.
She first notes the independent generalization that it is not possible to contract the
copular form is to ’s before a deleted constituent; consider the contrast between
(234a) and (234b).
(234) a. Al is happy, and Bill is ∆, too. where J∆K = happy
b. * Al’s happy, and Bill’s ∆, too. where J∆K = happy
Finally, she notes that it is not possible to contract is to ’s in the than-clause
of a GA comparative; contrast (235a) and (235b). On the hypothesis that there is a
rule of much-deletion as in (233), the ungrammaticality of (235b) can be explained
as an instance of whatever is responsible for (234b). If there were no such rule,
(235b) would need an independent explanation.
(235) a. The cat is prettier than the dog is ugly.
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b. * The cat is prettier than the dog’s ugly.
Bresnan’s analysis is situated within a model of grammar that posits the levels
of Deep Structure and Surface Structure, but can be recast in terms familiar from
contemporary Distributed Morphology; see Dunbar & Wellwood (in prep). Updating
her account, the posited rule in (233) can be seen as morphophonological (or PF)
in nature, and consequently not affecting LF interpretation.
Consequently, Bresnan’s account can be seen to predict that there could be
cases where a sentence containing an overt much alternates with a sentence wherein
it is covert, without a change in meaning.
Data noted by Bresnan confirm such a prediction:9 clauses headed by than/as
can act as interveners for the rule in (233), as shown in (236a) and (237a). Here,
the as/than clauses remain in situ. If they extrapose to the right, as in (236b) and
(237b), the conditions for the application of (233) obtain. Importantly, these pairs
are not obviously semantically distinct: (236a,b) express a possibility with respect
to the plants’ height, and (237a,b) express that John’s height is at least 6 feet.
(236) a. These plants may grow as much as 6 feet high.
b. These plants may grow as high as 6 feet.
(237) a. John is more than 6 feet tall.
b. John is taller than 6 feet.
On Bresnan’s proposal, the underlying structures of the strings in (236) can
be given schematically as in (238), and those of (237) as in (239).
9Related are cases like those with the GAs different and alike, much-deletion is apparently
optional (Bresnan 1973, p278, fn.4). Its presence/absence again fails to affect LF interpretation.
This pattern could be due in some way to the apparent morphological complexity of these GAs,
although investigating this pattern further is beyond the scope of the present work.
i. A tangerine isn’t as (much) different from an orange as I’d thought.
ii. You and I are as (much) alike as a horse and a cow.
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(238) a. These plants may grow [ as much as 6 feet high ]
b. These plants may grow [ as much ti high as 6 feeti ]
(239) a. John is [ -er much than 6 feet tall ]
b. John is [ -er much ti tall than 6 feeti ]
Corver (1997), agreeing with Bresnan that there is always some head that
merges with comparative morphemes before the latter merge with adjectives, rean-
alyzes Bresnan’s data in terms of what have been called, by him and others since,
much-support. Analogizing to do-support, Corver suggests that this “Q head” is
phonologically null, but must be phonologically supported in certain environments.
Such cases include when it appears next to the pro-form so in (240).
(240) John is generous, in fact he is too much so.
Despite the differences in implementation, both Bresnan and Corver posit
the presence of a head that is sometimes pronounced much that merges first with
comparative morphemes, regardless of the lexical category of expression that these
morphemes combine with. Now, either this head has a non-trivial semantics, or it
doesn’t. I have argued that it is interpreted as a monotonic mapping to degrees,
and in what follows, I continue to refer to it as much. The rest of this chapter is
devoted to explicating a theory on which GAs denote entities of the sort that can
be measured.
4.2. On ‘measurement’
In my analysis of nominal and verbal comparatives, I appealed to a general
predicate much that introduced a context-sensitive variable over measures. Permis-
sible values of µ were restricted to those that are homomorphic on the measured
domain. This understanding of “measure” is familiar from measurement theory,
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where measurement is defined as a structure-preserving map from an empirical re-
lational structure (essentially, a set of objects and an observable ordering relation
between them) and a numerical structure (essentially, a set of numerical objects and
an ordering relation between them—here, I understand these as degree orderings).10
On the account I offered, much “measures” ordered bits of matter (as with
JcoffeeK) or process (as with JrunK). If much is to measure in adjectival comparatives
as well, the question is: what is it measuring?
The answer to this question relates to a question from measurement theory:
when you measure an individual for their height, what is the measurement of? The
object itself, or the object’s height? The distinction may seem subtle, but it is
important, and can be answered in at least two ways. The practical answer is that
the object itself is measured; the conceptual answer is that the height is measured,
with the help of or by means of the object.
It seems, on the face of it, that when I ask of some coffee How hot is it? and
engage in some measuring behavior, that what I am measuring is the coffee. And
indeed, the standard analysis of GAs as predicates of individuals presupposes such
a view. But, as Berka (1983) understands it, the coffee is merely the measured
object (practical understanding of measurement11). The object of measurement in
this context is properly understood as the heat itself (conceptual understanding of
measurement12), here of the coffee as opposed to of something else. The operative
10For practical discussion, references, and introductory material, see Krantz et al. 1971 and
Roberts 1985; see Berka 1983 for philosophical discussion. I discuss Berka’s ideas in more detail
below. See also early discussion in Sapir 1944, and the linking of several ideas from measurement
theory to linguistic theory in Sassoon 2007.
11“Every measurement is always performed on objectively existing things and phenomena....
there exist no properties or relations as such, but always only spatiotemporally determined things
and phenomena having certain properties – things and phenomena which occur in definite relations
independently of our conceptual selection of the properties and relations between them.” (Berka
1983:28)
12“Often, there exist very complex connections between the measured objects, on which or with
the help of which we measure something... and the features which we measure or with the help
of which we measure these objects.... that which we measure, and that on what or by means of
which we measure, are not to be identified....” (Berka 1983:29)
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notion is that, whatever phenomena display the properties that are preserved in the
mapping to degrees, to use our terms, are what is measured.
On the latter view, the concept of measurement is understood as a structure-
preserving (or homomorphic) map from an empirical relational structure into a
numerical one. The interpretation of JmuchK offered in this thesis is measurement-
theoretic in the same sense: it invokes mappings from ordered domains to the domain
of degrees.
Objects (and other things) have varying quantities of heat, and these quantities
bear certain relations to one another. If measurement is defined as a structure-
preserving map from an empirical relational structure (like the relational structure
corresponding to, say, observation of all possible heats) to a numerical structure,
it couldn’t (conceptually) be that we are measuring the coffee, unless the coffee
indeed shows the relational properties that are preserved in the measurements. The
structure preserved when we assign degrees based on the heat of the coffee is not
the structure of, e.g., the coffee, as we saw above, but the structure of a property
that the coffee instantiates “in degrees”. It is only in virtue of this that it makes
sense to assign one degree as opposed to another, and to say that a given degree
represents the heat of the coffee.
More concretely, on the standard theory in semantics, the input to the “mea-
sure function” incorporated as part of the meaning of hot is some stuff x, e.g., that
satisfies JcoffeeK. If that stuff happens to have some interesting structure, this plays
no role in how the output of the hot function is determined. The output is de-
termined based on an ordering imposed on things like coffee, where this ordering
is by heat. Different properties may (of course) order objects differently depending
on the degree to which they possess/instantiate the property. The standard theory
thus can be understood as encoding the “practical” understanding of measurement:
the measure function takes entities to their measures along some dimension.
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(241) λx.hot(x) 〈e, d〉
However, we may opt instead to say that such a measure function as is ex-
pressed by hot, if it exists, is complex, and that it involves more kinds of entities
than we thought. Considering the “conceptual” understanding of measurement, we
could reify “heats” as eventualities that correspond to the heat-states of objects, i.e.
hot is a predicate of states. In the neodavidsonian context, instead of analyzing e.g.
JsleepK as a property of individuals (sleep(x)), it is a property of a first-class entity
in its own right, an event of sleeping (sleep(e)), which is related to its participants
via explicit thematic relations like Agent, etc. A parallel conception for gradable
adjectives is possible: instead of analyzing JhotK as a property of individuals or as a
relation between individuals and degrees, it is a property of states that such entities
can instantiate.
(242) λs.hot(s) 〈v, t〉
While we normally think of hot as applying to objects directly, on this view it
relates indirectly, via a thematic relation or function. On this understanding, when
we say something like This rock is hotter than that rock, only practically speaking
are we measuring the rock; conceptually (and linguistically) we are measuring the
states of heat that they have, bear, or instantiate.
So far, there is not yet the question of intensive versus extensive dimensions
for measurement, because we are not yet measuring anything like JcoffeeK. We are
measuring some state that the coffee is in. The question of intensive/extensive arises
when we go back to coffee, i.e. (243). Combining an expression denoting a predicate
like this with much, we consider directly the structure of the domain of application
of coffee, which, we have hypothesized, is an ordering of portions of coffee by the
part-of relation. That is because the definedness conditions on much require that
all permissible values of µ are homomorphic on the measured domains. Domains
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like this will thus give rise to extensive dimensions only.
(243) λx.coffee(x) 〈e, t〉
Indeed, if one were to measure such a domain by temperature, the mapping
would be intensive. This is precisely what is ruled out by definition with much.
However, the values of µ in the context of JhotK could be different, since it is not
coffee, but amounts of heat that are measured. In the next section, I formalize this
idea by analyzing adjectival comparative constructions as involving comparisons of
measures of states.
4.3. Measuring states
I propose that much plays the same semantic role everywhere it appears, and
that it appears everywhere there is a comparative morpheme, e.g. with -er, as, too,
etc. This section shows how this analysis, based on Bresnan’s (1973) morphosyntax,
implements much mapping states to degrees in GA comparative constructions. All
that is required is, for completeness, that we can see even GA comparatives as
involving monotonic mappings to degrees.
I adopt from the neodavidsonian theory the requirement that thematic rela-
tions are exhaustive and unique. This entails, among other things, that an individual
x can be said to be in a tall state s only if x bears the right thematic relationship
to s, and moreover, if x is in s, it is impossible for some other y to also be in
s.13 I assume that the thematic relations individuals bear to states could profitably
be labeled Holder-of, Bearer-of, or Instantiates, but I do not resolve this question
13Note that, if thematic uniqueness is assumed, it would sometimes be impossible to order e.g.
Al’s tall-state s and Bill’s tall-state s′ with respect to one another without something like much
further mapping those heights to degrees. That is, it cannot be the case that s = s′. The problem
would be exacerbated on interval-based theories, in which we would talk of Al’s tall-states S and
Bill’s tall-states S′, and the ordering would be understood in terms of inclusion. The two convex





The interpretable use of much, as we have seen, depends on at least two things:
first, that whatever it predicates of be in the domain of a (non-trivial) ordering, and
second, that the value of µ be chosen from among those that are homomorphic to
the relevant ordering. In the cases we’ve looked at in detail (mass nouns and atelic
verbs) the relevant ordering was a part-whole relation. Among other things, if the
state satisfiers of JhotK don’t have mereological parts, combining any much that
appeals to such a condition with hot should result in nonsense.
In discussing any restriction to intensive or extensive measures, it is important
to consider a distinction brought to the fore in Champollion (2010): that such
measures are only so classified relative to a system. For instance, while above I
talked as though the temperature dimension is “intensive” simpliciter, it is only
intensive relative to what is being measured. On the standard account, hotter coffee
expresses, in part, a measurement of portions of coffee. In such cases, temperature
is an intensive dimension.
However, on the present account, hotter coffee represents measures of the state
satisfiers of hot, which are different sorts of entities from portions of coffee with,
I presume, their own ordering relations. The question is, then, is temperature
extensive or intensive with respect to JhotK?
The interpretation of pseudopartitives is instructive in this respect. Schwarzschild
(2006) argues that examples like (244) are ungrammatical because the pseudopar-
titive construction requires monotonic (/extensive) dimensions for measurement.
(244) * Al drank 30 degrees Celsius of water.
14See Dowty 1989 for relevant discussion towards interpreting the content of thematic predicates.
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Yet, as Champollion (2010) points out, there are cases where the pseudopar-
titive, interpreted with respect to the temperature dimension, are perfectly gram-
matical; he gives the naturally occurring examples in ((245a,b); ibid., p153) as
examples. Here, what is measured is JfeverK and Jglobal warmingK; if we are to
maintain Schwarzschild’s explanation for data like that in (244), then it would have
to be that, contrary to intuition, the temperature dimension is monotonic on the
domains of such predicates.
(245) a. Emilia was lying on her bed, with 41 degrees Celsius of fever.
b. The scientists from Princeton and Harvard universities say just two
degrees Celsius of global warming, which is widely expected to
occur in the coming decades, could be enough to inundate the planet.
As Champollion (p.c.) also points out, we may observe that a smaller amount
of heat will have a smaller temperature measure than a larger amount. To think
of the temperature dimension as extensive with respect to heat requires the further
step of thinking about that smaller amount of heat as a mereological part of the
larger amount of heat. Herein lie metaphysical or psychological questions that are
beyond the scope of this work; however, the benefits of adopting such a perspective
are, as Champollion notes, that it allows us to maintain Schwarzschild’s explanation
for data like (244), and to see (245) as consistent with it.
It would be worth exploring whether weakening the conditions proposed for
the interpretation of much in §3.3.2 (i.e., that all that is required is an ordering,
not necessarily by part-of), but for the present I will adopt the stronger position:
the interpretation of much doesn’t change. Following Champollion’s suggestion, I
hypothesize that GAs predicate of states appearing in the domain D of an ordering
by 4Part.
Although this is likely counter-intuitive, my interest is in the idea that the
distinction between gradable and non-gradable adjectives is of the same basic
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sort as the distinction between mass/count and atelic/telic—all are distinctions in
the domains of application for predicates. At present, the best way I know how to
maintain that these distinctions are on a par is to assimilate the one to the other.
I thus maintain the interpretation and definedness conditions on much posited
in Chapter 3: (i) the measured domain must be measurable (i.e., structured); (ii)
the mapping must be homomorphic; and, (iii) the mapping must be extensive. In
what follows, I try to make more explicit the relationship between the orderings on
states that I posit, and the degree orderings that associate with GAs on the standard
theory.
On the standard theory, GAs associate with sets of ordered degrees. Cresswell
(1976) conceives of degrees as names for equivalence classes of objects based on
antecedent, extralinguistic ordering relations, such that the relation relevant to the
adjective hot might be represented (equivalently) as {〈x, x′〉 | x is as hot as x′}
or {〈x, x′〉 | x has as much heat as x′} (cf. Engel 1989). The collapsing of these
relations into equivalence orders is, on Cresswell’s account, extralinguistic.15
The present account adopts this basic idea, but differs in two ways. First,
the binary relation associated with hot is an ordering on states, rather than on
the individuals that instantiate them—the ordering on individuals can be recovered
via the thematic relations that link states with their bearers. Second, degrees are
introduced compositionally: states are mapped to degrees when they compose with
much, whereas on Cresswell’s view such mappings are part of the lexical semantics
of GAs.16
On this theory, the mapping to degrees is uniformly introduced by a single
expression across comparative constructions. That expression delimits a class of
measure functions depending on the nature of its α argument, one of which will be
15I discuss Bale’s 2008 lucid and accessible introduction to one way of modeling the construction
of scale structure at the end of this chapter.
16We will shortly be reminded that, on Cresswell’s view, such mappings were also part of the
lexical semantics of e.g. mass nouns.
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Table 4.1: The (simplified) structures underlying more coffee and hotter coffee, and
the relevant pieces of logical form. ‘δ’ abbreviates the contribution of the than-clause.






...µ(x)  δ & coffee(x)... ...µ(s)  δ & hot(s) & Θ(s, x) & coffee(x)...
contextually provided so long as it meets the stated conditions. On this account,
more coffee cannot express a comparison by temperature because any x that satisfies
coffee denotes in an ordering of amounts of matter, which are not (by hypothesis)
in the domain of the measure function temperature. In contrast, hotter coffee
cannot indicate a comparison by volume because heat-states are not in the domain
of volume. The general idea can be seen by inspection of Table 4.1, where Θ
abbreviates whatever thematic relation would have to obtain between portions of
coffee and states of heat when hot occurs prenominally.
Here, the gradable/non-gradable distinction is characterized as formally on a
par with the mass/count and atelic/telic distinctions. The hypothesis advanced is
that GAs, like mass nouns and atelic verb phrases, denote in structured domains:
the extension of a GA like hot is a join semi-lattice whose elements are states of heat.
Non-GAs like wooden, in contrast, are understood as predicates of atomic states, so
that, if one is in a state satisfying JwoodenK, one is in a singular state; with JhotK,
one is in many more. JhotK, then, will meet the definedness conditions for much,
while JwoodenK, e.g. (246), will fail to.
(246) ? This piece of wood is as wooden as that piece is.
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4.3.2. Composition: adjectives II
I have argued that comparative constructions like (247) have an underlying
syntax that renders them more like nominal (and verbal) comparative constructions
than is usually thought: contra to what was assumed in Chapter 2, GAs do not
combine directly with -er; -er first necessarily combines with much. In this section, I
provide a compositional semantics for GA comparatives that renders their similarity
to nominal and verbal comparative constructions explicit.
(247) Al’s coffee is hotter than Bill’s is.
Just as with verbal comparatives, the external argument of the adjective is
introduced by a separate thematic head, here labeled vS. The semantic function
of this head is to introduce the Holder of the state(s) that the adjective is true of
((248); Parsons 1990, Kratzer 1996, Husband 2012).17
(248) JvSK = λxλs.Holder(s)(x)
Since GAs have the same logical type as mass nouns and atelic verbs (that is,
they are all one-place predicates), composing them with much is straightforward:
its semantics are reproduced in (249). A GA like hot is interpreted as in (250); it
combines with much just as individual and event predicates do, conjunctively.
(249) JmuchµKA = λα.A(µ)(α) (with conditions)
(250) JhotKA = λs.hot(s)
Thus, the (simplified) structure that I posit underlies the matrix clause of
(247) is as in (251), ignoring the copular verb. Its interpretation is derived as in
(252), abbreviating the than-clause as δ. The result is an existential statement
17As Kratzer notes, nothing hinges on the choice of label ‘Holder’. The specific content of
thematic relations with states, as with eventualities of other sorts, remains a yet unresolved issue.
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about states of heat that Al’s coffee is in, whose assigned measure is greater than









(252) i. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
ii. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (i),FA
iii. JA2PKA = λs′.hot(s′) & A(µ)(s′)  δ (ii),PM
iv. JvS2PKA = λxλs′.Holder(s′)(x) & hot(s′) & A(µ)(s′)  δ (iii),EI
v. JS2KA = λs′.Holder(s′)(Al’s-coffee) & hot(s′) & A(µ)(s′)  δ (iv),FA
vi. = > iff ∃s′[Holder(s′)(Al’s-coffee) & hot(s′) & A(µ)(s′)  δ] (v),∃
The structure of the than-clause of (247) is given in (253), and the derivation
of it is interpretation in (254). The result is a definite description over degrees










(254) i. JDeg1’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α) < d IR,FA
ii. JDeg1PKA = λα.A(µ)(α) < A(i) (i),IR,FA
iii. JA1PKA = λs.hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < A(i) (ii),PM
iv. JvS1PKA = λxλs.Holder(s)(x) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < A(i) (iii),EI
v. JS1KA = λs.Holder(s)(Bill’s-coffee) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < A(i) (iv),FA
vi. = > iff ∃s[Holder(s)(Bill’s-coffee) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < A(i)] (v),∃
vii. JopPKA:Ai→d =
λd.∃s[Holder(s)(Bill’s-coffee) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < d] (vi),PA
viii. JthanPKA =
ιd[∃s[Holder(s)(Bill’s-coffee) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < d]] (vii),FA
The result of combining the interpretations of the two clauses is given in (255).
(255) encodes the prediction that an utterance of (247) will be judged true just in
case there is a state of heat that Al’s coffee is in, the measure of which is greater than
the measure of that state of Bill’s coffee. Since the measured entity is a heat-state,
measurement by temperature will be licensed.
(255) JAl’s coffee is hotter than Bill’s coffee isKA = > iff
∃s′[Holder(s′)(Al’s-coffee) & hot(s′) & A(µ)(s′) 
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ιd[∃s[Holder(s)(Bill’s-coffee) & hot(s) & A(µ)(s) < d]]]
As discussed above, the analysis of GAs as predicates of states is well-suited
to the analysis of sentences like that in (210) with multiple modifiers, repeated here
as (256). Semantically, (256) expresses a comparison of measures of patience that
are directed at Mary and spatially located in a certain way.
(256) Al is more patient with Mary on the playground than Bill is.
Again abbreviating the than-clause as δ, a simplified derivation of the inter-
pretation of (256) is given in (257). The result is a predicate of patient-states which
bear certain relations to other entities such as Mary (M) and the playground (ιp)
and whose measure is greater than δ.
(257) more patient with Mary on the playground than...







patient with Mary on the playground





Sentences like Al is patient with Mary on the playground more than Bill is with
more post-posed with respect to the modifiers are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
There, I propose a state-to-event mapping that perhaps will be relevant for the
analysis of sentences like (258a) and (258b), as well: very modifies the core stative
predicate, and on occasion quantifies over the derived events.18
18I do not intend the interpretation derived in (257) to suggest e.g. that the interpretation of (i)
would be equivalent to the interpretation of (ii). The non-equivalence could be derived, I suspect,
by further elaborating the structural heights at which with-phrases can attach, with consequent
effects on interpretation. It is possible that the with-phrase in (i) relates Mary to the state of
patience itself (and interpreted as ‘patience directed at/with respect to Mary’), and in (ii), relates
Mary to the occasion of the state’s holding (‘on that occasion, being patient and in spatiotemporal
proximity to Mary’).
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(258) a. Al was very patient last week.
b. Al was patient on occasion last week.
This account extends that presented in Chapter 3, as applied to GA compara-
tive constructions. The next section shows how this theory applies to comparatives
with distinct adjectives, nouns and verbs across the two comparative clauses.
4.3.3. Composition: subcomparatives
The analysis in terms of much can account for incommensurability data straight-
forwardly. I propose an analysis similar to Kennedy’s (1999; and references therein):
by imposing the natural condition on comparative morphemes that the degrees they
compare come from the same degree ordering. This is encoded on the present
account in the following way. much’s definedness conditions say that, for a given
measured entity x, there is an ordering on x and that ordering is in the domain
of some measure function. A measure function, as on the standard theory, maps
entities to degrees. The greater-than relation contributed by J-erK is identical to
that of the scale from which the compared degrees are drawn. If there is no scale
that orders the two degrees, the result is anomalous.
This requirement on the interpretation of e.g. -er (its interpretation is repeated
in (259)) may be encoded as a definedness condition, as in (260). (260) effectively
restricts the permissible measures in the comparanda of a comparative construction
to just those whose ranges are in the same degree ordering.19
(259) J-erK = λgλdλα.g(α)  d
i. Al is patient with Mary.
ii. Al is patient and Al is with Mary.
19The same requirement also falls out if we adopt the higher-type interpretation for comparative
morphemes discussed at the end of Chapter 3.
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(260) Definedness conditions on -er
For all d, d′, d  d′ just in case there is an ordering 〈D<Deg ,<Deg〉, such
that
i. d, d′ ∈ D<Deg ; and
ii. d Deg d′.
Consider the commensurable example (219a), repeated in (261). (261) is per-
fectly interpretable, expressing that a ladder has a width that exceeds the height of
a doorway. An utterance of such a sentence would be judged true, for example, if
the width-measure of the ladder is 6 feet, and the height-measure of the doorway
is 5 feet. While wide and tall are different in that they express predicates of differ-
ent sorts of states, they are comparable because there is class of measure functions
that map both sorts of states to the same degree ordering—an ordering on degrees
representing length.
(261) This ladder is wider than the doorway is tall.
Following the discussion in the preceding section, I posit that the underlying
(simplified) structure of the matrix and than-clauses of (261) are exactly as those
we saw in the preceding section (262), with the only differences that the than-clause
as in (263) contains a token of a distinct adjective from that of the matrix clause,
(262). Ultimately, these structures are pronounced differently as well: the distinct


















The calculation of the interpretation of these structures is the same as in the
case where a token of the same type of adjective appears in the matrix and than-
clauses, except for the difference in adjectives, (264). In (264), ιL abbreviates the
interpretation of the ladder, and ιD the interpretation of the doorway. The result is
that an utterance of (261) is predicted to be judged true just in case the assigned
measure of the ladder’s wideness exceeds the measure of the doorway’s tallness;
since both wide and tall denote in the domain of the measure function length, the
comparison succeeds so long as such a measure function is assigned by A.
(264) JThe ladder is wider than the doorway is tallKA = > iff
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∃s′[Holder(s′)(ιL) & wide(s′) & A(µ)(s′) 
ιd[∃s[Holder(s)(ιD) & tall(s) & A(µ)(s) < d]]]
Inspecting the interpretation in (264), we can see where the interpretive re-
strictions on J-erK are enforced. As soon as J-erK composes with JthanPK, the range
of permissible interpretations of ‘’ is fixed: it must be an ordering on degrees that
represent measures of tallness-states. This serves to restrict the range of permissible
measures invoked by the interpretation of much in the matrix clause.
Next, consider a case with incommensurable adjectives, as in (220a), repeated
here as (265). Again, wide and green express predicates of different sorts of states,
but they are incomparable because there is no class of measure functions that map
both of these sorts of states to the same degree ordering. If the states predicated of
by JwideK are not in the domain of any measure function in the class that maps to
degrees representing saturation, for example, or the states predicated of by JgreenK
are not in the domain of any measure function in the class that maps to degrees of
length, then the requirements of -er are not satisfied.
(265) ? This ladder is wider than the carpet is green.
Next, we can consider (in)commensurabilities in the nominal domain, the ex-
planation of which is exactly parallel. Consider (221a), repeated here as (266).
While booze and chocolate are different in that they predicate of different sorts of
entities, they are comparable because they denote in the domain of a class of measure
functions that map to degrees of volume.
(266) Al put more booze in the cake than she did chocolate. vol
The sentence in (266) has, I assume, the structure in (267)/(268), ignoring the






















Calculating the interpretation of these structures delivers the representation
in (269): this says that an utterance of (266) is predicted to be judged true just
in case there is an event of Al putting booze in the cake that measures a greater
quantity than that measured by the chocolate she put in. The than-clause denotes a
definite description over degrees that represent monotonic measures on the satisfiers
of chocolate; namely, degrees representing the volume or weight of the chocolate.
136
Correspondingly, measurement in the matrix clause will be restricted to degree
orderings along one or the other of these dimensions. Combining with the matrix
nominal booze will work out, then, because the satisfiers of booze denote in the
domain of the same range of measure functions.
(269) JAl put more booze in the cake than she did chocolateKA = > iff
∃e[Agent(e′)(Al) & put(e′)(εx′[booze(x′) & A(µ)(x′) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & put(e)(εx[chocolate(x) & A(µ)(x) < d]]]]])
Similarly for examples like (270). blood and sound indeed predicate of different
sorts of entities, but they are incomparable because booze denotes in the domain of
a measure function in the class that maps to degrees of volume, whereas sound does
not: it denotes in the domain of the class that maps to degrees of loudness. Such
measure functions map into different degree orderings, and thus -er cannot order
their respective degrees.
(270) ? Al saw more blood than he heard sound.
The explanation works the same way for commensurabilities in the verbal do-
main like (271), though there is a slight twist here. Events satisfying drive are in
the domain of measure functions that map to degrees representing temporal dura-
tion, as are events satisfying sleep. Restricting -er to comparing such degrees at the
point where the than-clause merges with the complex much-er restricts the range
of permissible measures to just those whose range contains degrees representing
temporal duration. Hence, (271) is predicted to be evaluable.
(271) Last night Al drove more than Bill slept. dur
The situation with incommensurabilities in the verbal domain is somewhat
more subtle. Consider (272). On one way of approaching this sentence, it is incom-
mensurable: sped up in the than-clause is most naturally read as being measured
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by speed. But, it may also be read more eventively, as expressing a measure by
temporal duration. If it is possible to fix on such an interpretation, (272) might be
acceptable.
(272) ? Last night Al slept more than Bill sped up.
On the theory just developed, the insights of the standard theory with respect
to incommensurability can be maintained, however, they are unified with parallel
effects in the nominal and verbal domain. Incommensurability needn’t, then, be
seen as an argument for scales lexically associated with adjectives; it can be seen
as an effect of the interaction between the measure functions contributed by much
and the semantic requirements of comparative morphemes like -er. Capturing these
data in a unified way relies on the idea that GAs are predicates of (measurable)
states, for which there is independent evidence; moreover, this move allowed me to
account for their modification behavior in comparative constructions.
It might be argued that the data discussed in this chapter so far could have
led one to exactly the opposite conclusion: why not hypothesize, instead, that all
‘gradable’ adjectives, nouns, or verbs (i.e., the ones that are evaluable in comparative
constructions) in fact denote measure functions? Then, all of their ‘non-gradable’
counterparts can denote simple properties. This option, in fact, corresponds to
Cresswell’s (1976) theory; I turn to comparisons with his and other closely related
accounts directly.
4.4. Monotonicity everywhere
On the theory I have proposed, GAs do not denote measure functions, but
properties of states. I suggested that we can understand the difference between
‘gradable’ and ‘non-gradable’ adjectives not in terms of their type (〈e, d〉 versus
〈e, t〉), but in terms of whether their domains are ordered; GAs denote in structured
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domains, whereas non-gradable adjectives do not.
I now compare this theory with three closely related alternatives, and suggest
how the present account might improve on them. My theory shares with Cresswell
(1976) a unified account of adjectival with nominal comparatives, and an acknowl-
edgement of the uniform presence of much in these constructions (whether overt or
covert). However, it differs in that he encodes the mapping to degrees directly in
the lexical entries of adjectives and nouns, rendering much semantically vacuous.
My theory shares with Bale (2006, 2008) the idea that there are more ‘primary’
or ‘primitive’ orderings associated with adjectives, but differs in that it does not
posit a ‘universal’ scale that these orderings are mapped to. Finally, the theory
shares with Reichenbach (1947) appeal to something like ‘specific properties’ (here,
states), but Reichenbach states comparisons directly over those entities rather than
over degrees.
In what follows, I show how consideration of each of these differences weigh in
favor of the present approach.
4.4.1. Comparison with Cresswell
On the account I’ve proposed, there is nothing irreducibly linguistically dif-
ferent about the gradability of adjectives and adverbs, on the one hand, and nouns
and verbs on the other. All denote entities/events/states that can be measured by
JmuchK, and the result of measurement compared by J-erK or JasK, etc. This pro-
posal was supported by (i) the observation that there is no in principle difference
in the kinds of dimensions for measurement the various constructions can give rise
to (intensive/extensive), (ii) that, regardless of syntactic category, incommensura-
bility phenomena are observed, and (iii) the morphosyntactic evidence that much is
uniformly present.
A uniform treatment seems to be what Cresswell (1976) (also von Stechow
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1984) endorsed. On Cresswell’s theory, every lexical item interpretable in compara-
tive constructions is treated of a formal piece, regardless of any conceptual differences
between them. Crucially, however, Cresswell posits that all of the relevant lexical
items involve lexically specified measure functions. He follows Bresnan (1973) as
I do in assuming that much is always present in comparatives, but, importantly,
Cresswell holds that the semantic function of that expression is merely to mark the
presence of a degree argument.
As Cresswell himself notes, his analysis predicts that pairs like (273a)-(273b)
should be synonymous, contrary to fact. The difference in meaning here must be due
to (at least) the presence of much, but this would be impossible if it were effectively
meaningless (Cresswell 1976:290-1). Indeed, if JmuchK’s only job is to signal the
presence of a degree, and if JwaterK involves those, then (273a) should not even be
generable.
(273) a. Drink this water.
b. Drink this much water.
On the account I advocate, much introduces degrees. Such degrees can be
demonstrated, (273b). There is no degree to demonstrate in (273a).
There is a yet more tangible difference between the accounts. As we’ve seen,
assigning much an interpretation allowed us to maintain the idea that nouns and
verbs denote properties (whether gradable or non-gradable), while capitalizing on
independently motivated ideas concerning the structure of their domains of appli-
cation. If the mapping to degrees that much performs has to be monotonic, then
we understand why only certain dimensions for comparison are available with e.g.
coffee and run. On Cresswell’s theory, the tight connection between mereological
structure and dimensionality in comparatives is effectively accidental.
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4.4.2. Comparison with Bale
The account I have offered hypothesizes that the orderings of individuals,
events, and states that the grammar of measurement and comparison requires can
accessed and talked about only via the semantics of much. This type of account
presupposes, of course, that there are many degree scales that can be recruited for
such talk. However, there is an alternative style of approach in which degree scales
are constructed on the basis of antecedent orderings. This is the account offered
most prominently by Bale (2006; 2008) for adjectival comparatives. I briefly discuss
his proposal and some of the pieces of it that should be incorporated into the present
account, as well as the shortcomings that prevent me from adopting it.
Bale’s theory has two major ingredients, supplemented as discussed below.
The first is that gradable adjectives denote what he calls ‘primary scales’, i.e. binary
relations between individuals. Comparative constructions are particular in that they
involve expressions that map relative positionings of individuals on primary scales
to what he calls the Universal Scale, notated Ω. Ω is a degree structure isomorphic
to the rational numbers between 0 and 1, inclusive, and the greater-than ordering
on those numbers.
On Bale’s account, gradable adjectives denote binary relations between indi-
viduals that corresponds to the relation expressed in English by the equative, e.g.
as beautiful as. Each of these relations, being described essentially in terms of <,
is transitive, reflexive, and connected. Notice they are not antisymmetric. For
suppose that a and b are equally beautiful (i.e. 〈a, b〉, 〈b, a〉 ∈ beautiful), it is
nevertheless false that a = b. These primary orders are very similar to the orderings
I posit for GAs, except Bale’s order individuals rather than states.
(274) Primary scales (Bale)
i. beautiful =df 〈Dβ, {〈x, y〉 | x has as much beauty as y}〉
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ii. intelligent =df 〈D)ι, {〈x, y〉 | x has as much intelligence as y}〉
iii. tall =df 〈Dτ , {〈x, y〉 | x has as much height as y}〉
iv. wide =df 〈Dυ, {〈x, y〉 | x has as much width as y}〉
Comparatives demand linear orders, which adds that every individual is com-
parable to every other individual in the relation; this requires an antisymmetric
relation. By collapsing the entities in these relations into equivalence classes under
<adj, Bale maps them to linear orders. The set of all equivalence classes relative
to a given primary scale is defined as in (275). The linear order on the set of all
equivalence classes can be defined a couple of ways, (276).
(275) Defining the set of all equivalence classes (Bale)
For all binary relations ζ = 〈Dζ ,<ζ〉,
i. a ∼ζ b iff ∀x(ζ(a, x)⇔ ζ(b, x) & ζ(x, a)⇔ ζ(x, b)) equivalence
ii. ∀x ∈ Dζ , x̄ζ =df {y | y ∈ Dζ & x ∼ζ y} equiv. class
iii. Eζ =df {X ⊆ Dζ | ∃x ∈ Dζ (X = x̄ζ)} all equiv. classes
(276) Defining an ordering on equivalence classes (Bale)
i. ∀X, Y ∈ Eζ , option 1
(X <Eζ Y ) iff ∃x, y[(x ∈ X) & (y ∈ Y ) & ζ(x, y)]
ii. ∀x, y ∈ Dζ , option 2
(x̄ζ <Eζ ȳ
ζ) iff ζ(x, y)
These pieces in place, Bale defines the universal scale Ω as in (277).
(277) The universal scale Ω (Bale)
Let Ω = 〈Dω,<ω〉, such that
i. Dω is a set of degrees in one-to-one correspondence with the set of
rational numbers between 0 and 1 inclusive. Elements are labeled dx,
where x is a rational number.
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ii. For all dx, dy ∈ Dω, dx <ω dy iff x ≥ y.
Primary scales are mapped to the universal scale by the universal homomor-
phism, H, defined in (278). The domain of H is the set of all primary scales, and
its range is a set of functions from elements of those primary scales to elements of
Ω that preserves the ordering relation between them. This homomorphism can be
seen as roughly equivalent to the understanding I have accorded to much above.
(278) The universal homomorphism (Bale)
Let H be a function from Σ to H such that
i. Σ is the set of all possible (primary) scales with a finite domain.
ii. H = {h | ∃〈Eζ ,<Eζ〉 s.t. ∀x, y ∈ Eζ , x <Eζ y ⇔ h(x) <ω h(y)}.
On Bale’s theory, GAs denote functions from comparison classes (type 〈e, t〉)
to measure functions (〈e, d〉), except the mapping to degrees proceeds by reference
to H in the lexical entry of the adjective adj, (279).
(279) JadjK = λCλx.H(adjC)/∼(x̄
adjC) type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈e, d〉〉
C in (279) is a context variable whose value is either given by the context,
or can be explicitly set via a for-phrase, for example as in (280). for-phrases are
interpreted as a restriction on the set of individuals in the binary relation associated
with a given adjective, (281). Intuitively, RA, for some primary scale, is just like
R, except it only orders the entities that are in the set A (i.e., it only contains pairs
of entities drawn from A).
(280) Al is taller for a woman than Bill is tall for a man.
(281) Restriction (Bale)
For all binary relations R and sets A,
R  A =df 〈(DR ∩ A), (<R ∩ (A× A))〉.
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for-phrases, on this account, don’t contribute to the at-issue content of sen-
tences containing them: their NP arguments are interpreted as a set A, and a
presupposition is triggered that A = C, as in (282).
(282) Presuppositions of for-phrases (Bale)
For all predicates P , comparison classes C, and sets A,
Jforcc(D)(A)K(P ) = P , defined iff (C = A).
Finally, (non-decomposed) more combines with a gradable adjective adj after
adj combines with C, then takes the degree d denoted by the than-clause to return
a property of individuals.
(283) JmoreBaleK = λgλdλx.g(x)  d type 〈〈e, d〉, 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉〉
Now we can see how Bale accounts for simple adjectival comparatives (like
those we have focused on in this chapter) and what he calls ‘indirect’ comparisons
like that in (284). Bale notes that it can’t be that entities ordered on the scales
associated with beautiful and tall are directly commensurable (i.e., degrees-of-beauty
and degrees-of-smartness are not orderable with respect to one another), and so
something else must explain the fact that (284) is perfectly interpretable.
(284) Esme is more beautiful than Seymour is intelligent.
On Bale’s account, (284) is fine because we’re not comparing along the primary
scales associated with beautiful and smart directly, but rather along the universal
scale. To see how this works, consider the truth conditions he assigns to (284), in
(285), assuming a uniform comparison class variable for the matrix and than-clauses.
Here, ‘e’ represents Esme, and ‘s’ represents Seymour. (285) says that an utterance
of (284) is predicted to be judged true just in case Esme is more highly ranked on
the primary scale associated with beautiful than how highly Seymour is ranked on
the primary scale associated with intelligent.
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(285) J(284)K = > iff H(βC)/∼(ē(βC))  H(ιC)/∼(s̄(ιC))
Such represents the basic case for Bale’s analysis of comparatives. In contrast,
what he calls ‘direct’ comparisons like that in (286) are more complex. In (286), the
heights and widths of other people do not (or cannot) matter, so it can’t be that it
compares Seymour’s ranking on the primary scale associated with tall to his ranking
on the primary scale associated with wide. In that case, (286) would be predicted to
be judged true even if Seymour’s width is in fact greater than his height (it just so
happens that he’s taller and skinnier than most people). Yet, the basic apparatus
that Bale has constructed relies on finding an individual’s relative position on two
primary scales, mapping those positions to positions on the universal scale, and
comparing universal degrees.
(286) Seymour is taller than he is wide.
To address what appears to be a direct comparison of measures in such cases,
Bale posits that elements of conventional measurement schemes participate as
individuals in the binary orders associated with adjectives. What this means is that
things like 6′11′′ are included in the domain of the primary scale, for example, as
elements of the set in (288).20
(288) {Al,Bill, Seymour, 2′11, 5′2′′, 5′′, ...}
For comparisons like (286) to be defined, Bale is explicit in requiring that
the utterance context provide three things, namely that (i) the measurements that
participate are a finite set, (ii) they have a definite granularity (i.e., the set cannot
20This is not altogether untoward, because it is true (as Bale points out) that a phrase like 6
feet can appear in subject position, and be predicated of tall; however, this could be an artifact of
the predicate be tall, perhaps allowing for ellipsis of material indicating a measurement:
(287) a. 6 feet is tall.
b. ? 6 feet is unexpected.
c. ? 6 feet is a tall measure.
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be dense21), and (iii) there are the same number of levels of measurements for the
two conventional schemes so associated. So long as these requirements are fixed
in a context, and so long as the adjectives in each clause have such an associated
“measuring stick”, the result is predicted to be judged not only interpretable, but
true. This is so because the fact that we’re talking about height or width effectively
drops out of the picture in the mapping to universal degrees. Does this account
make the right predictions?
Consider (289) against Fig. 4.1. By stipulation, there is only a single box
in the universe. Now assume: the scale for width gives units in inches, and spans






}. The scale for weight







}. The stipulated set of measures is finite, the granularity is limited, and
both measurement schemes have the same number of levels, i.e. 3. Here, (289)
should not only be judged perfectly interpretable, but determinately true. This fails
to accord with intuition.
(289) ? Box A is wider than it is heavy.
Figure 4.1: (In)commensurability on Box A
A
width(A) = d 3
3
heaviness(A) = d 2
3
To take a more esoteric example, suppose that we fix some conventions for mea-
suring pinkness and due-westness; with those conventions fixed, (290) also should
21See Solt & Gotzner 2012 for arguments based on experimental evidence that this assumption
may not accord with speaker judgments.
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be perfectly acceptable and determinately judged true or false.22
(290) ? That house is pinker than it is due west.
Such examples are potentially problematic for Bale’s theory of ‘direct’ com-
parisons.23 A. Djajali (p.c.) points to a class of examples that are problematic for
Bale’s account of ‘indirect’ comparisons. Say a given woman, Al, is the superlative
exemplar of two categories, neither of which associates with a conventional measure-
ment scheme, e.g. beauty and cleverness, and Al is such that (291) is judged true
in a context. In this case, whatever fractional degree is assigned to Al with respect
to the two categories, for any numbers of levels of degrees n, they will both equal
dn
n
and so such sentences should be judged either incoherent or false, contrary to
intuition.
(291) Al is more beautiful than she is clever.
Since Bale’s account may not correctly predict that ‘direct’ comparisons de-
pend on sharing a dimension for measurement, and fails to predict the interpretabil-
ity of ‘indirect’ comparisons in superlative contexts, the account does not appear
adequate to capture the interpretation of comparatives more generally.
However, so far Bale’s account correctly predicts that sentences like (292) only
have an ‘indirect’ comparison reading, which others cannot (see Bale 2011). That is
to say, (292) is not read as a comparison of Seymour’s width to his height directly (so
he doesn’t have to be wider than he is tall): indeed, if the primary scale associated
with tall is restricted to the set of men, then measurement values can’t get in!
(292) Seymour is wider for a man than he is tall for a man.
Nonetheless, the account of examples like (292) in terms of restriction by
comparison classes account faces its own challenges. Schwarz (2010) notes that not
22Thanks go to M. Morreau (p.c.) for this example.
23A. Bale (p.c.) does not agree that these are problematic, since given the right context (290)
should be fine and interpretable as a direct comparison. Further investigation is needed here.
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all for-phrases are interpreted as restrictions on the binary relation underlying the
gradable adjective. While (293a) will be correctly derived on Bale’s account (e.g.,
as expressing that Mia’s height is significant for a three year-old’s height), (293b)
will not be. On the other hand, Schwarz’s own analysis, by his admission, can’t
account for examples like (292).24
(293) a. Mia is tall for a 3-year old.
b. Mia has an expensive hat for a 3-year old.
There are aspects of Bale’s account which are shared with my own: GAs
denote in ordered domains, and comparatives involve homomorphic mappings from
these domains to degrees. However, by not constructing scales in the manner he
does my account is able to avoid the potential issues we’ve seen with his. For
completeness, however, I must extend the theory I’ve developed here into one that
can accommodate the contributions of for-phrases.25
Lastly, it seems to me that what Bale calls an ‘indirect’ comparison like (284)
isn’t indirect at all, just the nature of the degrees has been misdiagnosed. One could
imagine that the (ordered) states predicated of by JbeautifulK and JintelligentK are
just the sort to be measured along a (shared) dimension like subjective value. I
discuss Bale’s ‘indirect’ comparisons in some more detail in Chapter 6.
4.4.3. On ‘specific properties’
The logical form I propose for GAs is most similar to that proposed by Re-
ichenbach (1947). After introducing his account, I discuss Bartsch & Venneman’s
(1972) major criticism of it, and then detail how the present proposal avoids that
24See Schwarzschild 2013 for a recent attempt to acount for both Bale’s and Schwarz’s data.
25A sketch of an idea is: analyze the head, for, as denoting a thematic relation between its NP
complement and the states predicated of by the adjective. Such an account likely would rely on




Reichenbach doesn’t appeal to particulars like events or states in his analysis
of verb phrases, but rather to ‘specific properties’. Specific properties are properties
that are unique to the individuals that bear them, and that themselves can have
various (higher-order) properties. On his account, verbs like move denote one-place
properties of specific properties, rather than relations (as on the traditional view, or
on accounts with partial thematic separation as that assumed here), as do adverbs.
(295) gives the logical form that Reichenbach’s account assigns to a sentence
like that in (294). (295) says that there is a specific property f of Al which itself
has the move property.
(294) Al moves slowly.
(295) ∃f [f(Al) & move(f) & slow(f)]
There is a specific property f that Al has, f is in the class of movement
properties, and f is in the class of slow properties.
We can note that this analysis bears more than a family resemblance to the
neodavidsonian analysis following Parsons (1990) for similar sentences, (296). The
major difference is that, following Davidson (1967), the kind of ‘specific property’
Reichenbach has in mind is here reified as a first-order entity in its own right.26
(296) ∃e[Agent(e,Al) & move(e) & slow(e)]
There is an event e of which Al is agent, e is a moving and e is slow.
To see the problems that arise for Reichenbach’s account, consider how he
analyzes the comparative in (297a) and the measure phrase construction in (297b),
in (298a) and (298b), respectively.
26Indeed, if one could understand the ‘Agent’ relation as a kind of ‘expressive’ as opposed to ‘de-
notational’ instance of functional application, formally the two accounts may be indistinguishable.
In terms of natural language ontology, they differ considerably.
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(297) a. Al is taller than Bill is.
b. Al moves at 50mph.
(298) a. ∃f∃g[f(Al) & g(Bill) & tall(f) & tall(g) & f > g]
There is a specific property f and a specific property g, Al has f and Bill
has g, f and g are in the class of tallness properties, and f is greater
than g.
b. ∃f [f(Al) & move(f) & f = 50]
There is a specific property f that Al has, f in the class of motion prop-
erties, and f is equal to 50.
Bartsch & Venneman (1972) criticize the forms in (298a) and (298b) on two
points. First, what is the ordering relation ‘>’ between specific properties that
(298a) appeals to? This can be corrected by positing orderings such as those we’ve
discussed in this chapter. More importantly, how can a specific property equal the
number 50?
To see the problem in perhaps starker light, consider how Reichenbach’s anal-
ysis would extend to the equative sentence in (299), given in (300). The issue is in
the stated identity between f and g. A major motivation of Reichenbach’s account
is that (like Agent or Holder relations), specific properties are unique to their bear-
ers. How can f and g be unique to Al and Bill, respectively, and yet nevertheless
be identical?
(299) Al is as tall as Bill is.
(300) ∃f∃g[f(Al) & g(Bill) & tall(f) & tall(g) & f = g]
There is a specific property f and a specific property g, Al has f and Bill
has g, f and g are in the class of tallness properties, and f is equal to g.
Interestingly, precisely the problems that face Reichenbach’s account dissolve
on the account that I propose. (Note that, in (301), I am retaining Reichenbach’s
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style for ease of comparison.) On this account, the states s and s′ are uniquely
related to their bearers, and the relevant identity is stated over the measures of
those states, rather than over the states themselves.
(301) ∃s∃s′[Bearer(s,Al) & Bearer(s′,Bill) & tall(s) & tall(s′) & µ(s) = µ(s′)]
There is a state s and a state s′, Al is the bearer of s and Bill is the bearer
of s′, s and s′ have the tall property, and the measure of s is equal to the
measure of s′.
I have showed that Cresswell’s, Bale’s, and Reichenbach’s theories have poten-
tially problematic aspects that are avoided on the theory I propose. With respect
to Cresswell, by positing the separation of the measure function from the adjective,
I am in a better position to account for the distribution and semantic contribution
of much. With respect to Bale, by presupposing (rather than constructing) degree
orderings I am able to account for perceived incommensurabilities. Finally, with re-
spect to Reichenbach, by stating comparisons between degrees rather than between
‘specific properties’, I am able to avoid stating implausible identities.
Before concluding this chapter, I consider two sets of questions that arise for
my account specifically: the question of the fine-grainedness of states, and of the
interpretation of adjectives with very, measure phrases, and when they occur bare
(in a copular or attributive construction).
4.5. Fine-grainedness
One question that arises for neodavidsonian analyses generally, and equally
well here, is the question of how a conjunct like ‘µ(s)  δ’ can be true or false, inde-
pendent of the information that s is a state of tallness. That is, I have not relativized
the interpretation of much to a predicate directly, which might be thought necessary
to provide the description under which the measured entity is being viewed. The
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interpretation of ‘&’ as Boolean conjunction depends on it.
The same question arises with respect to the interpretation of thematic rela-
tions themselves. To see the issue, consider the sentences in (302a)-(302b). Suppose
that there is, intuitively, exactly one event in the world that suffices to make both
(302a) and (302b) true.
(302) a. Al sold Bill a car.
b. Bill bought a car from Al.
The problem is, if there is just one event (which happens to be describable in
multiple ways), how does the Agent function in (303a) and (303b) know, indepen-
dently of the information that e is a buying or a selling, who to map e to? The
Agent of e could equally well be Al the seller or Bill the buyer, etc.
(303) a. ...Agent(e,Al)...
b. ...Agent(e,Bill)...
There are two major options. One involves hypothesizing that, näıve intuitions
aside, there just are two events involving Al, Bill, and the car. Thus, Agent is a
function in virtue of the fine-grainedness of the entities that value the e variables
(see e.g. Parsons 1990, for whom it is unproblematic to assume that the buying and
the selling are, in fact, distinct events). The second involves relativizing the Agent
function to the verbal description (see e.g. Schein 2002 who introduces relativization
via perspectives, or scenes, on events). For discussion of these options and others, I
refer the reader to Pietroski (in prep).
The analysis I have offered assumes that the individuals, events, and states
that a measure function µ predicates of are fine-grained enough to do the semantic
work required of them. As with neodavidsonian analyses generally, the account can
be recast within a relativist’s aesthetic, as desired.
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4.6. very, MP, ‘positive’
Lastly, I address the so-called ‘positive’ construction, very, and measure phrases
with GAs. Until such data have been addressed, it is not clear how to ultimately
compare the proposal I offer with the standard theory. Some of the major reasons
for thinking that GAs are (type-theoretically) different from nouns and verbs is that
they are context-sensitive when they appear bare in the copular construction, they
combine directly with very (very tall/fast, but not *very soup, run) and with mea-
sure phrases (2 feet tall). In this section, I offer suggestions for how to account for
these patterns on the present theory.
First, the standard analysis of GAs as denoting measure functions allows us to
neatly explain why very combines with GAs but not with nouns and verbs. What is
this test diagnosing, if not the presence of a measure function-denoting expression?
To answer this question, suppose that very is a comparative morpheme, on
a par with -er, as, etc.27 On my account, this means that it must combine with
much before it combines with an expression of any other category. Indeed, much
is required with very when that expression modifies nouns and verbs, see (304b,c).
Why is much prohibited in (304a)? It appears to me that much cannot surface
in (304a) for precisely the same reason that it can’t surface with as: obligatory
much-deletion (Bresnan 1973).28
(304) a. Al wasn’t very (*much) intelligent.
b. Al didn’t eat very *(much) soup.
c. Al didn’t run very *(much).
27For the semantics of very, see discussion and proposals in Wheeler 1972, Lasersohn 1999, Katz
2005, Bale 2006, and references therein.
28These examples use a negative environment to illustrate the distribution of very and much,
because (the overt form of) much is odd in positive contexts. Instead of Al ate (very) much soup,
English speakers say Al ate a lot of soup. I have no explanation for this pattern; see Bolinger 1972
for discussion of the (diachronic and synchronic) fluidity of form of degree words, also Doetjes
1997; Solt 2009 discusses the NPI-like behavior of much.
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Second, how is (305) interpreted, if tall does not denote a measure function?
The standard theory can successfully capture such data by positing that 6 feet
denotes a degree, which saturates the degree argument of JtallK (on the individual-
degree relation analysis of GAs) or that of abs (on the measure function analysis).
Without a degree variable to saturate, such sentences should be predicted to be
judged anomalous.
(305) Al is 6 feet tall.
On this point, I appeal to the fact that very few gradable adjectives actually
appear in the measure phrase (MP) construction, as Schwarzschild (2005), Bale
(2006), and Beck (2011) point out. The standard theory, on which all GAs are
degree predicates, predicts that measure phrases should always be able to show up
with GAs in such constructions; however, witness the failure in English of examples
like (306).
(306) a. * Al is 160 pounds heavy.
b. * That book is a thousand dollars expensive.
c. * The temperature is 99 degrees Fahrenheit hot.
Such negative data can be multiplied, and some positive data added: all of the
GAs that are anomalous or ungrammatical in the MP construction are fine with MPs
in the comparative (This dress is two pounds too heavy/a thousand dollars more ex-
pensive than that one). This suggests that the analysis of MP constructions needn’t,
and probably shouldn’t, be taken as central to the semantics of GAs. Regardless,
the present account could be augmented with a lexically-specified type-shifting rule
to capture the good cases (see Schwarzschild 2005 for an analysis like this; though
Schwarzschild’s particular solution would have to be modified considerably). My
theoretical intuition about this, however, would be to pin the matter on expressions
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like 6 feet, rather than tall: for instance, MPs could be lifted to the type of states
in limited cases.
In this vein, a similar sort of objection can be leveled at the standard theory
of GAs. Nearly any GA can be modified by an XP that picks out an entity or state
of affairs that typifies some standard for the GA, for example (307). The present
account could be expanded to handle such facts by appealing to equivalence classes
of states (this relates to an analysis for MP constructions briefly entertained by Bale
2006). That is, the interpretation of a sentence like (307a) could be paraphrased as
Al is in a state of heaviness that it is in an equivalence class with a state of heaviness
that Andre-the-Giant is/was in. In any case, the type of construction in (307) is
productive in English, yet there is no obvious sense in which expressions like Andre
the Giant or dinner at the Ritz are degree-denoting.
(307) a. Al is Andre-the-Giant heavy.
b. Our meal was dinner-at-the-Ritz expensive.
c. The temperature is Florida hot.
Third, what about the occurrences of bare GAs in the copular construction
or in attributive position? Interpreting GAs as predicates of states (simpliciter)
might, on the face of it, incorrectly predict that they have a weaker meaning when
they occur here: the examples in (308) should just express that there is a state of
height that Al is in (cf. ∃s[tall(s) & Holder(s,Al)]), which would be predicted to
be trivially true whenever the referent of Al physically exists.
(308) a. Al is tall.
b. Al is a tall woman.
There are at least four ways of approaching this question, some of which may
be more theoretically appealing than others.29
29The following discussion focuses on the copular construction, but should extend to the attribu-
tive construction.
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The first would be to accept that, indeed, such sentences would have a trivial
interpretation, and so receive strengthened interpretations in context. This route is
pursued by Panzeri & Foppolo (2012) and Panzeri et al. (2013) to explain otherwise
puzzling developmental data. They found that 3 year-old children treated novel
objects of any size as positive instances of adjectives like tall or short, and that
adults could be made to act the same way when it was made clear that informativity
was not at stake.30 Their explanation of this pattern was that children start out
with a literal (i.e., weak) meaning for GAs, and as pragmatic competence develops,
they strengthen this meaning, as adults generally do.
The second option would be to posit that there is a covert much in the positive
construction, which is deleted by the same rule that applies in adjectival comparative
constructions with, e.g., as, too, and how. One could then adopt von Stechow’s
(1984) analysis of e.g. Much gold fell off the counter, in which a morpheme like pos
applies to much. However, positing two covert morphemes whenever there is a bare
occurrence of a GA makes such an account less than desirable.
The third option would be to blame the construction itself.31 Consider that
(309a) expresses that the relevant argument meets some minimal standard of valid-
ity, while (309b) means that the relevant argument exceeds some significant stan-
dard. Assuming a theory in which a GA’s measure function is somehow retained in
its nominalization (see Chapter 7 for discussion of such accounts in the adjectival-
verbal direction), it is not obvious why (309a) fails to require the exceeding of a
significant standard. Perhaps certain constructions, like (309b), require a notion
of ‘exemplification’ that other, minimally contrasting constructions don’t. More
pairs are given in (310).
30Here’s how they did this. They presented adults with an alien puppet who, they said, is just
learning the language, and tasked them to say of his statements whether they were correct or not.
However, they should not say he is incorrect when what he says is just “not optimal” yet strictly
speaking “true”, i.e., in cases where a scalar implicature is violated.
31To extend this explanation to attributive occurrences of GAs, they would have to be analyzed
as involving something like a small clause, with a covert copula or equivalent morpheme.
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(309) a. This argument has validity.
b. This argument is valid.
(310) a. Al has beauty / is beautiful.
b. Al has intelligence / is intelligent.
c. Al has tallness (height) / is tall.
d. Al has width / is wide.
Finally, the fourth way of approaching the issue would be to blame the concepts
associated with the GAs themselves. What would it mean to be tall, simpliciter?
We know that, minimally, it would be to have height. But, very many things
have height, and not all of them can be tall, lest the concept lose all significance.
Yet, we know exactly what it would mean for one individual to be taller than
another, namely, it is to have more height, and the question of whether one is tall
doesn’t arise. However, here’s one way you might figure out whether something falls
under the concept tall: see if it is at least as tall as the tallest individual in the
context. Schmidt et al. (2009) provide evidence suggesting that copular adjectival
predications require ‘indifference’ or ‘equivalence’ with respect to the superlative
exemplar of the category in an evaluation context.
Regardless, some general observations suffice to show that copular adjectival
constructions should not be analyzed as a comparative construction in the first place,
casting doubt on the explanatory value of degree-theoretic, pos-based accounts of
their semantics. First, no overt exponent of pos has been found in any language
in which it has been sought. Mandarin’s hen at one time seemed to counter this
trend, but Grano (2012) argues convincingly that it is not. Moreover, appeal to the
presence of a degree-theoretic pos suggests a precision and crispness that the positive
construction simply lacks (see Fults 2006 and Kennedy 2007 for data, discussion,
and arguments).
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For another, data from Navajo suggest that the copular predication is very dif-
ferent from other comparative constructions, which is not predicted on any account
that appeals to a degree-theoretic pos. Navajo GAs are marked by either ‘compara-
tive’ or ‘absolute’ aspect. When they appear bare in the copular construction, a GA
like tall can only take absolute aspect, yet other Navajo comparative constructions
(like the comparative, equative, etc.) require comparative aspect (this pattern is
observed and discussed by Bogal-Allbritten 2013a).
Lastly, it may not be that GAs are particularly special when it comes to
context-sensitivity. Indeed, we don’t know whether tall or expensive applies to an
individual until we know what comparison class we’re talking about, (311). Al may
be tall for a jockey, but not tall for a basketball player, etc. Such facts might lead
one to the conclusion that, since GAs require appeal to a standard for their inter-
pretation, they should have a different compositional semantics. I will now suggest
that appeal to context-sensitivity and standard-dependence is neither necessary nor
sufficient to delimit GAs from expressions of other categories.
(311) a. Al is tall (for a jockey).
b. This bracelet is expensive (for plastic jewelry).
With respect to necessary. As Rotstein & Winter (2004) and Kennedy &
McNally (2005) discuss, there are many GAs whose standards are not context-
dependent in the same way, and which consequently do not make a lot of sense with
for-phrases. dirty counts as a GA, as evidenced by the fact that it combines with
the usual host of comparative morphemes, (312).
(312) a. This cloth is dirtier than that one is.
b. This cloth is as dirty as that one is. etc.
However, dirty does not comfortably combine with a for-phrase specifying a
comparison class in the positive construction (313). The explanation for this is that
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any amount of an object’s being dirty is enough to classify it as dirty, and as such it
is lexically specified for a “minimum standard”. This results in an interpretive clash
when we attempt to provide it a relative standard-degree descriptor. (An alternative
would be to say that it is unclear what the standard of dirtiness ‘for a terry cloth’
should be.)
(313) This cloth is dirty (?for a terry cloth, ?for a bar towel).
In this connection, it is interesting to question why mass nouns and atelic
verbs might not combine with standard phrases, see (314). This could be for the
simple reason that they are much like minimum standard GAs (Morzycki 2012):
(315a) is intuitively true if some non-zero amount of wine actually passed through
John’s gullet, and (315b) is true if John did at least the minimum required for what
he was doing to count as running.32
(314) a. Al drank wine (?for a lightweight, ?for a box of wine).
b. Al ran (?for a running, ?for a marathon).
(315) a. Al drank wine.
b. Al ran.
With respect to sufficient. Despite not combining comfortably with for-
phrases, mass nouns and atelic verbs do display some degree of context-sensitivity
in “how much” of what they predicate of needs to be present for an example to be
felicitous. (This example based on one given by Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002,
32Interestingly, V. Hacquard (p.c.) observes that examples like (314) seem possible with much:
i. Al didn’t drink much wine for an alcoholic.
ii. Al didn’t run much for a world champion marathon runner.
A plausible avenue for analysis, then, is that even in the adjectival case, with for-phrases
a silent much is present. I leave investigation of this intriguing possibility for future research.
Regardless, the similarity drawn in the text, then, might seem a disanalogy, if minimum standard
adjectives indeed cannot appear with for-phrases.
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p12.) The quantity of wood expected for (316a) to be judged true is normally quite
different from that expected for (316b) to be judged true. The barest fragment of
a wood shard is enough to make (316a) true, but it is harder to say that the same
quantity would make (316b) true.33
(316) a. There’s wood in my eye.
b. There’s wood in my truck.
The same can be shown for atelic verbs like run. The amount required of
running in (317a) is presumably exponentially smaller than the amount of running
required for (317b), again considering normal circumstances.
(317) a. The rat ran a maze.
b. Al ran a marathon.
Continuing on this thread, it is likely that intensive nouns like idiot and verbs
like love are probably better analyzed parallel to relative standard GAs: a minimal
degree of idiot-like behavior is probably not enough to earn one the label of being
an idiot (318a), and some small amount of loving affection is probably not enough
to warrant the declaration in (318b).
(318) a. John is an idiot.
b. John loves Mary.
The proper analysis of bare adjectival predications with GAs (and the relation
to adjectival comparative constructions) remains, to my mind, an open question;
these thoughts are suggestive, but I do not yet deem any of them conclusive. Further
research is required to see whether and how which of these possibilities could be
fruitful. Nonetheless, I henceforth assume that bare adjectival copular constructions
do not involve a (degree-theoretic) pos morpheme as part of their interpretation.
33Of course, this discussion may just be about felicity, and not truth. In the context of a murder
investigation, and a crucial bit of evidence is whether there is wood in the back of a given pickup
truck, any detectable amount of wood would suffice for truth.
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4.7. Conclusion
This chapter argued for a revision of one of the basic tenets of the degree
analysis in natural language semantics: that gradable adjectives (and adverbs) de-
note neodavidsonian properties, rather than measure functions (or, by extension,
individual-degree relations). The semantic data that have been argued in the litera-
ture to set GAs apart from nouns and verbs (namely giving rise to intensive dimen-
sions for measurement, and incommensurability phenomena) do not really seem to.
Moreover, data from iterated modification, and a closer look at the morphosyntax
of comparative constructions, support such a conclusion.
The theory I developed crucially appeals to a different notion of ‘measurement’
in semantics than is standardly employed. Following discussion by Berka (1983),
I suggested that, instead of thinking of measure functions as acting on objects
and measuring them for specific dimensions, we measure properties directly. These
‘specific properties’ can be thought of as states that a given object is in. Once
this distinction is made, measurement can be uniformly understood as a monotonic
mapping from ordered domains to degrees.
Following previous literature, I showed how the restrictions on the interpre-
tation of -er (namely, that it orders only degrees on the same scale) can be used
within the context of the new theory to explain cases of commensurable and incom-
mensurable ‘subcomparatives’ across syntactic categories. While the explanation
for (in)commensurability indeed ultimately rested on the interpretation of the com-
parative morpheme, I showed how it can be understood in the context of a theory
in which much alone introduces measure functions.
Finally, I compared the resultant theory with some of the less-standard theories
in the literature, those of Cresswell (1976), Bale (2006, 2008), and Reichenbach
(1947). Each of these theories was shown to founder on some or other aspect of the
distribution and interpretation of comparatives in English, while the present theory
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does not.
In the next chapter, I turn to another class of phenomena that similarly cross-
cuts syntactic category divides: classes of sentences that uniformly give rise to
comparisons by number.
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Chapter 5: Grammar in measurement
One of the major results of the theory developed in Chapters 3 and 4 was that
the notion of measurable and non-measurable predicates is uniform across syntactic
categories: measurable predicates are those that meet the definedness conditions on
much, i.e., requiring that the measured domain is ordered, and that licit mappings
from those domains to a degree structure be homomorphic.
There, this distinction played a role in distinguishing expressions at what
I will call an ‘internal’ level. The relevant data are summarized in (319): mass
nouns like coffee are distinguished from (singularly-interpreted) count nouns like idea
(319a); atelic verb phrases like run are distinguished from singular telic verb phrases
like kill Peter (319b), gradable adjectives like patient are distinguished from non-
gradable adjectives like pregnant (319c), and finally, gradable adverbs like quickly
are distinguished from non-gradable adverbs like hourly (319d).
(319) a. Al had more coffee/?idea than Bill did. nominal
b. Al ran in the park/?killed Peter more than Bill did. verbal
c. Al is more patient/?pregnant than Susie is. adjectival
d. Al worked more quickly/?hourly than Bill did. adverbial
In this chapter, I show that what are usually non-measurable predicates can
become measurable, in a certain sense. That is, I am now concerned with more
‘external’ levels, and its consequences for measurability.
In the nominal domain, count nouns are interpretable in the comparative by
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the addition of the plural morpheme -s, (320a). In the verbal domain, comparisons
with telic verb phrases are licit if they can be construed as repeatable (i.e., inter-
preted habitually), (320b). In the adjectival domain, comparisons with non-gradable
adjectives are interpretable with post-adjectival more, if they can be construed as
Stage-level (320c). Finally, in the adverbial domain, comparisons with non-gradable
adverbs are interpretable with post-adverbial more, seemingly as regular verbal com-
parisons (320d).
(320) a. Al had more coffees/ideas than Bill did. nominal
b. Al ran to the park/hit Peter more than Bill did. verbal
c. Al is patient/pregnant more than Susie is. adjectival
d. Al worked quickly/hourly more than Bill did. adverbial
All of (320a)-(320d) can (and in some cases, must) be read as comparisons of
numbers of entities (i.e., their cardinality, or their numerosity1): (320a) expresses
a comparison of numbers of coffees/ideas, (320b) of numbers of running-to-the-
park/hitting-Peter events, (320c) of numbers of occasions on which a certain sort
of state obtains, and (320d) of numbers of events of a certain sort. The theory I
develop in this chapter holds that such readings uniformly arise when comparisons
are made between predicates that are, overtly or covertly, plural-marked.
Measuring with much, which measures are possible depends importantly
on the nature of what is talked about. Adding structure can have the effect of
changing what is talked about—e.g., masses in (319a) versus pluralities in (320a).
This point is crucial because, across the various cases, it is not obvious that the
explanation could be pinned on any particular lexically-specified measure function.
While the facts I discuss in this chapter would not be impossible to capture on the
1For the purposes of this chapter, I set aside proportional readings as discussed by e.g. Tanaka
2006 for Japanese comparatives, and, similarly, such readings of expressions like many; see Barwise
& Cooper 1981, Partee 1989, among others.
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standard theory as presented in Chapter 2, they are expected on the account I have
advanced and I extend in this chapter.
I first discuss the distribution and interpretation of forms like those in (320a)-
(320b), paying particular attention to the role of aspect in verbal comparatives. I
then present the formal framework for plural representations that I will assume,
and my analysis of how much interacts with such representations to guarantee com-
parisons by number in the cases where it is observed. Next, I focus on cases like
(320c), paying particular attention to the role of Stage versus Individual level inter-
pretations of adjectives. Lastly, I discuss possibilities for the relating this analysis
to the observation that verbs like want have both stative and eventive readings in
comparatives.
5.1. Plurality and aspect
This section examines structural consequences for measurement in comparisons
across the nominal and verbal domains. In each domain, two things are illustrated:
(i) that adding to or changing the functional structure of a sentence renders formerly
non-measurable predicates measurable, and (ii) that such additions or changes to a
predicate that was already measurable have the effect of excluding dimensions for
comparison that were formerly possible.
There are three salient features of nominal and verbal comparative construc-
tions that any adequate proposal for their semantics should address. In Chapter
3, I captured two of them, given certain assumptions about the lexical properties
of nouns and verbs: first, that predicates understood as relevantly ‘singular’ are
anomalous here, due to the semantic properties of much; and second, that measures
must be monotonic with respect to a given ordering, again due much. The third
feature is that certain structural environments lead only to comparisons by number.
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Table 5.1: ‘Internal’ and ‘external’ factors affecting dimensions for measurement in
the nominal domain.
mass count
expression measure(s) expression measure(s)
−plural rock volume, weight idea *
+plural rocks number ideas number
Table 5.2: ‘Internal’ and ‘external’ factors affecting dimensions for measurement in
the verbal domain.
atelic telic
expression measure(s) expression measure(s)
perfective run-pfv in the park dur, dist reach-pfv the top *
imperfective run-impf in the park dur, dist, num reach-impf the top number
The data that I discuss in this section is summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Unlike the mass-count flexible rock, abstract count nouns like idea are anoma-
lous in the comparative: (321a) cannot express a comparison by e.g. the profundity
of the idea, or by the number of ideas satisfying the predicate. However, by adding
the plural morpheme, a count noun is perfectly interpretable and is interpreted only
as a comparison of numbers of entities (321b).
(321) a. * Susie has more idea than Al does. *profundity, *num
b. Susie has more ideas than Al does. *profundity, num
With the bare mass noun in (322a), certain varied dimensions for measure-
ment are possible, but many are not. In addition to prohibiting comparison by
temperature, color, etc., we may observe that (322a) does not express a com-
parison by number. However, adding the plural morpheme as in (322b) leads to
only comparisons by number (322a). This was discussed by Bale & Barner (2009)
and demonstrated experimentally by Barner & Snedeker (2005).2
2Giving children a choice between e.g. area and number to answer a more question, formulating
the question with the bare mass term children chose area, but they chose number when it was
formulated with the plural noun.
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(322) a. Al found more rock than Bill did. weight, vol, *num
b. Al found more rocks than Bill did. *weight, *vol, num
Similar patterns can be observed in the verbal domain: certain non-measurable
predicates become measurable by the addition of functional structure, and certain
dimensions for measurable predicates are ruled out by those same additions.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, plurality in the verbal domain can be detected
using aspectual morphology in languages that mark the relevant distinctions, and
is here often referred to as ‘pluractionality’.3 We saw there that telic VPs with
perfective aspect are ungrammatical in the comparative, see (323)-(325). The per-
fective involves non-plural verb phrases (Ferreira 2005); with telic predicates, they
are relevantly like singular count nouns with respect to the comparative.



















‘Last week, Ivan climbed Musala more than Maria.’





















‘Last week, Juan climbed Mt.Tom more than Maŕıa.’











‘John reached the top more than Mary.’
In contrast, the result of combining telic predicates with imperfective morphol-
ogy (Bulgarian, Spanish) or habitual morphology (Hindi) is perfectly grammatical
3See Cusic 1981 for extensive discussion of pluractionality across languages, also
Cabredo Hofherr & Laca 2012. Bach 1986, Ferreira 2005, van Geenhoven 2004, 2005, Nakan-
ishi 2007, Henderson 2012, a.o. give formal implementations of plurality in the verbal domain.
Wellwood et al. 2012 discuss interactions between aspect and more.
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(326)-(328), and the only interpretation expressed is as a comparison of numbers
of events. Imperfective morphology can express habitual aspect, which, it has been
said, indicates that the verb phrase is plural (Ferreira 20054).





















‘In those days, Ivan climbed Musala more than Maria.’





















‘In those days, Juan climbed Mt. Tom more than Maŕıa.’















‘Ram watches this film more than Sita.’
Bulgarian, Spanish, and Hindi show us that singularly-interpreted (i.e., per-
fective) telic verb phrases are incompatible with the comparative, and plurally-
interpreted (i.e., imperfective) telic verb phrases are necessarily interpreted as com-
parisons by number. This pattern can be replicated in English, aspectually deficient
as it is, in how the comparative interacts with ‘repeatable’ versus ‘non-repeatable’
telic predicates (Nakanishi 2007).
A repeatable verb phrase is one whose action can be performed by a single
agent multiple times (i.e., that can be performed habitually). The predicate climb
the mountain is like this; observe that with for an hour it cannot be interpreted as
describing the temporal duration of a single event, while with in an hour it does,
(329a). In the comparative, only a comparison by numbers of events is possible with
such a predicate (329b).
4Imperfective is also used to express progressive aspect, which, on Ferreira’s view, occurs when
the imperfective contains a singular verb phrase.
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(329) a. Al used to climb the mountain ?for an hour / in an hour.
b. Al used to climb the mountain more than Bill did.
In contrast, a non-repeatable verb phrase is one whose action cannot be per-
formed by a single agent multiple times. The verb phrase make his chair patterns
as a telic predicate (330a), where the iterative reading with for an hour is odd, as
it implies the chair was made multiple times. Predicates like this resist relevantly
plural interpretations. As may perhaps by now be expected, such predicates in the
comparative, too, are odd.
(330) a. Al made his chair ?for an hour / in an hour.
b. ? Yesterday, Al made his chair more than Bill did.
In English, we can also use other temporal modifiers to indicate whether a sin-
gular or plural interpretation is intended. In some cases, collective telic predicates
like form a triangle are anomalous in the comparative: with a punctual adverbial
(331a), more cannot be used to express something about the relative sizes of the
relevant triangles, or the number of triangles formed. Changing to a durative adver-
bial like that afternoon leads to a comparison by number (331b), wherein the time
frame is wide enough to admit of a plurality of events.
(331) a. * Then the boys formed a triangle more than the girls did. *size, *num
b. That day the boys formed a triangle more than the girls did. *size,
num
In Chapter 3, we saw that the telicity profile of a verbal predicate has a similar
effect in verbal comparatives to that observed with mass nouns. However, this
distinction only plays a role when there is no plural or pluractional interpretation:
when there is, the ‘internal’ properties of expressions cease to affect the available
dimensions for comparison, and even render those dimensions inaccessible. We saw
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this for plurality in the nominal domain, and by the pluractionality inferrable from
verbal aspect in the verbal domain.
Before introducing what I will consider to be parallel data in the adjectival
domain, I first turn to the question of how plural and pluractional reference may be
modeled.
5.2. Plur(action)als
This section considers two major issues in the semantics of plurals: whether
plural reference includes singular entities, §5.2.1, and the question of whether plurals
are represented as individual sums, plural variables, or sets, §5.2.2. The discussion
will be brief, as the resolution of these issues (in particular the second) is not within
the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I ultimately suggest that adopting a
sets-based approach to plurality makes it easier to see why plural representations
interact how they do with comparative morphemes. I hope to show, despite this
choice, that nothing crucial hinges on it.
After presenting the formalism for nominal plurality that I will adopt, I show
how parallel representations can be generated in the verbal domain. With these
pieces in place, the next major section offers a treatment of the S-/I-level distinction
that I again render formally parallel: with post-verbal more, S-level predicates are
represented as pluralities of events during which a certain sort of state holds.
5.2.1. In/exclusivity
This section considers whether plural denotations are inclusive or exclusive
with respect to atomic entities (‘inclusive’, ‘exclusive’ terminology is due to Farkas
& de Swart 2010). The exclusive theory posits that the plural form of a noun
N essentially means two or more N (Link 1983, Chierchia 1998b). The inclusive
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theory posits that the plural form essentially means one or more N (Krifka 1989,
Sauerland 2003, Sauerland et al. 2005, Chierchia 2010). The exclusive theory expects
plural nominals to behave as though they do not apply to singular entities, and the
inclusive theory expects them to behave as though they do.5
‘Dependent plurals’ (de Mey 1981) pose a problem for both theories (see
Schwarzschild 1996 for discussion). Consider first the problem they pose for the
inclusive theory. Construed inclusively, (332) should be paraphrasable as Five boys
flew one or more kites, and so is predicted to be judged true in a situation wherein
five boys flew only one kite in total. This fails to accord with intuition, however; ut-
terances of sentences like (332) are intuitively judged true just in case the boys flew
more than one kite. Yet, if kites can apply to singular entities, this is unexpected.
(332) Five boys flew kites.
Consider next the problem dependent plurals pose for the exclusive theory.
The exclusive theory suggests that sentences like (333) should be paraphrasable
as No boys flew two or more kites, and so utterances of such sentences should be
judged true in a situation in which any number of boys flew no more than one kite
each. This fails to accord with the intuition that such utterances would be judged
true only if no boy flew any kites. This is unexpected, if plurals cannot apply to
singular entities.
(333) No boys flew kites.
Zweig (2008; 2009) offers a pragmatic solution to the challenges posed by
dependent plurals.6 On Zweig’s account, plurals are uniformly, basically interpreted
inclusively, with exclusivity inferred just in case it strengthens the interpretation of
the sentence in context. ‘Strength’ can be defined as in (334).
5This discussion owes a great debt to Champollion 2010.
6This analysis is also suggested in Gillon 1992:620, fn.23.
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(334) Sentence S1 is stronger than sentence S2 iff:
JS1K will be judged true in less contexts than JS2K.
To see how this helps with (332), consider that Five boys flew one or more
kites will be judged true in any situation in which Five boys flew two or more kites,
but not vice versa. Therefore, an utterance of (332) will trigger the exclusivity
inference, as expected on Zweig’s account.
The situation is reversed with (333) and in downward-entailing contexts gen-
erally: No boys flew two or more kites will be judged true in any situation in which
No boys flew one or more kites will, and not vice versa. Hence, the exclusivity in-
ference would not strengthen the interpretation of the utterance, and thus will not
be triggered, again as expected.
I henceforward assume that Zweig’s suggestion is basically correct: plural
expressions refer not only to pluralities proper, but also to the singular entities
that comprise them. I turn next to the question of how pluralities themselves are
represented.
5.2.2. Plur(action)al reference
It is often assumed, as we’ve seen, that a count noun like cup denotes a set of
(singular) objects, with no ordering relation between them. However, theories differ
on what is the appropriate representation of a plural noun like cups.
(335) JcupK = {a, b, c}
First, note that plural noun phrases have the cumulativity property, unlike
singular count nouns, (336). Following discussion in Chapter 3, this suggests that
they denote something with the structure of a join semi-lattice. In this context,
adopting the inclusive theory for plurals boils down to whether the minimal elements
in those lattices are singular entities (|x| = 1) or plural entities (|x| > 1).
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(336) Nominal plural cumulativity
a. > If these are cups and those are cups, their sum is cups.
b. ⊥ If this is a cup and that is a cup, their sum is a cup. cf. cups
There are four major approaches to the question of what plural reference
involves.7 The individual sums theory (beginning with Link 1983), the plural
variable theory (beginning with Boolos 1984; see also Schein 1993, et seq, Pietroski
(2005), et seq; see Nicolas 2008 for an extension to mass nouns), the sets theory
(Winter 2001 cites Scha 1981, van der Does 1992, and van der Does 1993 for early
works; also Schwarzschild 1996, Winter 2001), and the aggregates theory (Gillon
1992; see also Bale & Barner 2009).8 Assuming the “background set” in (335), the
satisfiers of JcupsK would be represented by each of the theories as in (337).9
(337) Different theories of the satisfiers of plural expressions
i. Individual sums a, b, c, a⊕ b, a⊕ c, b⊕ c, a⊕ b⊕ c















iii. Sets {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}
iv. Aggregates {a, b, c}, {ab, c}, {ac, b}, {bc, a}, {ac, ab}, {ab, bc}, {ac, bc}, {abc}
Here, in brief, is the main way in which these representations differ. The
individual sums theory treats entities and sums of entities as equivalent sorts of
objects in the domain. So De contains, in addition to the individual cups a and
b, their sum, a ⊕ b. The plural variable theory admits only of the cups a and b
in De, and allows variables to be satisfied by multiple entities simultaneously. So,
7See also the extended discussion in Lasersohn 2011.
8Bunt 1985 offers a theory in terms of ‘ensembles’, which are relevantly like aggregates for
present purposes.
9Note that Link 1983 did not include singular entities in his plural denotations. The individual-
sums theory given in (337) is updated based on the sorts of considerations discussed in the previous
section.
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the braces in (337ii) enclose the value(s) of a plural variable on a given assignment.
The sets theory treats pluralities as sets of entities. Depending on one’s theory, in
addition to admitting the cups a, b in De, there may also be sets of such entities in
De. The aggregates theory can be seen as a hybrid of the individual sums theory
and the sets theory: aggregates themselves are roughly equivalent to individual sums,
and are elements of the domain of entities, but the satisfiers of plural expressions
are sets of such entities, which (depending on one’s theory) may or may not be in
De.
10 This discussion is summarized in (338).
(338) Ontological commitments of the four theories
i. Individual sums De includes entities like a, b, c and like a⊕ b
ii. Plural variables De includes entities like a, b, c
iii. Sets De includes entities like a, b, c and (perhaps) like {a, b}
iv. Aggregates De includes entities like a, b, c, like ab, and (perhaps) like
{a, bc}
The theories thus differ in how ontologically committed they are. However,
what is relevant for present concerns is what all of the theories share. Regardless
of the particular representation chosen amongst (337), and the ontological commit-
ments thereby inherited, there is a natural ordering between the satisfiers of plural
expressions that we may neutrally refer to as ‘plural part-of’, a relation that defines
a join semi-lattice. On the individual sums theory, x is a plural part of y just in
case every atom in x is an atom in y. On the plural variables theory, x is a plural
part of y just in case every entity among the xs is an entity among the ys. On the
10An aggregation is “a set of aggregates with the requirement that their join yields the greatest
aggregate... and [which] is minimal,” i.e., “no aggregate in the set is a proper sub-aggregate of any
other aggregate in the set” (Gillon 1992:619). This is the aggregates-based version of the notion
of a “cover” on sets: “A cover is just like a partition except it is not restricted to disjoint sets”,
i.e. “X covers Y iff X ⊆ P (Y ) ∧ ∅ 6∈ X ∧ UX = Y ” (Gillon 1992:617, fn. 15), where P indicates
powerset and U generalized union.
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sets theory, x is a plural part of y just in case x is a subset of y. On the aggregates
theory, x is a plural part of y just in case every aggregate in x is an aggregate in y.
Because of the relative equivalence between the theories at this level of ab-
straction, I can essentially remain neutral with respect to the proper representation
of plurals in what follows. What is most relevant is just that representations like
those in (337) are appropriate for plural-marked nominals.11 All involve atomic
entities and pluralities formed from them.
Nonetheless, I will opt to represent plurals using the sets theory. This repre-
sentation needn’t inherit any particular ontological baggage, since it needn’t posit
that sets are in De. The plural arguments of the relevant functions can be defined
as ranging over subsets of the powerset of the background set, i.e. the extension
of the bare nominal. This constructive approach builds sets out of basic entities,
rather than positing that they are themselves basic.
Turning to the verbal domain, recall that I am assuming that the telicity
distinction is formally parallel the mass/count distinction. Atelic verb phrases like
run in the park have mass-like referential properties, while telic verb phrases like
eat two apples have count-like referential properties. I am now concerned with
the greater functional structure that such phrases may be embedded within. We
saw that it was possible to detect the verbal equivalent of plurality by looking
at languages that have imperfective morphology: with telic verb phrases, this is
interpreted as habitual aspect. Ferreira (2005) suggests that this pattern indicates
that a verb phrase is (covertly) plural-marked, while, on the other hand, perfective
and progressive involve non-plural verb phrases.
Importantly, plural verb phrases are cumulative, whereas singular verb phrases
are not. To see this in English, we can make use of the contrast between habitual
11This is not to say that representations like these are not appropriate for some nouns without
plural marking, e.g. furniture. See, among others, Gillon 1992, Bale & Barner 2009 for relevant
discussion.
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eat apples and perfective eat two apples. Indeed, Al eats apples gives rise to the
cumulativity inference, but Al ate two apples does not.
(339) Verbal pluractional cumulativity
a. > If this is eat apples and that is eat apples,
their sum is eat apples.
b. ⊥ If this is eat two apples and that is eat two apples,
their sum is eat two apples.
Consequently I suggest that it is appropriate to talk about pluractional refer-
ence using the same vocabulary as for plural reference, except with respect to Dv.
(340) displays the kinds of entities proposed to satisfy plural expressions on the four
theories discussed previously, as applied to the domain of events.
(340) Different theories of the satisfiers of pluractional expressions
i. Individual sums e, e′, e′′, e⊕ e′, e⊕ e′′, e′ ⊕ e′′, e⊕ e′ ⊕ e′′















iii. Sets {e}, {e′}, {e′′}, {e, e′}, {e, e′′}, {e′, e′′}, {e, e′, e′′}
iv. Aggregates
{e, e′, e′′}, {ee′, e′′}, {ee′′, e′}, {e′e′′, e}, {ee′′, ee′}, {ee′, e′e′′}, {ee′′, e′e′′}, {ee′e′′}
As noted above and discussed in greater detail below, I will use the language
of the sets theory to talk about verbal pluractionality as well as nominal plurality.
5.3. Measuring pluralities
In Chapters 3 and 4, I offered a theory of comparative constructions in which
much introduces degrees, regardless of the syntactic category of expression that
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forms the basis for the comparison. In this section, I show how this account naturally
extends to contexts in which only comparisons by number are expressed.
I begin by presenting an analysis in which the presence of the nominal plural
morpheme necessarily leads to comparisons by number with much. I contrast this
theory with the widely held view that comparisons by number in the nominal domain
in English are due to the semantics of a different expression, many. I show that,
for crosslinguistic morphological reasons as well as for semantic reasons, such an
account is both unnecessary and unwarranted.
5.3.1. Constructing measurables
On the analysis in which much monotonically maps entities/events/states to
degrees, pervasive grammatical effects on the available dimensions for comparison
should be expected: (almost) all we need to know is how the composition of plural
and/or aspectual structure affects the measured domain, and dimensionality can be
made to follow.
When JmuchK measures, the nature of what is measured determines the
possibilities for how it’s measured. Given the disassociation between ‘internal’
and ‘external’ measurability, I propose that plural morphemes introduce a new kind
of (measurable) entity, which, by its nature, restricts the interpretation of much to
measurement by number. The definedness conditions on much are, as discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4, that (i) the domain for measurement must be structured; (ii) the
mapping to degrees must be homomorphic; and (iii) the mapping must be extensive.
On this view, if measuring a plurality is a different thing than measuring
entities directly, the pattern in (341a)-(341b) is expected.
(341) a. * Susie has more idea than Al does. *num
b. Susie has more ideas than Al does. num
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What has to be explained, though, is why with plural-marked nouns like rocks,
the only possible dimension for comparison is number, despite the conceptual avail-
ability of other dimensions, and their availability in the absence of plural marking.
An analysis in terms of much faces two challenges. The first can be seen by observing
that (342a) cannot express a comparison of measures by weight, which would seem
to be monotonic on a domain of objects. However, given the intuitions surrounding
(342a), there is the serious question of why this dimension is ruled out. The second
is the question of why the form many surfaces in examples like (342b). I address
each of these challenges below.
(342) a. Al has more rocks than Bill does. num, *weight
b. Al has as many rocks as Bill does. num, *weight
With respect to the first challenge, it is true that, on the face of it, a measure-
ment by weight would meet the monotonicity condition on much’s interpretation.
My solution crucially relies on the idea that pluralities are different kinds of
things than singular entities.
On the sets theory, while count nouns have a denotation like that in (343i),
plural count nouns have a denotation like that in (343ii). Were we to attempt to
apply JmuchK to the entities satisfying cup, it would fail since there is no ordering on
that set. However, the sets in (343ii) are ordered by the plural part-of relation, and
so measurement can proceed. Moreover, since the measured objects are sets (i.e.,
pluralities), measurement by number can be invoked. As Schwarzschild (2006) points
out, number is monotonic with respect to plural part-of structures; meanwhile, sets
don’t have weights.
(343) i. JcupK = {a, b}
ii. JcupsK = {{a}, {b}, {a, b}}
I believe that a similar account can be adapted to the other representations
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of plurality, but it is not as obvious to me how to say it. I submit that however we
ultimately understand plural representations, it should have as a consequence that
only cardinal measures are defined for it. What is important for this dissertation is
the proposal that this correspondence is necessary: if a measured domain is plural,
then it is necessarily interpreted as a comparison by number.
Next, there is the question of how essentially (or ‘lexically’, ‘internally’) mass
expressions interact with plurality. We have seen, on the one hand, that flexible
terms like rock may be pluralized, and consequently the comparative in which they’re
embedded interpreted as a comparison by number, (344).
(344) Al drank more coffees than Bill did. num, *vol
Here is what I propose to account for these data. Following the discussion in
Chapter 3, I hold that the base or ‘internal’ nominal and verbal expressions denote
anti-atomic join semi-lattices. However, in order to be pluralized, they must first
be mapped to a set of atoms. For this function, I propose a covert ‘singulative’
morpheme in the nominal and verbal domains, which I motivate presently.
Following that discussion, I address the challenge posed by many.
5.3.1.1. The singulative
Following discussion and argumentation in Mathieu (2012), I propose that
more coffees contains a covert ‘singulative’ morpheme—i.e., an expression that maps
mass domains into the count domain. Only once they have been ‘singulativized’ can
mass expressions be pluralized. The inclusion of this morpheme is not necessary
for what I will ultimately argue (one could posit a type-shift from mass domains to
atomic domains in English, or even lexical ambiguity), but setting up the kind of
mass-to-atomic domains will allow for a clear statement of the parallels between the
nominal and adjectival domains to come.
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Table 5.3: Different modes of singulative formation across languages. Sources and
citations are from Mathieu (2012).
non-singular ref. singular ref. language source
lyod ‘ice’ MASC l’dina ‘block of ice’ FEM Russian Greenberg 1972
geot ‘grass’ geot-enn FEM ‘blade of grass’ Breton Trépos 1980
gwer ‘glass’ gwer-enn FEM ‘a glass’ Breton Ternes 1992
teen ‘mud’ teenah SG ‘a chunk of mud’ Class. Arabic Mathieu (AlQahtani p.c.)
xamer ‘wine’ xamrah ‘an amount of wine’ SG Class. Arabic ibid.
owiiyaasi ‘meat’ IN owiiyaasa ‘a piece/cut of meat’ AN Fox Goddard 2002
The notion of the singulative (in the languages that show it overtly) as having
the semantic role of ‘atomizer’ goes back to Greenberg (1972) (these and the rest
of the references in this paragraph are from from Mathieu 2012). Remnants of the
singulative can be detected in Russian (Greenberg 1972), Hebrew (Doron & Müller
2010), Breton (Stump 2005, Trépos 1980), Classical Arabic (Greenberg 1972), Syrian
Arabic (Cowell 2005), German and Dutch (Wiltschko 2006, De Belder 2008, 2011,
Ott 2011), Ojibwe (Rhodes 1990, Piggott 2007), and Fox (Goddard 2002). Table
5.3 shows some of the varieties of ways that languages mark this: in Russian and
Breton, it is via a gender shift; in Classical Arabic via a singulative suffix; and in
Fox via an animacy shift.
Of interest here is that, in many cases, the result of singulativizing a mass (or
collective) noun can be pluralized, as the examples in Table 5.4 show.12
Mathieu (2012) offers an account of the singulative building on the typology
of heads that encode semantic ‘division’ in Borer’s (2005) theory. Abstracting away
from the derivational details of Mathieu’s account, for my purposes his proposal can
be distilled as in (345), which represents the Ojibwe mkwamiins-ag (‘pieces of ice,
icicles’). In (345), the singulative is represented using sg (realized morphophono-
logically in Ojibwe as diminutive morphology in this example), and the plural using
pl. The function of sg, on my interpretation, is to map the mass domain denoted
12Intriguingly, É. Mathieu (p.c.) confirms that, in singulative-marking languages, nouns marked
with the singulative are ungrammatical in comparative constructions.
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Table 5.4: Plural-marked singulatives across languages.
base singular reference language
se’ar ‘hair’ MASC sa’ar-a ‘hair (sg)’ FEM Hebrew
buzhug ‘worms (coll)’ buzhug-enn ‘worm (sg)’ FEM Breton
zhooniyaahi ‘silver, money’ IN zhooniyaaha ‘coin, bill’ AN Fox
mikwam ‘ice’ mkwamiins ‘ice piece, icicle’ DIM Ojibwe
plural reference source
sa’ar-ot ‘hairs’ FEM-PL Doron & Müller 2011
buzhug-enn-oú ‘worms (pl)’ FEM-PL Stump 2005
zhooniyaaha-ki ‘coins, bills’ AN-PL Goddard 2002
mkwamiins-ag ‘ice pieces, icicles’ DIM-PL Rhodes 1990
by ‘ice’ to a set of atoms, which pl can then map to a set of sets whose members
are atomic entities constituted by ice.
















I propose that English coffees hides similar structure, as in (346).








Before continuing, a note on how this analysis is similar yet different from
that offered by Kratzer 2005 (building primarily on Krifka 1992, Landman 1996,
and Chierchia 1998b). Kratzer hypothesizes that all nouns (count or mass) are
lexically plural: they denote sets of atoms and (in the Link 1983-style approach) the
sums of those atoms. Count nouns seem singular (i.e., like sets of atoms) because
they have incorporated a classifier that takes a plural predicate to the set of its
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atoms.13 Moreover, both count and mass nouns must combine with a classifier like
this before they can combine with the plural morpheme. Thus, on Kratzer’s view
(which she extends to verb phrases), there is no such thing as a singular morpheme
per se.
In this dissertation so far, I have been assuming that count nouns are lexically
singular, that is, that they denote sets of atoms when they come out of the lexicon.14
This aspect of the account can be recast in Kratzer’s terms, namely that they have
lexically incorporated a classifier. However, I do not assume (with Chierchia 1998)
that mass noun denotations are essentially the same as count noun denotations;
instead, they are underspecified with respect to atomicity (Chapter 3; Gillon 1992,
Bale & Barner 2009, among others). Thus, the classifier that mass nouns would
need to combine with before they can be pluralized is essentially what I will propose
for the singulative.
The semantics I propose for this morpheme is not one that selects atoms from
the mass denotation, but rather one that introduces atoms constituted of the
stuff denoted by the mass noun. The constitution relation idea comes from Link
(1983), who uses it to account for the fact that examples like (347) are not judged
contradictory. If the ring were nothing but the sum of the gold that constitutes it,
that stuff, call it g, would be such that it is both not old and old. Link solves
this problem by positing that the ring denotes an object, call it r, which stands in
the ‘(materially) constituted-of’ relation to the gold, i.e. r B g.
(347) The ring is new but the gold is old.
The analysis I propose ties comparisons by number to the presence of an overt
or covert plural morpheme. In the nominal domain in English, this is the overt
13I abstract away from her discussion of the ambiguity of this classifier; namely that it can map
to individual or kind atoms.
14See pertinent discussion of nouns that appear to behave as plurals yet are morphologically
unmarked, i.e. Turkish and Western Armenian; Bale et al. 2010. Wellwood et al. 2012 discuss two
different strategies within a single language for marking plurality, e.g. in Bulgarian and Finnish.
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plural morpheme -s. I will assume, following Ferreira (2005), that this corresponds
to a covert plural morpheme in the verbal domain.
In the next section, I explain the relationship that I posit to hold between
much and many, and then give the compositional details.
5.3.1.2. many as much-pl
The preceding section addressed in greater detail what I called the first chal-
lenge to the analysis of plural comparisons in terms of much: why it is that only
comparisons by number are permitted here, rather than other (conceptually plausi-
ble, and monotonic) dimensions like weight. There was another challenge, however:
namely, why it is that the form many surfaces in e.g. equative constructions like
that in (348a), and, it has been inferred, also underlies more in (348b).
(348) a. Al has as many rocks as Bill does.
b. Al has more rocks than Bill does.
Often, the posited many in (348b) is assumed to hard-code a mapping from
pluralities to their cardinalities (e.g., a function like number: De 7→ DN). Such a
proposal can be found in Heim (1985, 2000), Bhatt & Pancheva (2004), Hackl (2001,
2009) (cf. Higginbotham 1994, Doetjes 1997, and Chierchia 1998a; Schwarzschild
2006, Rett 2008, Solt 2009, to appear, take a different perspective in which much
and many both denote predicates of scalar intervals containing an underspecified µ
term). On the other hand, if many is not a primitive denoting something like the
cardinality function, we need to explain why plural denotations must be measured
by number in the comparative.
Bale & Barner (2009) give a non-decompositional (i.e, they give an analysis of
more, not much-er) in which the nature of a plural denotation leads to a restriction
to cardinal measures. This is achieved by stipulating an ordered list of measure
183
functions µ1, µ2, µ3, ..., the first of which is the cardinality function. If a denotation
is in the domain of that function, it must be chosen. Although Bale & Barner do not
address monotonicity with nominal and verbal predicates, generalizing the ordered
list approach would require one to stipulate, for each lexical item, which position(s)
in the list one ‘stops at’ to select a measure function in a given context. Moreover,
it would have to explain the apparent optionality of measurement with expressions
like more coffee.
I argue, instead, that many is just the suppletive form of much plus the nominal
plural morpheme, the result of a rule like that in (349), where small caps indicate
lexical primitives. The reasoning will be based on the fact that a much/many-
type opposition is not typically found across languages, but rather appears to be a
quirk of English The semanticists’ task, then, is to specify what it is about plural
denotations that leads only to number-based interpretations in comparatives.
(349) many formation (morphophonological rule)
much → many / pl
A summary of a survey of a typologically-diverse set of languages is given in
Table 5.5, with the English pattern at the top and the indicated dimensions for com-
parison, volume or number, listed across the top. In each of the languages reported,
the same interpretations are possible for nominals expressing similar concepts. In
French, there is no morphological distinction between the form of beaucoup used
with a bare or a plural marked noun. In Spanish and Italian, the same base form
mucha or molt- is used, surfacing either bare or with plural agreement. In Mandarin,
which lacks plural marking, the classifier kuai indicates that number is at issue with
henduo. In Bangla, the classifier affix -gulo on onek indicates the same.
Moreover, this pattern does not merely reflect the fact that some nouns are (at
least notionally) mass or count. The same pattern obtains for mass-count flexible
nouns like rock or beer.
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Table 5.5: ‘much’ and ‘many’ across languages.
volume number mode language
much soup many cookies suppletion English
beaucoup de soupe beaucoup de biscuits - French
mucha sopa muchas galletas agreement Spanish
molta minestra molti biscotti agreement Italian
mnogu supa mnogu kolaci noun affix Macedonian
henduo tang henduo kuai quqi classifier Mandarin
onek sup onek-gulo biskuT classifier Bangla
Spanish más (‘more’) is invariant in form, but the dimension for measurement
that it compares along correlates with the presence/absence of plural agreement.
(350a), for example, is interpreted as expressing that the volume of beer Silvia































‘Silvia drank many (bottles/cups of) beer during dinner’
French is similar in that e.g. trop (‘too’) is invariant in form. Meanwhile, often
the contrast between plural and non-plural is not audible (though the orthography
distinguishes it, e.g. bière, bières), however, it be detected through verbal agreement,
as in (351a)-(351b). In (351a) with singular agreement, the comparison expressed
is in terms of the volume of the beer that was drunk, while with (351b) with plural
agreement (ont été), the comparison expressed is in terms of the number of beers



































‘Many beers were drunk last night.’
The same or very similar patterns can be shown in Bulgarian (R. Pancheva,
p.c.), Mandarin (A. He, p.c.), Macedonian (I. Stojanovska, p.c.), and Bangla (Biswas
2012); see also Doetjes (1997) for discussion of categorial underspecification of com-
parative morphemes across languages.
So we see that, in general, some morphosyntactic indication of plurality leads
to interpretations by number, both with lexically count and mass nouns. Such
data suggest that comparisons by number are not, in general, due to the meaning
of a distinct lexical primitive. Rather, they are due to something like much in
combination with a plural, however a language marks this. Thus, I posit that,
across languages, a rule like that in (352) applies. How much and pl are realized
on the surface varies.
(352) many formation (morphophonological rule)
much → many / pl
In the next section, I give the compositional details for this analysis of cross-
categorial plural comparisons. Following that, I address potential counter-examples
to this claim for English, namely cases involving expressions like much mashed pota-
toes.
5.3.2. Composition: plurals
The plural morpheme, I suggest, requires that the predicate it combines with
be true of atomic entities. With some nouns, this ‘singularness’ is inherent (at least
in the way we’ve been talking; e.g. idea). However, some mass nouns (like rock) can
be pluralized, though, as I assumed, are most naturally interpreted as substance-
denoting. To account for the fact that these can combine with the plural morpheme
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as well, I posited the existence of a covert singulative morpheme in English that
maps anti-atomic domains into atomic domains.
I begin by discussing the derivation of sentences like that in (353), wherein
the count noun toy is pluralized.
(353) Al broke more toys than Bill did.
Recall that, in Chapter 3, we hypothesized that the denotations of such nouns
are quantized, and encoded this by positing that the satisfiers of functions like that
in (354) contain only atoms.
(354) JtoyK = λx.toy(x)
The denotation of the plural morpheme that I propose is as in (355). This
morpheme requires that the predicate it pluralizes be atomic (capturing the fact
that pluralities are always comprised of atomic entities), and, given such a predicate
returns one that is true of sets of such entities (see Link 1983, Landman 1989,
Chierchia 1998a, among many others, for analyses in which the plural morpheme
contributes algebraic closure of an atomic set; however, on these approaches, the
‘minimal parts’ of the lattice are individuals, not singleton sets). As in previous
chapters, I use the variable names α, β to indicate neutrality with respect to the
types of entities e or events v. I encode the X argument as ranging over elements
of the powerset, P , of the relevant domain of entities.15
(355) JplK = λP〈η,t〉 : Quantized(P ).λX : X ∈ P(Dη).∀β ∈ X[P (β)]
Nouns that lexically denote sets of atoms combine with the plural morpheme
without further ado. Given these assumptions, (353) has the posited (simplified)
matrix-clause structure in (356). Here and below, I assume for simplicity that pl
merges within the extended projection of the lexical category, in this case N.
15This means that, on this theory, sets are not elements of the domain of entities; this avoids















The interpretation of (353) is derived as in (357); as usual, the than-clause
is abbreviated δ. I have also omitted the steps above e2P for simplicity; nothing
at these levels changes from previous derivations. The result is an existential claim
about breaking events involving a plurality of (atomic) toys whose measure is greater
than δ.
(357) i. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ IR,FA x 2
ii. JN2PKA = λX ′ : X ′ ∈ P(De).∀x′ ∈ X ′[toy(x′)] FA
iii. JN2P’KA = λX ′ : X ′ ∈ P(De).∀x′ ∈ X ′[toy(x′)] & A(µ)(X ′)  δ (i),(ii),PM
iv. Je2PKA = εX ′[∀x′ ∈ X ′[toy(x′)] & A(µ)(X ′)  δ] (iv),FA
v. JS2PKA = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & break(e′)(εX ′[∀x′ ∈ X ′[toy(x′)] & A(µ)(X ′)  δ])]]
The than-clause of (353) has the structure in (358), and its interpretation given
in (359). It is a definite description of degrees that represent the measure of the

















ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & break(e)(εX[∀x ∈ X[toy(x)] & A(µ)(X) < d]]]
Combining the two, the result is as in (360). This interpretation encodes the
prediction that (353) will be judged true in a context where Al was the agent of a
breaking event involving a plurality of toys whose measure is greater than that of
the toys that Bill broke. Since here a plurality is measured, it will be understood
as a comparison by number.
(360) JAl broke more toys than Bill did.KA = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & break(e′)(εX ′[∀x′ ∈ X ′[toy(x′)] & A(µ)(X ′) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & break(e)(εX[∀x ∈ X[toy(x)] & A(µ)(X) < d]]]])]]
For the case of a mass noun appearing in the plural, I posit a somewhat richer
structure. The plural morpheme was defined so as to require that the predicates it
combine with be atomic. Consequently, if a noun like coffee denotes an anti-atomic
join semi lattice (as we supposed in Chapter 3), it will not meet that condition.
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The interpretation of the singulative morpheme that I propose is as in (361).
It takes a property of individuals or events P that are anti-atomic16 to a property of
atomic entities β. It maps those entities to truth values just in case there is some α
satisfying the mass predicate P , and α stands in the constitution relation with the
atom β. ‘B’ is read as ‘β is constituted of α’ (e.g. Link 1983).
(361) JsgK = λP〈α,t〉 : Anti-Atomic(P ).λβ : Atom(β).∃α[P (α) & β B α]
The interpretation of a mass noun like coffee is repeated in (362). Since such
a predicate is cumulative, we understand that the xs satisfying coffee are ordered
by the part-of relation. Moreover, since such a predicate does not suggest reference
to minimal parts, the lattice denoted by this predicate is anti-atomic; thus, it will
meet the definedness conditions of sg.
(362) JcoffeeK = λx.coffee(x)
Now we can see how a sentence like that in (363) is derived, focusing on the
noun phrases. The structure that I posit for the relevant parts of the matrix clause
are as in (364). Of note in this structure is the inclusion of the morpheme ‘sg’ in
between coffee and -s. The derivation of e2P is given in (365), with δ abbreviating
the than-clause.
(363) Al drank more coffees than Bill did.
16If JfurnitureK is an atomic join semi-lattice, and if (distributional) mass nouns need to be
singularized before they are pluralized as I have said, then combined with the interpretation in














(365) i. JN2’KA = λy′ : Atom(y′).∃x′[coffee(x′) & y′ B x′] FA
ii. JN2PKA = λX ′ : X ′ ∈ P(De).∀y′ ∈ X ′[∃x′[coffee(x′) & y′ B x′]] (i),FA
iii. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
iv. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (iii),FA
v. JN2P’KA =
λX ′ : X ′ ∈ P(De).∀y′ ∈ X ′[∃x′[coffee(x′) & y′ B x′]] & A(µ)(X ′)  δ
(ii),(iv),PM
vi. Je2PKA = εX ′[∀y′ ∈ X ′[∃x′[coffee(x′) & y′ B x′]] & A(µ)(X ′)  δ] (v),FA
The composition of the same phrase in the than-clause in (366) is exactly as












(367) Je1PKA = εX[∀y ∈ X[∃x[coffee(x) & y B x]] & A(µ)(X) < A(i)]
Combining the two clauses, the interpretation of (363) is as in (368). (368)
says that there is a drinking event involving Al and a plurality of coffees, the measure
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of which is greater than the measure of the coffees Bill drank.
(368) JAl drank more coffees than Bill did.KA = > iff
∃e′[Agent(e′)(Al) & drink(e′)(εX ′[∀y′ ∈ X ′[∃x′[coffee(x′) & y′ B x′]] & A(µ)(X ′) 
ιd[∃e[Agent(e)(Bill) & drink(e)(εX[∀y ∈ X[∃x[coffee(x) & y B x]] & A(µ)(X) < d]]]])]
In this section, I suggested how the plural morpheme might compose with
atomic predicates to deliver pluralities (i.e., elements of the powerset of the atomic
set). I suggested that such entities are measurable only in terms of number, because
they are a different sort of thing than either singular entities (which, as we’ve
seen, are not measurable) and masses. I then suggested how this account extends
to plural contexts with lexically mass predicates.
In the next section, I consider a set of potential counter-examples to the claim
that the form many arises whenever there is a plural much. Following that, I turn
to my proposal for the interpretation of plural verbal comparatives.
5.3.3. On ‘mass plurals’
There is a set of potential counter-examples to the claim that the form many
arises whenever there is a plural much, and similarly to the claim that such con-
figurations necessarily lead to comparisons by number. Expressions in this class
have been called ‘mass plurals’ (Schwarzschild 2012; he cites McCawley 1975 and
Ojeda 2005; see also Lasersohn 2011, who also cites Jespersen 1913 for discussion).
Schwarzschild gives those in (369) as examples of members of this class.
(369) belongings, fumes, preparations, directions, brains, dregs, suds, droppings,
guts, valuables, outskirts
As can be seen in the naturally occurring examples in (370), many of these
are natural with much.
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(370) a. How much belongings can I bring?17
b. If one purposely sniffs gasoline or glue, or accidentally gets too much
fumes while painting inside a closet, he can get damage to the lungs,
brain, etc.18
c. Too much suds push the door outward.19
d. On average five hens produce as much droppings as one medium
sized dog and unlike dogs, chicken and rabbit droppings can be easily
composted.20
Schwarzschild (2012) points out that, like ‘regular’ plurals, mass plurals trigger
plural agreement on the verb (371a), and combine with plural demonstratives (371b).
However, unlike regular plurals, they seem odd with numerals and other count
modifiers, (372).
(371) a. The suds were/*was spilling out of the machine.
b. I can’t take these/*this fumes.
(372) a. ? a sud, *several fumes, *many dregs
b. ? How many preparations did you make for the party?
c. ? He gave me too many directions to your house.
Moreover, as Solt (2008) notes, for expressions like mashed potatoes that com-
bine equally well with both much and many, there is a distinctly different flavor
to the interpretation in the two cases. (373a) seems to suggest a call for a mea-








(373) a. How much mashed potatoes do you want?
b. How many mashed potatoes do you want?
Schwarzschild (2012; he (p.c.) cites Acquaviva 2008) suggests an analysis of
mass plurals (for our purposes: those that appear to be plural-marked yet nonethe-
less combine with much) in terms he dubs the ‘internal’ plural, posited to have an
underlying structure like that in (374a), versus the ‘external’ (or, ‘regular’) plural,
which has a structure like that in (374b). In (374a), pl is a feature on the head of a
projection labeled Num, whereas in (374b) it is a feature on the categorizing head,
little-n.
(374)







While both plurals are available for certain agreement processes (cf. (371)),
they are differentially available for (i) semantic processes and (ii) (I will argue)
certain other agreement processes.
With respect to (i), consider a modified version of Schwarzschild’s examples
in (375) (his (28)-(29)). Suppose there are two people, Al and Chris, that together
are the plural referent of they in (375a). Then, (375a) is paraphrasable as there are
two directions such that Al and Chris went in those directions. In contrast, (375b) is
not interpreted in this way: the only interpretation of (375b) is that there are some
directions that Chris gave me which are different from those someone else gave me.
Schwarzschild likens the difference in interpretation between such examples to the
presence of the two different plurals, as indicated on the right hand side of (375).
(375) a. They went off in different directions. direction + plouter
b. Chris gave me different directions. direction + plinner
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He makes a similar point with the interpretation of reciprocals (citing an ex-
ample from Gillon 1992; Schwarzschild’s (38)-(39)). With two sets of directions
explicitly mentioned by way of coordination, the reciprocal each other is licensed,
(376a). However, without coordination and just the directions you gave me, the
reciprocal is not licensed, (376b).
(376) a. The directions you gave me and the directions she gave me contra-
dicted each other.
b. * The directions you gave me contradicted each other.
With respect to (ii), I suggest that mass plurals require a more specific inter-
pretation of the morphophonological rule I gave in the preceding section, repeated
here in (377). Using Schwarzschild’s terminology, I posit that the structural condi-
tions for this rule are met just in case much combines with (something like) NumP,
rather than the bare nominal. Suppose that in these cases the plural ‘feature’ on
NumP projects. Then we can understand (377) as being a local, automatic conse-
quence of much merging with NumP. On this account, the agreement facts in (371)
arise because of an agreement relation triggered by the verb and targeted at the
subject noun phrase. In the case of the inner plural, I assume that the structural
conditions for the rule in (377) are not met: the plural feature on little-n does not
project.
(377) many formation (morphophonological rule)
much → many / pl
The more important question for our purposes, then, is: what about the se-
mantic contribution of pl when it merges lower in the structure (e.g., with sud)?
First, observe that the sentence in (378) seems perfectly interpretable as a compar-
ison in terms of volume, and not at all (truth-conditionally) interpretable in terms
of number.
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(378) There are more suds in the sink than in the dishwasher.
There are at least two options that immediately present themselves. The
first is to posit that the inner plural is not semantically interpreted at all (in this
light, the facts in (375) and (376) may be expected), and so suds denotes the same
kind of anti-atomic join semi-lattice as coffee, modulo the nature of the stuff. The
second option is that Schwarzschild’s (2012) analysis of nouns is correct, and that
all are actually predicates of states, not predicates of individuals. On that account,
the external plural on the noun expresses that a plurality of states is at issue,
whereas the internal plural expresses that a (single) multiparticipant state is at
issue.
If Schwarzschild’s analysis is correct, then the mereologies of mass expressions
will have to be (potentially radically) reunderstood. This may be a welcome conse-
quence; for one thing, it would highlight the similarities that we have seen in this
and the preceding chapter between nouns, verbs, and adjectives (i.e., all are, at
root, predicates of eventualities). However, advancing this project is beyond the
scope of this dissertation. Thus, I will rest the ‘mashed potatoes’ matter on the
morphosyntactic explanation given above, and assume henceforth that the internal
plural is semantically uninterpreted.
5.3.4. Composition: pluractionals
Parallel to the nominal domain, I posit that there is a verbal plural morpheme
that requires of the verb phrases it combine with that they denote atomic predicates.
Atomic predicates are incompatible with much, unless they are pluralized. This
section presents the compositional details.
I build on proposals in Sternefeld (1998), Sauerland (1998) Beck (2000), Beck
& Sauerland (2000) and Ferreira (2005) (cf. Kratzer 2005) in positing a silent
verbal plural morpheme, which serves to introduce pluralities of events just as the
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nominal plural introduces pluralities of individuals. In the comparative in Bulgarian,
the combination of a telic predicate with imperfective morphology is interpreted
with habitual aspect, signaling that the verb phrase is plural (cf. Ferreira 2005,
Wellwood et al. 2012). When this is the case, the comparative is necessarily read as
a comparison by number, (379).





















‘In those days, Ivan climbed Musala more than Maria.’
Similarly, in English, where the simple past form can have both a perfective
and an imperfective/habitual interpretation, telic predicates like that in (380) must
be interpreted habitually (i.e., by my assumptions, as involving a plurality of events).
If the predicate were read perfectively, the comparison would be uninterpretable. In
such cases the denoted events are atomic, by assumption, and consequently non-
measurable.
(380) Al reached the top of Everest more than Bill did.
For simplicity, I will present the compositional details using the verb jump. It is
assigned the interpretation in (381). Again by assumption, jump is a predicate that
is true of atomic jumping events, and as such will meet the definedness conditions
of the plural morpheme in sentences like (382). The denotation I assigned to the
plural morpheme is repeated in (383).
(381) JjumpK = λe.jump(e)
(382) Al jumped more than Bill did.
(383) JplK = λP〈η,t〉 : Atomic(P ).λX : X ∈ P(Dη).∀β ∈ X[P (β)]
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The structure that I posit underlies the matrix clause of (382) is as in (384).












(385) i. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
ii. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (i),FA
iii. JV2PKA = λE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).∀e′ ∈ E′[jump(e′)] FA
iv. JV2P’KA =
λE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).∀e′ ∈ E′[jump(e′)] & A(µ)(E′)  δ
(ii),(iii),PM
v. Jv2PKA =
λxλE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).Agent(E′)(x) & ∀e′ ∈ E′[jump(e′)] & A(µ)(E′)  δ
(iv),EI
vi. JS2KA =
λE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).Agent(E′)(Al) & ∀e′ ∈ E′[jump(e′)] & A(µ)(E)  δ
(v),FA
vii. = > iff ∃E′[Agent(E′)(Al) & ∀e′ ∈ E′[jump(e′)] & A(µ)(E′)  δ] (vi),∃
The structure underlying the than-clause is as in (386). The derivation pro-
ceeds in exactly the same way, modulo the familiar contributions of opP, etc.; the
interpretation of the than-clause in (386) is as in (387). It is interpreted as a definite
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(387) JthanPKA = ιd[∃E[Agent(E)(Bill) & ∀e ∈ E[jump(e)] & A(µ)(E) < d]]
Combining the two, the result is as in (388). (388) says that an utterance of
(382) is predicted to be judged true just in case Al was the agent of a plurality of
jumping events measuring greater than the measure of Bill’s plurality of jumping
events. Since pluralities are measured, µ resolves to a measure by number.
(388) JAl jumped more than Bill did.KA = > iff
∃E ′[Agent(E ′)(Al) & ∀e′ ∈ E ′[jump(e′)] & A(µ)(E ′) 
ιd[∃E[Agent(E)(Bill) & ∀e ∈ E[jump(e)] & A(µ)(E) < d]]]
Parallel to mass nouns appearing in the plural, we have seen that expressions
like run in the park permit a comparison by number in the verbal comparative,
(389). However, they do not do so obligatorily. I first sketch the analysis, and then
offer a tentative explanation for this phenomenon.
(389) Al ran in the park more than Bill did. num, time
By assumption, run will not, on its own, meet the condition for pluralization.
199
Its interpretation is repeated in (390). Since this predicate is cumulative, we under-
stand that the es satisfying run are ordered by the part-of relation, and so we say
that the domain of this predicate has the structure of a join semi-lattice. Since we
do not detect minimal parts in this domain, this semi-lattice is anti-atomic.
(390) JrunK = λe.run(e)
To combine run with the verbal plural, I posit that there is a verbal singulative
(cf. Ferreira’s 2005 verbal singular morpheme) that run first combines with. On this
account, the fact that (389) allows for measures by temporal duration or number
is possible because the singulative and the verbal plural are both covert: speakers
can infer their mutual presence or absence. The interpretation of the singulative
morpheme is repeated in (391). Since JrunK is anti-atomic, it will be defined for the
singulative.
(391) JsgK = λP〈η,t〉 : Anti-atomic(P ).λβ : Atom(β).∃α[P (α) & β B α]
In contrast, if run appears with a modifier like to the store, the only possible
interpretation in the comparative is a comparison by number. I assume, then,
that modifiers like to the park require atomic events (e.g., they express that those
events are contained within a given space); in such cases, run must be singularized
before the two can combine. I do not attempt to account for the semantics of such
predicates, but use the simplifying assumption that if to the park has the domain
condition in (393), anything it combines with will meet the definedness conditions
on pl. Without it, the result would be anomalous (e.g. *jump-sg more).
(392) Al ran to the store more than Bill did.
(393) Jto the parkK = λe : Atom(e).to-the-park(e)
Thus, the structure that I posit underlies the relevant portions of the matrix
clause of (392) is as in (394), and its interpretation derived as in (395), abbreviating















(395) i. JDeg2’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
ii. JDeg2PKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (i),FA
iii. JV2’KA = λe′′′ : Atom(e′′′).∃e′′[run(e′′) & e′′′ B e′′] FA
iv. JV2”KA =
λe′′′ : Atom(e′′′).∃e′′[run(e′′) & e′′′ B e′′] & to-the-park(e′′′) (iii),PM
v. JV2PKA =
λE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).∀e′′′ ∈ E′[∃e′′[run(e′′) & e′′′ B e′′] & to-the-park(e′′′)] (iv),FA
vi. JV2P’KA =
λE′ : E′ ∈ P(Dv).∀e′′′ ∈ E′′′[∃e′′[run(e′′) & e′′′ B e′′] & to-the-park(e′′′)] & A(µ)(E′) 
δ (ii),(v),PM
The relevant portion of the than-clause of (396) is as in (396), and its inter-














ιd[∃E[Agent(E)(Bill) & ∀e′ ∈ E[∃e[run(e) & e′ B e] & to-the-park(e′)]
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& A(µ)(E) < d]]
Combining the two, the result is as in (398). (398) says that an utterance of
(392) is predicted to be judged true just in case Al was the agent of a plurality of
atomic running events whose measure is greater than the measure of Bill’s plurality.
Since pluralities are measured, A(µ) must be a measure by number.
(398) JAl ran to the store more than Bill did.KA = > iff
∃E′[Agent(E′)(Al) & ∀e′′′ ∈ E′[∃e′′[run(e′′) & e′′′ B e′′] & to-the-park(e′′′)] & A(µ)(E′) 
ιd[∃E[Agent(E)(Bill) & ∀e′ ∈ E[∃e[run(e) & e′ B e] & to-the-park(e′)]
& A(µ)(E) < d]]]
I have presented data from comparative constructions across the nominal and
verbal domains which is suggestive of the ways that grammar conspires to express
comparisons by number. I then argued for a particular analysis of how those readings
come about: namely, they are the result of the interpretation of a plural morpheme
interacting with the semantics of much. In English and languages like Bulgarian,
such a morpheme is covert. However, in languages like Bulgarian its presence can be
detected via how it interacts with aspectual morphology. In these languages, mass
or atelic expressions must first be singularized (mapped to a set of atomic entities)
before they can be pluralized (mapped to a predicate of pluralities).
Next, I turn to data in the adjectival domain that I suggest can be analyzed
as instances of the same singular versus plural distinction in the domain of events.
5.4. Measuring derived events
We have seen that a distinction relevant to comparison at one level (what I
called ‘internal’) becomes irrelevant at another level: non-measurable expressions
like singular count nouns and telic verb phrases became measurable with the addi-
tion of plural morphology (overt or covert), and, I argued, by the same addition,
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Table 5.6: Factors affecting dimensions for measurement in the adjectival domain.
measures: pre-adjectival / post-adjectival more
gradable non-gradable
expression measure(s) expression measure(s)
I-level tall height / * wooden * / *
S-level drunk drunkenness / number pregnant * / number
dimensions for measurement that were available with mass nouns and atelic verb
phrases became unavailable.
I now show what I will argue is parallel phenomena in the adjectival domain,
wherein certain structural configurations lead only to comparisons by number. The
distinctions to be discussed are summarized in Table 5.6.
5.4.1. Stages and individuals
Chapters 2 and 4 discussed gradability with adjectives: adjectives that are
perfectly interpretable in comparative constructions are called ‘gradable’, and ones
that are not are called ‘non-gradable’. This notion flags the difference between, for
example, sentences like (399a) and (399b).
(399) a. Al is taller than Sue is.
b. ? This piece of wood is more wooden than that piece of wood is.
Another distinction relevant to the interpretation of adjectives is that between
Stage- and Individual-level predicates (henceforth abbreviated S-/I-level; these terms
are Carlson’s 1977).
The intuitive distinction is between those that denote states that (normally)
hold temporarily, and those that (normally) hold for a lifetime. Such states are
tested for by combining different phrases with expressions that imply an individual
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goes in and out of the state.21 Consider the predicates be my favorite number (S-
level) and be prime (I-level). Suppose that the truths of mathematics always hold,
but my preferences change from time to time. Use of such predicates with a modifier
like last year suggests that whatever held then does not hold now. In such contexts,
(400b) is odd, since it implies that the number ‘2’ is no longer prime.
(400) a. The number ‘2’ was my favorite number last year.
b. ? The number ‘2’ was prime last year.
The complement of perception verbs (Carlson 1977) imply that the state an
individual is perceived to be in is one that they’re not normally in. If a predicate is
preferentially understood as denoting a property that always holds of the individual
(I-level), then that predicate is correspondingly odd here.
(401) a. Al saw Bill drunk/healthy.
b. Al saw the firemen happy.
c. ? Al saw Bill tall/male.
d. ? Al saw the firemen altruistic.
S-level predicates are those that are natural in there-existentials, unlike I-level
predicates (Milsark 1974). (402c) and (402d) seem to imply that the relevant people
and doors are no longer tall or wooden, respectively.
(402) a. There were people drunk.
b. There were doors open.
c. ? There were people tall.
d. ? There were doors wooden.
21This discussion draws on Husband 2012. I discuss the S-/I-level distinction as though it is
lexical in nature, parallel to how the mass/count distinction was treated. Husband 2012 argues that
it is better understood as phrasal/syntactic, and the account I offer below is likely complementary
to his position.
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S-level predicates can induce an existential interpretation22 of their bare plural
subjects in the present tense, (403a), whereas I-level predicates only allow for generic
interpretations of their subjects (at least in the present tense; Carlson 1977), (403b).
(403) a. Firemen are available. ∃, gen
b. Firemen are altruistic. *∃, gen
We can see the distinction clearly in a language like Spanish, which distin-
guishes between the two types of predicates with the use of different copulas, i.e.
ser (‘essential being’) and estar (‘temporary being’; cf. Camacho 2012). The ad-
jective embarazada (‘pregnant’) is odd with ser (404a) because it expresses the odd
thought that Maŕıa is in a persistent state of being pregnant. With estar (404b),
the more typical thought is expressed that an individual is in a transient state is
expressed.23
(404) a. ? Maŕıa es embarazada.
b. Maŕıa está embarazada.
With this much in place, consider the contrast in comparatives with more pre-
versus post-posed with respect to the adjective. While (405a) with more pregnant
is odd, since pregnant is generally thought non-gradable, while (405b), in contrast,
straightforwardly expresses a comparison of numbers of occasions during which a
certain state obtains. While lexical gradability is relevant for preadjectival more, the
I-/S- level distinction is relevant for postadjectival more: pregnant is a non-gradable,
but S-level predicate.
(405) a. ? Al is more pregnant than Sue is.
b. Al is pregnant more than Sue is.
22This is the term Husband 2012 and references therein employ; one could equally well say that
the predication is ‘episodic’.
23The Spanish data and judgments were discussed with S. Lago, p.c.
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In Spanish, even in the context of combining embarazada with estar there
is an interpretive contrast between the pre-posed (406a) and post-posed (406b)
más (‘more’). With más pre-posed, the sentence is odd in the same way as the
English more pregnant, (406a), and with más post-posed, it expresses a comparison
of numbers of occasions during which a state of being pregnant obtains, just like
English pregnant more, (406b).
(406) a. ? Maŕıa está más embarazada que Susana.
b. Maŕıa está embarazada más que Susana.
In contrast, consider the case of gradable tall. (407a) with more pre-posed is
perfectly fine, expressing a comparison of the heights of two individuals. (407b), in
contrast, is odd; it implies that Al regularly goes in and out of a state of being tall.
The oddity arises if we usually understand that, if you’re tall on Tuesday, you’re tall
on Wednesday, etc.; tall is a gradable, but, on this understanding, I-level predicate.
(407) a. Al is taller than Bill.
b. ? Al is tall more than Bill is.
We can now see that the S-/I-level distinction is independent of the gradable/non-
gradable distinction, and that each plays a role depending on the syntax of the
comparative. With more pre-posed, non-gradable adjectives are odd (408c)-(408d).
Moreover, the range of dimensions for comparison expressed varies with the adjective
(408a)-(408b).
(408) a. This giant is taller than that giant. gradable
b. This alcoholic is drunker than that alcoholic. gradable
c. ? This wooden slab is more wooden than that wooden slab. non-gradable
d. ? This lady is more pregnant than that lady. non-gradable
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The S-/I-level distinction becomes relevant when more is post-posed. I-level
adjectives are odd here, (409a) and (409c), and moreover the dimensions for com-
parisons with S-level adjectives are uniform: (409a) and (409d) only express com-
parisons by the numbers of occasions during which a certain sort of state obtains.24
(409) a. ? This giant is tall more than that giant. I-level
b. This alcoholic is drunk more than that alcoholic. S-level
c. ? This wooden slab is wooden more than that wooden slab. I-level
d. This lady is pregnant more than that lady. S-level
A similar pattern obtains with non-gradable adverbs. With quickly, the in-
terpretation of pre-posed as opposed to post-posed more differs sharply. (410a)
expresses a comparison of the speed of two running events, and cannot express a
comparison by numbers of events. In contrast, (410b) cannot express a comparison
in terms of speed, but can express a comparison in terms of numbers of occasions
of running quickly.
(410) a. Al ran more quickly than Bill did. speed, *num
b. Al ran quickly more than Bill did. *speed, num
Finally, as we’ve seen, hourly with more is awkward (411a). However, with
more post-posed in (411b) the sentence expresses a comparison between Al’s having
performed a certain kind of activity on a greater number of occasions than Bill did.
(411) a. ? Al worked more hourly than Bill did. *hourly, *num
b. Al worked hourly more than Susie did. *hourly, num
24I have heard speculation from some native speakers that post-adjectival more comparisons may
not necessarily be carried out in terms of number. This judgment is not stable, either within
speakers or across them. R. Schwarzschild (p.c.) points out that there is potentially a different
kind of postadjectival interpretation, easily detected with phonologically ‘heavy’ phrases, e.g. He’s
(very) interested in Renaissance art, more than most first-graders are.
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In this section, we have seen another case of syntactic context affecting whether
a predicate is measurable, and which dimensions for measurement are possible. As
with the nominal and verbal domains, some contexts are interestingly restricted to
comparisons by number. I next propose that, here, such comparisons arise because
a plurality is measured.
5.4.2. From states to events
In Chapter 4 I analyzed non-gradable adjectives as denoting (the characteristic
functions of) sets of atomic states, and gradable adjectives as denoting anti-atomic
join semi-lattices. This distinction is relevant for pre-posed more comparatives,
which involve measuring the states predicated of by an adjective directly, (412).
With an intuitively non-gradable adjective like pregnant, (412b), the comparison
goes through only if it can be coerced into having a gradable reading.
(412) a. Al is more intelligent than Sue is.
b. ? Al is more pregnant than Sue is.
The relevant distinction for post-adjectival more is the S-/I-level distinction,
and that this distinction is independent of gradability, contrast (412a)-(413a) and
(412b)-(413b). Moreover, the kinds of interpretations that are possible for (412)
are not possible for (413). Rather, (413b) expresses a comparison of the number of
occasions on which a certain state holds: it implies that the number of occasions of
Al being pregnant exceeds the number of occasions of Sue being pregnant. (413a)
goes through only if we can coerce tall into having an S-level meaning, and then it
is interpreted the same way (mutatis mutandis) as (413b).
(413) a. ? Al is tall more than Sue is.
b. Al is pregnant more than Sue is.
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To account for the fact that post-adjectival more is sensitive to the S-/I-level
distinction, I propose that post-adjectival more indicates event comparison. To
accomplish this, I suggest that the states denoted by the adjective are first converted
into a predicate of events by a covert ‘eventizer’ that I will call ev. The output of
this function is a predicate of atomic events, themselves defined relative to the
adjectival state’s holding. To be compatible with the semantic requirements of the
comparative construction, this (now eventive) predicate must be pluralized.
The existence of a covert expression that maps states to events is not new to
semantic theory; something like it has been proposed both by Kratzer (2000; see
also von Stechow 2002). One of Kratzer’s goals was to classify verbs according to
their (in)ability to provide a ‘target state’ (Parsons 1990) as the input to further
operations (cf. von Stechow 2002, and Piñón 1999 [cited by Kratzer 2000]). If a de-
adjectival verb can appear in a target state passive modified by immer noch (‘still’;
(414), and if it allows a certain implication when modified by für-phrases (415),






























‘We will pump up the boat for a few hours.’
but implies: the boat will remain inflated for a few hours
In my proposal, events are introduced separately from the stative predicate,
while on Kratzer’s they are both part of the expression’s lexical denotation. Hence,
she assigns a type 〈v, 〈v, t〉〉 to the verb after it has applied to its internal argument.
One or the other of its type v arguments (the event or the state one) will be exposed,
depending on whether the verb combines with an ‘eventizer’ or a ‘stativizer’. The
eventizer has the interpretation in (416i), and the stativizer that in (416ii). Here,
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R ranges over event-state relations, and applied to such an argument the function
returns either a predicate of states or a predicate of events. An example of one such
value for R is as in (417).
(416) Kratzer’s eventizer and stativizer
i. JeventK = λR : R ∈ D〈v,〈v,t〉〉λs.∃e[R(s)(e)]
ii. JstateK = λR : R ∈ D〈v,〈v,t〉〉λe.∃s[R(s)(e)]
(417) Jdas Boot aufpumpenK =
λsλe.[pump(e) & Event(e) & inflated(the boat, s) & Cause(s, e)]
I propose to encode the basic idea of a mapping from states to events here, but
couched within the neodavidsonian framework that I assume. That is, instead of
the stative predicate carrying along its own event argument, the covert expression
ev introduces it. Here is how I use this to explain the relevance of the S-/I-level
distinction in post-adjectival comparatives. If a state description can only be un-
derstood to hold once and for always of an individual, then it will fail to meet the
conditions for generating a plurality of events that are defined in terms of a kind of
state coming in and out of existence. I-level predicates can be mapped to events,
but only to singular events: ones that an individual participates in just once, and
whose temporal duration is that individual’s lifetime.
In contrast, if a state description can be understood to hold on-again, off-
again for a given individual, pluralization will succeed, and comparisons between
pluralized predicates will be understood in terms of numbers of events.
5.4.3. Composition: adjectives III
To account for comparatives with post-adjectival more, I propose the exis-
tence of the morpheme ev that maps stative predicates to (sets of) atomic events.
Post-adjectival more is, on this view, just verbal more. Pluralizing that set using
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the same morpheme as I did for the nominal and verbal domains leads to S-level
interpretations of the adjectival predication. Thus, if any adjective’s denotation is
conceived of as rigidly I-level, it will be anomalous in this construction.
The denotation of ev that I propose is as in (418). It takes a predicate of
states and returns a function from the atomic subset of Dv to truth values, just in
case a ‘constitution’ relation holds between the event and the state.
(418) JevK = λP : Stative(P ).λe : Atom(e).∃s[P (s) & e B s]
Here is how I propose we understand ‘B’ in this context, proceeding by analogy.
Consider the example of the ring and the gold. In Link’s ontology, the two are
distinct, but they are intimately related: the ring wouldn’t exist without the gold,
for example. In order to capture the notion of an atomic event that intimately
depends on a certain state’s holding, we need a relation like this. es constituted by
ss, then, can be understood as representations of, for a stative predicate P , events
defined by an individual’s being P .25
To see how this works, consider the sentences in (419a) and (419b). (419a)
has the posited logical form in (420), in light of the theory developed in Chapter
4. Here, JmuchµK applies to those states that are predicated of by drunk, which
restricts the available range of measure functions to just those with such states in
its domain.
(419) a. Al is more drunk than Bill is.
b. Al is drunk more than Bill is.
(420) JAl is more drunk than Bill isKA = > iff
∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & A(µ)(s) 
ιd[∃s′[Holder(s′)(Bill) & drunk(s′) & A(µ)(s′) < d]]]
25See Mourelatos (1978) for discussion of the distinction between the occasion of a situation,
and the situation itself, e.g. Tom loved Mary (state) when he was a teenager (occasion).
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In contrast, consider the proposed underlying structure for (419b) in (421),
ignoring the internal complexity of the than-clause. Here, the adjective phrase and
the head that introduces its thematic subject, a predicate of states, merge with
ev which, I posit, heads a verbal projection. V’ is interpreted as a predicate of
(atomic) events, which is then pluralized. This entire complex will be interpreted















The relevant portions of the derivation of this structure are given in (422),
abbreviating the than-phrase with δ. Since Al drunk denotes a stative predicate, it
meets the conditions for the application of ev; after ev has applied, the resultant
complex meets the conditions for the applications of pl. The result is a property
of pluralities of atomic events that are temporally constituted by some state of
drunkenness of which Al is the Holder.
(422) i. JvS’KA = λxλs.Holder(s)(x) & drunk(s) FA,EI
ii. JvSPKA = λs.Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) (i),FA
iii. JV’KA = λe : Atom(e).∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & e B s] (ii),FA
iv. JVPKA =
λE : E ∈ P(Dv).∀e ∈ E[∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & e B s]]
(iii),FA
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v. JDeg’KA = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d IR,FA
vi. JDegPKA = λα.A(µ)(α)  δ (v),FA
vii. JSKA = λE : E ∈ P(Dv).
∀e ∈ E[∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & e B s]] & A(µ)(E)  δ
(iv),(vi),PM
viii. =
∃E[∀e ∈ E[∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & e B s]] & A(µ)(E)  δ]
(vii),∃
Completing the derivation of the interpretation delivers (423); it is predicted
to be judged true if there is a plurality of events, each constituted by a state of
drunkenness instantiated by Al, and that plurality measures greater than the mea-
sure of Bill’s corresponding plurality. As again we are measuring pluralities, the
understood measure will be in terms of number.
(423) JAl is drunk more than Bill isKA = > iff
∃E[∀e ∈ E[∃s[Holder(s)(Al) & drunk(s) & e B s]] & A(µ)(E) 
ιd[∃E′[∀e′ ∈ E′[∃s′[Holder(s′)(Bill) & drunk(s′) & e′ B s′]] & A(µ)(E′) < d]
The derivation of the other examples is similar. The result of pluralizing the
derived states will be evaluable just in case the underlying stative predicate is one
that can be ‘on and off again’—one that denotes states that can underlie pluralities
of atomic events.
5.5. ‘Gradable’ verbs
Before concluding the chapter, I would like to offer some mainly specula-
tive remarks about the interpretation of verbs that appear to be ‘gradable’ (i.e.,
interpreted non-eventively) in the context of comparatives, and to highlight their
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similarities to adjectives. I first present two accounts for gradability with attitude
verbs like want, that of Villalta (2008), cast in the more traditional possible worlds
framework (building on Heim 1992, Stalnaker 1968; see also Katz et al. 2012), and
the alternative, probabilistic approach of Lassiter (2011a,b). After that, I present
some data that suggests how these proposals might be incorporated into the theory
of comparatives that I’ve been developing.
The crucial parts of the interpretation of want that Villalta (2008) and Lassiter
(2011b) propose may be summarized as in (424) and (425). Both, as on traditional
analyses of attitude verbs, posit that want denotes a relation between individuals
x and propositions p, but have the added property that these are also related to
degrees. The two accounts differ mainly in what they take the mapping to degrees
to consist in; the relevant hypotheses are noted on the right hand side.26
(424) JwantV illaltaK(d)(p)(x) = wantx(d)(p) wantx invokes >desx,w
(425) JwantLassiterK(d)(p)(x) = Ex(d)(p) E ≈ expected utility
The degree analysis is warranted in this case, according to Lassiter, because
want has a similar distribution and interpretation to gradable adjectives; see the
naturally-occurring examples he gives in (426).27
(426) a. [M]any library officials want more to intimidate than to really
change an institutional culture that has squelched feedback.
b. I am an American and I want very much to travel to Cuba.
I begin by reviewing Villalta’s (2008) account. She constructs degrees as equiv-
alence classes of propositions, i.e. sets of worlds, via the steps in (427i)-(427v). She
starts with a primitive ordering on worlds in (427i), in which a world w′ is considered
26They also differ factually in that Villalta offers a degree relation analysis (a la von Stechow
1984, Heim 1985) whereas Lassiter offers a measure function analysis (a la Bartsch & Venneman
1992, Kennedy 1999). I have reduced this difference for ease of comparability.
27I note, in passing, that this distribution isn’t quite the same as that of GAs; e.g. (426b) shows
that very combines with much as opposed to want directly (cp. very tall).
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better according to an individual x at world w just in case w′ is more desirable
than w′′ to x. An ordering on propositions (sets of worlds) is defined in terms of this
relation, (427ii): a proposition p bears the >desx,w relation to proposition q just in
case: according to x in w, every world in q is better than some world in p, and some
world in p is better than every world in q. An equivalence order on propositions is
defined in terms of >desx,w as in (427iii), where W is the set of all possible worlds.
Finally, she defines an ordering on these equivalence classes as in (427v), where [p]
names the equivalence class containing p. These equivalence classes are degrees of
desire.
(427) More desirable (Villalta)
i. w′ >x,w w
′′ (“better”) iff w′ is more desirable to x than w′′
ii. p >desx,w q iff
i. ∀w′ ∈ q ∃w′′ ∈ p s.t.: w′′ >x,w w′, and
ii. ¬(∀w′ ∈ p ∃w′′ ∈ q s.t. w′′ >x,w w′).
iii. p ≈desx,w q iff ∀p′, q′ ⊆ W
i. p >desx,w p
′ ⇔ q >desx,w p′; and
ii. q′ >desx,w p⇔ q′ >desx,w q.
iv. ∀p ∈ D>desx,w , [p] = {p′ | p ≈desx,w p′}
v. [p] >desx,w [q]⇔ p >desx,w q
Lassiter (2011a) raises several challenges for Villalta’s account, though I will
mention only one here. This takes issue with the fact that a proposition p will
be judged more desirable than a proposition q whenever there is a single p world
that is better than all q worlds. The consequent degree ordering doesn’t care at all
whether the very worst worlds also happen to be in p, so long as just one of them
is better than all of the worlds in q. At the heart of Lassiter’s concern is that the
degree-ordering is ultimately based on a pairwise comparison between worlds.
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Lassiter’s own account builds on that of Levinson (2003), in which the seman-
tics of want place conditions on the probability-weighted average preference
(i.e., the expected utility, E(·)) of the worlds in the proposition-denoting argument
taken by want. The idea is that a proposition p is better than a proposition q just
in case the expected utility of p is higher than the expected utility of q, as in (428).
Degrees of desire are, on this account, representations of the expected utility of a
proposition relative to an attitude holder.





i.e., the expected utility of p is the weighted average of the desirabilities
(U) of the worlds w ∈ p, where the weight is given by the conditional
probability that w will be actual if p obtains.
There are two data points that should be considered in light of these proposals,
that, once incorporated, might suggest an analysis of gradable verbs couched more
in the terms worked out in this dissertation. The first is the fact that want appears
with much in examples like (426b), as noted above. If the theory presented in
this dissertation is correct, this raises the question of how both want and much
can introduce degrees for comparison by expressions like -er (cf. the discussion of
Bresnan and Corver in Chapter 4). The second is that want can be used to explicitly
refer to a state of desire, (429).
(429) The opioid antagonists seem to work in part by affecting the liking of food,
as opposed to the wanting of food.28
Further, want supports not just gradable but eventive readings in compara-
tives. Consider (430a) and (430b). In the context of a single lunchtime event, (430a)
does indeed seem to involve comparing degrees of desire. However, in the context
28Based on an example from The Gravity of Weight, books.google.com
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of several lunchtime events in (430b) it seems that the comparison can be about
numbers of occasions of desiring. A contrast like that between (430a) and (430b) is
reminiscent of the ‘gradable’/‘S-level’ interpretations of GAs, which suggests they
could have a similar analysis in terms of ev.
(430) a. Each day, students choose between cupcakes and strawberries.
Friday at lunchtime, Al wanted a cupcake more than Bill did.
b. Al chose cupcakes three times, Bill only once.
Last week, Al wanted cupcakes more than Bill did.
A proposal that may be worth exploring is to reify desires as states, and
to build comparisons (using much) off of an ordering that represents their magni-
tudes, as in (431). Such a proposal would remain neutral as to how such things are
measured, which could perhaps sometimes be something like Villalta’s ≥DESx,w ,
Lassiter’s E, or perhaps other things.
(431) <want= { 〈s, s′〉 | s is as much desire as s′ }
On such an account, an attitude verb like want would be ‘born’ into the syntax
as a stative predicate, which much can access, and which leads to a degrees-of-desire
reading. Applying an ‘eventizer’ like that proposed in this chapter could relate
those states to events; and once pluralized, measuring the events would lead to a
comparison by number. Such an account would effectively explain (431) in terms of
structural ambiguity.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined data from the nominal, verbal, and adjectival
comparatives that express comparisons by number. Across domains, we saw that
what was in bare form non-measurable, could be made measurable by the addition
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of functional structure with its concomitant semantic commitments. We also saw
that the dimensions for comparison that were possible with bare forms became
inaccessible in the new syntactic contexts.
I proposed that these data could be accounted for within the same theory
as I developed in Chapters 3 and 4. The only expression that introduces measure
functions into the interpretation of comparative sentences, regardless of syntactic
category, is much.
Extending this theory faced two major challenges. The first was why certain
prima facie monotonic dimensions for measurement were not possible with plurals
like rocks, and the second why the form many surfaces in nominal equatives. I sug-
gested, in response to the first challenge, that a different sort of thing is measured
in bare versus plural contexts—pluralities, which I modeled as sets—and that plu-
ralities can only be measured by number. In response to the second challenge, I
provided a number of pieces of cross-linguistic evidence to suggest that many is not,
in fact, a lexical primitive, and thus comparisons by number must be in the purview
of an analysis that appeals only to an expression like much.
Finally, I provided some speculative remarks about whether and how the the-
ory could apply in contexts with gradable attitude verbs like want, which show
properties of both stative and eventive comparisons. In Chapter 7, I discuss what
may represent a similar sort of case, namely so-called ‘degree achievements’ like
The soup cooled. Such sentences can be used to convey ‘degrees-of-coolness’-type
comparisons, as well as ‘time-spent-cooling’ comparisons.
In the next chapter, however, I turn to a somewhat broader question. The
literature has proposed that there exist many more varieties of constructions with
-er than I have so far admitted. The goal of the next chapter, then, is to show
that, if anything, there are two such varieties. I further argue that the theory of
comparatives developed thus far is flexible enough to handle these varieties.
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Chapter 6: The comparative in English
This curious world which we inhabit is more wonderful than it is convenient, more
beautiful than it is useful; it is more to be admired and enjoyed than used...
— Henry David Thoreau
In this dissertation so far, I have examined what, for convenience, might be
called ‘commensurating’ (or, ‘regular’, ‘direct’) comparatives, canonically illustrated
by sentences like those in (432). As on the standard theory, I have said that such
sentences express (strict) greater-than relations between various sorts of degrees,
themselves understood as measures along various dimensions: (432a) expresses that
the measure of Al’s height strictly exceeds that of Bill, (432b) expresses that the
measure of Al’s height strictly exceeds that of Bill’s width. It is possible to compare
heights and widths because their measures are comparable in terms of length.
(432) a. Al is taller than Bill is.
b. Al is taller than Bill is wide.
Comparatives like the naturally-occurring examples in (433) seem different,
in that they don’t seem to invoke measures, at least not obviously in the same
way. (433a) is most naturally read as qualifying the ease of acquiring this badge in
terms of time, rather than in terms of its difficulty; (433b) suggests the problem is
better thought of in terms of the “psychological” as opposed to the “real”, and so
on. Given the discussion in Chapters 2 and 4, such sentences should perhaps seem
more odd than they do, if any of the dimensions along which e.g. addictiveness
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and funness are measured are incommensurable. This second variety we may refer
to, again for convenience, ‘categorizing’, as they intuitively suggest that what is at
issue is the aptness of a particular predication holding of an object, rather than
the ordering of measurements directly. The quote at the beginning of the chapter
perfectly illustrates this variety; it manages to not only be coherent, but evocative.
(433) a. This badge is more time-consuming than it is difficult.1
b. The problem is more psychological than it is real.2
c. Frankly, I think Farmville is more addictive than it is fun.3
d. Her outfit is more interesting than she is talented.4
The literature on comparative constructions recognizes several varieties, all
of which have repeatedly been suggested to be irreducible one to another. The
regular (or ‘commensurating’) comparative in (434a) has been distinguished from
‘metalinguistic’ comparatives like (434b) (Bartsch & Venneman 1972, McCawley
1988, Kennedy 1999, Bale 2006, 2008, Morzycki 2011), ‘comparisons of deviation’
(434c) (esp. Bartsch & Venneman 1972, Kennedy 1999) and ‘indirect comparisons’
(434d) (esp. Bale 2006, 2008). How many different varieties are there, in fact? And,
how does the theory developed in this disseration fit in?5
(434) a. Al is taller than Bill is (wide). regular/commensurating
b. Your problems are more financial than legal. ‘metalinguistic’




3www.gamasutra.com/.../Farmville Social Gaming and Addiction.php
4www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/13/grammys-2011-nicki-minaj- n 822654.html
5This chapter is mainly concerned with -er/more comparatives, as has the literature been.
I overheard this equative sentence in March, 2014, which seems a plausible candidate for the
categorizing variety: Your plan is as foolhardy as it is desperate.
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d. Esme is more intelligent than Einstein is clever. ‘indirect
comparison’
In this chapter, I first discuss the intuitive distinction between commensurating
and categorizing comparatives, and use this as a basis for showing that (most) of
the sentences of the type in (434) are best thought of as categorizing. As we saw
in the discussion of Bale’s theory in Chapter 4, many of what he calls ‘indirect’
comparisons are likely commensurating, they perhaps only seem different in that the
measure functions that are applicable for comparisons of beauty and intelligence are
more exotic than those we use for heights and widths. I suggest that the remainder
are indistinguishable from what I call the ‘categorizing’ variety.
The main goal of this chapter is to argue that the apparent variety reduces
to a single type, that there is in fact the comparative construction in English, and
not several, contra e.g. Kennedy (1999), Morzycki (2011) and Giannakidou & Yoon
(2007). I develop an account of the categorizing comparative that builds on the
morphological analysis of ‘metalinguistic’ comparatives proposed by Embick (2007),
and relates to a notion of measuring credence proposed by Davis et al. (2008). The
idea to be developed is that categorizing comparatives express a greater degree of
credence on the part of the speaker towards one proposition (that denoted by the
matrix clause) over another (that denoted by the than-clause). On this account,
comparative morphemes and much remain univocal, unlike on previous accounts.
6.1. Basic data
In this section, I introduce the intuitive distinction between commensurating
and categorizing comparatives, and then discuss their similarities and differences
in some detail. I focus on these two (apparent) types in order to fix intuitions
about their properties as cleanly as possible, before turning to a comparison of
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their properties with the other types of comparatives that have been claimed to be
distinct.
6.1.1. Commensuration or categorization
Consider (435), a familiar enough example of a comparative construction with
a single adjective type figuring in the comparison. It expresses that Box A’s height-
measure is strictly greater than Box B’s height-measure. Such a sentence is intu-
itively judged true in a situation like that depicted in Fig. 6.1. In this figure, Box
A is in fact twice as tall as Box B.
(435) Box A is taller than Box B is.






Consider now the case with two adjectives that are commensurable via a scale
representing lengths. (436a) is naturally read as describing Box A’s height as strictly
greater than its width. Both (436a) and (436b) are intuitively judged true when
evaluated against the situation depicted in Fig. 6.1. In that figure, Box A’s height-
measure is twice its width-measure, which is twice Box B’s width-measure.
(436) a. Box A is taller than it is wide.
b. Box A is taller than Box B is wide.
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In the same scenario, (437), talking only of Box B, is intuitively judged false.
(437) Box B is taller than it is wide.
Commensurating comparatives do not entail attribution of the positive
form of the adjective to the subject in either of its two clauses. We can see this by
looking at Fig. 6.2, which is just like Fig. 6.1 except additional boxes have been
added to the context. This additional context is necessary for the interpretation of
the positive form of adjectives, as in the sentences in (438); we don’t know what it
is to count as tall or wide in the absence of further information (see the discussion
at the end of Chapter 4). Against Fig. 6.2, the sentences in (436a)-(436b) are
intuitively judged true, however, their combined truth is not enough to ensure the
truth of any of (438); in fact, all of (438) are intuitively false in this context.
(438) a. Box A is tall.
b. Box A is wide.
c. Box B is wide.
Figure 6.2: Boxes
A B
Such are the basic properties of commensurating comparatives.
Turning to categorizing comparatives, consider Fig. 6.3.6 (439) features
the analytic form more tall as opposed to the synthetic form taller, with focal stress
6Note that I will refer to this class with a different label than any that has been used for the
various varieties of comparatives in the literature because, as I show shortly, they do not have any
of the properties which, as a class, have been taken as characteristic of any of those classes.
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on tall as indicated by small caps.7 Intuitively, interpreting (439) requires accessing
different information than does (435): it suggests a comparison between Box A’s
and Box B’s height-measures with respect to the heights of the other boxes in the
context. That is, it suggests that Box A is a better exemplar of the category tall
in this context than Box B is.
(439) Box A is more tall than Box B is.
In this context, it is unlikely that Box A will be taken as tall (probably it
will not be taken as short either); however, Box A is taller than at least two other
boxes (Box B, and the middle box), whereas Box B is wider only than one other
box (Box A). This situation seems to verify (440), now with two (commensurable)
adjectives. While there is still some uncertainty whether Box A (or Box B, for that
matter) count as positive instances of the category tall (or wide) in this context,
(440) indicates a greater degree of certainty in that categorization of Box A than
the respective categorization of Box B.
(440) Box A is more tall than Box B is wide.
Figure 6.3: Boxes
A B
We saw that commensurating comparatives fail to entail the positive attribu-
tion of the matrix adjective to its subject, and there is some question about whether
the categorizing variety has such an implication. In the next section I will suggest
that it has no such implication.
7Bringing out the categorizing is aided by stressing the comparanda; I offer some speculation
about this below when I turn to the morphological discussion, though I will offer nothing like a
complete account.
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6.1.2. Explorations of difference
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that commensurating and categorizing
comparatives are distinct varieties of construction, with the attendant differences in
their interpretations. We will consider seven pieces of evidence for a difference: (i)
dependence on a (wider) context, (ii) morphosyntax, (iii) a requirement for com-
mensurable adjectives, (iv) polarity sensitivity, (v) distribution of measure phrases,
(vi) lexical flexibility, and (vii) presuppositions.
First, with respect to context dependence. Commensurating comparatives are
not context-sensitive, whereas categorizing comparatives are. Consider a situation
with just one box, as in Fig. 6.4. If we suppose that to count as wide, a box must
be 3′, and to count as tall it must be 4′. Box C in Fig. 6.4 falls 1 inch short of wide,
but 1 foot short of tall. In this context, (441a) is intuitively false; the difference
in the width-measure and height-measure of Box C with respect to contextually-
specified standards is irrelevant. In contrast, (441b) has at least a passing shot at
being intuitively judged true: Box C measures closer to the contextual standard
for width than it does to the standard for height.8
(441) a. Box C is wider than it is tall.
b. Box C is more wide than it is tall.
Second, commensurating comparatives may not appear with a bare adjective
in the than-clause (442a), but categorizing comparatives may, (442).9 Moreover,
constructing the parallel examples with the equative, as in (443), a bare adjective in
the comparative clause is fine so long as much appears in the matrix clause. I will
8It may be that judgments for the categorizing reading are more difficult in the case where
the commensurating reading is false. If so, I do not have an explanation of this at present. The
example in Fig. 6.4 may just not be ideal; Box C just clearly doesn’t count as wide nor tall in the
context given, so an utterance of (441b) might just be taken to be pointless in such a context.
9This was observed by di Sciullo & Williams (1987), and discussed by Embick 2007 in the
context of discussing “metalinguistic comparatives”; see also Morzycki 2011. They give it a ‘*’,
my intuitions are not so sharp. I return to this point below.
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Figure 6.4: The “standard box”, and Box C
std(width) = 3′
std(height) = 4′
width(Box C) = 2′8′′
height(Box C) = 3′
argue below, following Embick (2007), that these unusual morphological patterns
are the result of a subtle structural difference between ‘regular’ and categorizing
comparatives.
(442) a. ? Box A is taller than wide.
b. Box A is more tall than wide.
(443) a. ? Box A is as tall as wide.
b. Box A is as much tall as wide.
Third, categorizing readings of comparatives with adjectives expressing in-
commensurable dimensions for measurement are perfectly interpretable, while the
commensurating reading seems unavailable. (444a) is difficult to interpret as a com-
mensurating comparative, because there is no obvious dimension along which height
and intelligence are comparable. In contrast (444b) has the by-now familiar inter-
pretation in which Susie is more apt to be categorized as tall than Al is to be
categorized as smart. What is compared is the aptness of the categorization, the
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difference in dimensions is irrelevant.10
(444) a. ? Susie is taller than Al is smart.
b. Susie is more tall than Al is smart.
Fourth, commensurating comparatives are sensitive to the polarity of the com-
pared adjectives, unlike categorizing comparatives. (445a) cannot, for example,
compare the heights of Susie and Al directly, whereas (445b) compares, again, the
aptness of the respective categorizations. They are impervious to the fact that the
two adjectives point to opposite ends of the same scale.11
(445) a. ? Susie is taller than Al is short.
b. Susie is more tall than Al is short.
Fifth, commensurating comparatives allow for a bare measure phrase in their
than-clause (446a), whereas categorizing comparatives do not (446b).12 (446a) ex-
presses that John’s height exceeds 6 feet, whereas (446b) is odd; it perhaps improves
if the than-clause is clausal, e.g. than 6 feet is tall.
(446) a. John is taller than 6 feet.
b. ? John is more tall than 6 feet.
Sixth, categorizing comparatives are flexible with respect to the syntactic cat-
egory of expression they combine with, both lexical (447) and functional (448):13 I
have provided context sentences to ease interpretation in some case, in parentheses
before the target sentence.
10It is likely, though, that in many cases very different dimensions will be pragmatically infelic-
itous.
11(445a) represents what Kennedy 1997 calls Cross-polar anomaly (see also Büring 2007, Heim
2006, 2008). I do not discuss antonyms in detail in this dissertation, though see Chapter 7.
12This was observed by Giannakidou & Yoon 2008, in their discussion of “metalinguistic” com-
paratives.
13Sentences labeled with a superscript m are from Morzycki 2011, small caps mine. Sentences
labeled superscript e are from Embick 2007. The sentence with superscript l is from Lin 2009.
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(447) Lexical categories
a. (Al is successful.) She’s more enthusiastic than she is talented. AP
b. (Will Al commit to Bill?) Al more likes Bill than loves him. VP
c. That man is more beneath contempt than beyond help.m PP
d. Al swam more excitedly than skilfully. AdvP
e. Al is more Las Vegas than Monte Carlo.e PrN
(448) Functional categories
a. The world is more to be admired and enjoyed than used. TP
b. (Claim that Al finished reading the book.) What? Al might have looked at
the book more than read it. AspP
c. (Do what Bill says.) Bill is more a boss than the boss. DP
d. (That cloud looks like a duck.) Its more a rooster than a duck. DP
e. Al believes more that Bill likes her than that she loves him. CP
f. Her mother cried more because Julie lied than because she stole.l CP
g. George is more incredibly dumb than really crazy.m DegP
h. Al is more seven feet tall than six and a half feet tall. MP
The range of categories that can be compared in categorizing comparatives
is thus great.14 It is not clear that comparable examples of the commensurating
14And not likely as restricted as the examples in the main text suggest. In (447)-(448), the
compared expressions are phrasal constituents. However, it appears that non-phrasal constituents
can be compared as well, (449). In (449a), the phrase to the store may be so dislocated, and in
(449b), Dick.
(449) a. (A claim that he rushed.) John more strolled than ran to the store. V
b. George more fears than loves Dick. V
These may plausibly be analyzed as right node raising (RNR) constructions, the result of a
syntactic process that Across-the-Board moves arguments of the verb to a higher functional pro-
jection. Morzycki judges such examples as particularly degraded, while McCawley 1988 finds them
acceptable, as do I and the speakers I have consulted. Although the RNR approach occurred to
me independently, Morzycki credits a reviewer for pointing it out to him. Morzycki analyzes these
in terms of ambiguity: one lexical entry for fear requires a syntactic object, the other does not.
In (447)-(448), the compared expressions are drawn from the same lexical or functional category.
Morzycki (2011) offers (450) to show that the categories need not match.
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variety can be constructed.
Lastly, the two varieties may differ with respect to their conditions of felicitous
use. To see this, consider the context depicted in Fig. 6.5. Here, both of the
sentences in (451) are intuitively judged true. The height of Box A exceeds that of
every other box (it is the tallest box), and the height of every box exceeds that of
Box C (it is the shortest box). In this context, it would be odd to utter the pairs of
sentences in (452), whereas the sentences in (453) seem blandly true. If it is already
established in the discourse that a given box exceeds a certain contextual standard
along a given dimension, it seems unnecessary to say that it is more in that category
than another.
Figure 6.5: More boxes
A B
C D
(451) a. Box A is tall.
b. Box C is short.
(452) a. Box A is tall. Indeed, it’s more tall than Box B is.
b. Box C is short. Indeed, it’s more short than Box D is.
(453) a. Box A is tall. Indeed, it’s taller than Box B is.
(450) a. Susanna was more afraid of Dick than in love with him. AP/PP
b. The official is more a war criminal than criminally insane. DP/AP
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b. Box C is short. Indeed, it’s shorter than Box D is.
Such data suggest that the categorizing comparative presupposes either that
there is some uncertainty about whether the positive form of the adjective holds of
the subject of its clause, or that the positive form does not hold. The commensu-
rating comparative is neutral with respect to this pragmatic condition.
6.2. Metalinguistic, indirect, deviation
In this section, I evaluate whether ‘metalinguistic comparatives’ (MCs), ‘indi-
rect comparisons’ (ICs), and ‘comparisons of deviation’ (CODs) represent distinct
classes of comparatives from those I have been calling ‘categorizing’. These various
types are supposed to differ from each other in their implicational profiles. I argue
that these implicational profiles do not in fact differ, which suggests indeed that we
are dealing with a uniform class.
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, these four types are proposed for
examples like those in (454). I will suggest that most of the non-regular examples
that have been cited as instances of these types in fact fall in the categorizing
class. However, it seems likely that some of the cases Bale refers to as ICs can be
understood as regular comparisons.
(454) a. Al is taller than Bill is (wide). regular
b. Your problems are more financial than legal. MC
c. The Red Sox are more legitimate than the Orioles are fraudulent.
COD
d. Esme is more intelligent than Einstein is clever. IC
Following this discussion, I argue for a reduction of categorizing and commen-
surating comparatives. That is, in all of the relevant semantic respects, they are
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indistinguishable. The differences between them derive from the fact that while
commensurating comparatives involve measurement of adjectival denotations (and
those of expressions of other syntactic categories) directly, categorizing comparatives
represent measurement of something else.
6.2.1. Whither presuppositions
Bartsch & Venneman (1972), McCawley (1988), Kennedy (1999), Bale (2006,2008),
and Morzycki (2011) discuss, in greater or lesser detail, what have usually been called
“metalinguistic” comparatives (MCs). Bartsch & Venneman and Kennedy describe
them as comparatives with incommensurable adjectives that presuppose that the
positive form of the matrix adjective holds of the subject. One of McCawley’s
examples of a MC is (455).
(455) Your problems are more financial than legal.
Bale (2006) rejects this conclusion for the class of comparatives that he calls
“indirect”, and in Bale (2008) he distinguishes this class from MCs and CODs.
Consider the examples in (456). He admits that these seem to imply that the view
is beautiful in (456a), and that Heather is intelligent in (456b).
(456) a. The view is more beautiful than the phone call is urgent.
b. Heather is more intelligent than Paul is devious.
However, he suggests that the implications of (456a,b) are not presupposi-
tions, since they fail to project under negation (457a), in questions (457b), or the
antecedent of a conditional (457c).
(457) a. The view isn’t more beautiful than the phone call is urgent.
b. Is the view more beautiful than the phone call is urgent?
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c. If the view is more beautiful than the phone call is urgent, then I won’t
answer the phone.
Moreover, the implication is cancelable. Imagine a context in which we assume
that the phone is ringing because a telemarketer is calling back to again try and
sell us car insurance (which we already have). To describe the view from the hotel
room (which looks out onto a brick wall), I could utter (458). The very low degree
of urgency is used to imply a very low degree of beauty.15
(458) Unfortunately, the view is as beautiful as the phone call is urgent.
Even canonical MCs fail to show the implication under these circumstances.
Using McCawley’s original MC sentence, the implication that your problems are
financial does not arise, as in (459a-c).
(459) a. Your problems aren’t more financial than legal.
b. Are your problems more financial than legal?
c. If your problems are more financial than legal, then you should speak
to an accountant as opposed to an attorney.
Morzycki (2011) writes that, indeed, MCs implicate, but do not in fact entail
the positive attribution of a property to an individual. His evidence for this is that
the inference to Clarence is tall from the MC in (460a) is cancelable, (460b).16
(460) a. Clarence is more tall than ugly.
b. Clarence is more tall than ugly, but he’s not (really) tall.
We have seen that categorizing comparatives neither entail nor presuppose
that the positive form of the matrix adjective holds of it subject. Thus, by this
15Sentences like (458) also sound like they’d only be used sarcastically; it’s not clear what that
means for the present, however.
16Note that it is difficult to construct a similar example using the original McCawley sentence.
For example, Your problems are more financial than legal, but they’re not really financial. This
might be because financial is likely non-gradable: consider that This is a very financial matter
sounds anomalous.
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diagnostic, we have not yet seen a difference from the class we have been calling
‘categorizing’.
6.2.2. Whither entailments
Another class of comparatives that have been discussed are called ‘comparisons
of deviation’ (CODs). An example of a COD is (461). Kennedy (2001b) holds that
examples like that in (461) entail, in both the matrix and the than-clauses, the
attribution of the positive form to the subject. That is, (461) is said to entail (at
least) that the Red Sox exceed the contextual standard for legitimacy.
(461) The Red Sox are more legitimate than the Orioles are fraudulent.
Kennedy’s judgment of this entailment is the basis for Bale’s differentiation
of CODs from what Bale calls ‘indirect’ comparisons like that in (462), and Morzy-
cki’s differentiation of Kennedy’s CODs from McCawley’s MCs. If CODs entail the
positive attribution of the matrix adjective to the subject, while MCs and ICs only
(we’ve now seen) implicate such an attribution, then ICs and MCs are distinct from
CODs.
(462) Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is clever.
I do not share this intuition (and neither does Embick 2007). For example,
consider (463). This sentence doesn’t seem contradictory, yet the literal meaning of
the continuation should contradict the proposed entailment that the Red Sox meet
the contextual standard for legitimacy. This suggests that CODs do not properly
entail the positive attribution of the matrix adjective to its subject.
(463) The Red Sox are more legitimate than the Orioles are fraudulent, and
this is kind of hilarious because the Red Sox aren’t even remotely
legitimate.
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Is the difference between CODs, on the one hand, and MCs/ICs on the other,
just supposed to be that the two adjectives compared are antonymous? To check
this, consider (464) in the context of Fig. 6.6. Observe that, in this figure, the third
box from the left and the fourth box from the left neither count as tall nor short
respectively. Suppose that is true. Now consider (464). By assumption the positive
attribution is false, yet nonetheless (464) is neither false nor incoherent, in fact it is
intuitively judged true.
(464) The second box is more tall than the third box is short.
Figure 6.6: Boxes again
Finally, we can consider Bale’s ICs. He claims that these are different from
both MCs and CODs because they do not entail the positive attribution of the
matrix adjective to that clause’s subject. Instead, ICs like that in (465) license the
(weaker) conditional inference that if the positive attribution of the adjective in
the than-clause holds of that clause’s subject, then the positive attribution of the
adjective in the matrix clause also holds of its subject.
(465) Mary is more beautiful than Susie is intelligent.
⇒ If Susie is very intelligent, then Mary is (at least) very beautiful.
However, licensing this sort of conditional inference does not differentiate ICs
from CODs (466) and MCs (467).
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(466) The Orioles are more fraudulent than the Red Sox are legitimate.
⇒ If the Red Sox are very legitimate, then the Orioles are (at least) very
fraudulent.
(467) Her outfit is more interesting than she is talented.
⇒ If she is very talented, then her outfit is (at least) very interesting.
However, the inference does fail if the same individual is denoted by the subject
of each clause, and the clauses contain antonymous adjectives, (468), and it fails
if the two categories compared are mutually exclusive more generally (e.g., some
claimed MC patterns), (468).
(468) Mary is more beautiful than she is ugly.
6⇒ If Mary is very ugly, then she is (at least) very beautiful.
(469) Your problems are more financial than legal.
6⇒ If your problems are very legal, then they are (at least) very financial.
Recall that I said in Chapter 4 that it seems some of Bale’s ICs might better
be analyzed as ‘regular’ comparatives. The fact that vanilla examples like (470) fail
to license the conditional inference may be taken as evidence against such specu-
lation. Standards just do not seem to matter here, and the conditional inference
is constructed on top of bare adjectives whose use comes with its own particular
commitments. It may be that Bale’s ICs can be read either as ‘commensurating’
or ‘categorizing’, and on the ‘categorizing’ reading they license the inference. It is
difficult to know, because all of his examples involve a ‘subjective’ dimension for
comparison that isn’t easy to pin down.
(470) Al is wider than he is tall.
6⇒ If Al is very wide, then he is at least very tall.
Thus, it does not appear that there are stable presuppositions or entailments
of MCs, CODs, or ICs that differentiate them one from the other. In the next
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section, I suggest that, if anything, we are left with the distinction we started this
chapter with: that between commensurating and categorizing comparatives.
6.3. A clarification
In this section, I consider how commensurating and categorizing comparatives
might differ with respect to their implicational profiles more directly, using some
of the diagnostics described in the preceding two sections. While the literature has
proposed more distinctions in the types of comparatives that are, if anything, distinc-
tions within these classes, it has not yet been rigorously examined what specifically
to pin the distinctions on.
I will examine combinations of the following properties: same or distinct sub-
jects of the two clauses, commensurable versus incommensurable adjectives, and of
the same or opposite polarity. What we will see is that commensurating compara-
tives care about all of these properties except the first, while categorizing compar-
atives care about none of them. However, commensurating and categorizing com-
paratives do differ in their implicational profiles: categorizing comparatives tend to
license Bale’s conditional inference, but commensurating comparatives do not seem
to.
The commensurating comparatives that can be constructed with each of these
parameters in mind are as in (471). I have used a question mark to indicate those
examples that cannot receive a commensurating reading. As this collection shows,
it is possible to get a commensurating reading whether there is the same or distinct
subjects of the two clauses, so long as the adjectives across the two clauses are
commensurable. The good examples are interpreted as a comparison of the width-
measure of the alley with its length-measure or that of the street.
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(471) Commensurating
a. The alley is wider than it is long.
b. ? The alley is wider than it is clean.
c. ? The alley is wider than it is short.
d. ? The alley is wider than it is dirty.
e. The alley is wider than the street is long.
f. ? The alley is wider than the street is clean.
g. ? The alley is wider than the street is short.
h. ? The alley is wider than the street is dirty.
The same type of examples but with the synthetic form more and prosodic
emphasis on the compared adjectives are given in (472). To my ear, none of these
are awkward or difficult to interpret, and all express that the alley is a better
exemplar of the category wide in the context than it/the street is an exemplar of
the category long, dirty, etc. Categorizing comparatives are insensitive to all of
the properties that commensurating comparatives are sensitive to.
(472) Categorizing
a. The alley is more wide than it is long.
b. The alley is more wide than it is clean.
c. The alley is more wide than it is short.
d. The alley is more wide than it is dirty.
e. The aley is more wide than the street is long.
f. The alley is more wide than the street is clean.
g. The alley is more wide than the street is short.
h. The alley is more wide than the street is dirty.
237
Moreover, neither commensurating readings (the interpretable examples in
(471) nor categorizing readings entail the positive attribution of the adjective to the
subject in either of the clauses. As indicated in (473), the relevant sentences can be
followed up with expressions negating that inference without contradiction.
(473) a. (472a)/(471a) ...but of course it’s not actually wide or long.
b. (472b) ...but of course it’s not actually wide or clean.
c. (472c) ...but of course it’s not actually wide or short.
d. (472d) ...but of course it’s not actually wide or dirty.
e. (472e)/(471e) ...but of course the alley isn’t actually wide nor the
street long.
f. (472f) ...but of course the alley isn’t actually wide nor the street clean.
g. (472g) ...but of course the alley isn’t actually wide nor the street short.
h. (472h) ...but of course the alley isn’t actually wide nor the street dirty.
Moreover, all of the categorizing comparatives in (472) license the (respective)
conditional inferences in (474), while none of the commensurating comparatives
do. That is, the alley can be longer than it is wide, for example, while being
neither a positive exemplar of the categories long and wide, as should be obvious.
This follows from the fact that commensurating comparatives, unlike categorizing
comparatives, are insensitive to context.
(474) a. If the alley is very long, then it is (at least) very wide.
b. If the alley is very clean, then it is (at least) very wide.
c. If the alley is very short, then it is (at least) very wide.
d. If the alley is very dirty, then it is (at least) very wide.
e. If the street is very long, then the alley is (at least) very wide.
f. If the street is very clean, then the alley is (at least) very wide.
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g. If the street is very short, then the alley is (at least) very wide.
h. If the street is very dirty, then the alley is (at least) very wide.
In summary, there are detectable meaning differences between the categoriz-
ing and commensurating comparative. What is the nature of that difference? In
the next section, I briefly review two previous proposals for the interpretation of
‘metalinguistic’ comparatives, which I will understand as analyses for comparatives
on the categorizing reading, and present a sketch of an alternative account following
that.
6.4. Previous proposals
This section considers two previous analyses of what have been called ‘met-
alinguistic’ comparatives. Both are ‘meta’ in the sense that they require something
more like pragmatic calculations to formulate the truth conditions of such sentences,
and both posit that the difference between categorizing and commensurating com-
paratives turns on distinct lexical entries for more. Following this discussion, I
present a speculative alternative analysis that does not posit such an ambiguity,
rather appealing to differences in what is measured on the two readings.
6.4.1. Morzycki
Morzycki (2011) in that it maintains a fairly standard analysis of regular com-
paratives, which express comparisons along lexical scales provided by GAs. For
categorizing comparatives, he posits that the comparison is made along a scale of
‘precision’, building on ideas found in Lasersohn (1999).
The first ingredient of Morzycki’s analysis is the rule of Hamblin Functional
Application, by which expressions (now denoting sets of functions rather than sin-
gle functions; Morzycki follows the formulations in Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002 and
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Shimoyama 2006, which themselves build on Rooth 1985). I omit the C parameter
from the interpretation function for readability, as it does not play a role in Morzy-
cki’s analysis. The d parameter on the interpretation function indicates the degree
of precision at which the input is to be interpreted. (Note: I am representing these
rules in the manner familar from Chapter 2 of this dissertation, rather than how
Morzycki represents them.)
(475) Hamblin Functional Application (HFA)
If σ is a branching node, {β, γ} the set of σ’s daughters, and JβKd is a function
whose domain contains JγKd, then JσKd = {b(c) : b ∈ JβKd ∧ c ∈ JγKd}.
Here, the denotation of a typical S node will be a set of propositional alter-
natives, rather than a single proposition. Thus, Morzycki posits a default rule of
existential closure that applies to such sets (what I will represent as type 〈ω, t〉) to
return a set of worlds, i.e. a single proposition.17 Given these rules, we can see first
how Morzycki derives the interpretation of (what he calls) regular comparatives.
Consider the sentence in (476).
(476) George is dumber than Dick.
I will not go through the steps of the derivation.18 The result is that the
interpretation of dumber than Dick in (476) is as in (477). Here’s what this means.
If the degree of precision parameter is set to absolute precision (i.e. d = 1), then
the comparison expressed would be that George is dumb to a degree to which Dick
isn’t dumb. Interpreted at lower degrees of precision, predicates like foolish which
merely resemble dumb play a role.19 The result is then existentially closed.
17Morzycki notes that his version of this rule, called Hamblin-Intensional Existential Closure,
differs in important ways from Kratzer’s and Shimoyama’s.
18Note that the basic shape of the meanings of comparative morphemes that Morzycki assumes
is the A-not-A analysis; see Chapter 2.
19A word on how Morzycki rules out incommensurabilities, while allowing that distinct adjectives
can be compared by regular more. Some of the alternatives in the set in (477) would lead to
comparisons of degrees of dumbness and degrees of foolishness, which are incommensurable. Since
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Now we can see how a categorizing comparative is derived on this account.
They have a structure like that in (478). Noteworthy is that there is a distinct
lexical item, moreML, and the pos morpheme; Morzycki indicates that he is thinking
about prec and existential closure ∃ as nodes in structure, but that they could be





On this account, the interpretation of the comparative phrase in (479) is as in
(480). This set of worlds corresponds to the proposition: there is a degree of precision
at which some alternative to dumb holds of George, but at which no alternative to
crazy holds of George.




 ∃f [f ∈ JdumbKd′ ∧ f(George)(w)]∧
¬∃g[g ∈ JcrazyKd′ ∧ g(George)(w)]


In sum, Morzycki analyzes categorizing comparatives as expressing compar-
isons of degrees of precision, cast in a technical framework that appeals to rich
additions to our stock of interpretive rules, which, however, may be independently
both predicates would have to apply to the same degree d, these alternatives are ruled out. If two
adjectives are “so similar” that they compare along the same scale, then these would “survive”.
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necessary. More saliently, the account has as a consequence that any comparative
morpheme evoking a categorizing interpretation is ambiguous, not just within a sin-
gle language, but across languages. This may be undesirable, given that, in general,
a univocal form (like more) surfaces.
I turn now to Giannakidou & Yoon’s analysis, which shares this property of
Morzycki’s account, but which differs considerably in the details.
6.4.2. Giannakidou & Yoon
Giannakidou & Yoon (2011) (updating Giannakidou & Stavrou 2009; hence-
forth GY) offer an alternative approach to categorizing comparatives, 20 which differs
from Morzycki’s (2011; they cite a previous version of that paper from 2009) account
primarily in the following ways. First, they question whether categorizing compar-
atives are always about (im)precision, citing data that they take to indicate that
speakers are rather expressing preferences for one utterance over another. More
generally, they indicate that there appears to be more variability in the pragmatic
force of utterances of categorizing comparatives than is captured on Morzycki’s ac-
count.
Their main issue, then, i sthat Morzycki’s account doesn’t allow moreML to
operate at a propositional level, but rather over properties. For one, they claim that
this cannot capture the fact that expressions like *hotter than humid fail to have
categorizing interpretations, and are in fact ungrammatical.
On GY’s account, moreML is a sentential modifier. However, they understand
speakers to use such constructions to express an attitude of desirability, appropriate-
ness, or preference, as the case may be, which they suggest falls under the umbrella
notion of “desirability”. The expression of this attitude is contained in the meaning
20In fact, they also discuss comparatives with expressions like rather and, also Korean “negative
preferential comparatives”. I leave investigation of these constructions for a later date.
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of moreML. In (481), u, u
′ are understood to range over quotations of sentences in
the sense of Potts (2007), and α is the “individual anchor” in the sense of Farkas 1992
and Giannakidou (1998, 1999)); I have omitted reference to the context variable c.
(481) “Accuracy assessment MC” (Giannakidou & Yoon)
JmoreML2K = λuλu′.u des(α) u′.
Further elaborating on the intended interpretation of (481), GY indicate that
the comparison is ultimately conducted in terms of degrees; I infer that the quoted
utterances are then mapped to degrees, and the comparison is takes place between
those.
Like Morzycki, GY posit an ambiguity of more. They cite as evidence for
this data from Greek, which has a distinct standard-marker para that appears with
perissotero (more) that unambiguously signals an MC interpretation, (482). Their
paraphrase of the interpretation of (482) is, “the degree d to which the speaker
desires the sentence ‘Paul is a philologist’ is greater than the degree d′ to which he
desires the sentence ‘Paul is a linguist”’ (ibid., p639). They do not give a paraphrase
















‘Paul is more a philologist than a linguist.’
An investigation of why there is this distinction in Greek is beyond the scope
of the present work. However, it is potentially interesting that GY do not give an
example of a para comparative with a plainly clausal complement. It may be that
the distribution of para versus apoti is the result of more boring syntactic reasons
than they suppose: para is phrasal than and apoti is clausal or reduced clausal than
(cf. Pancheva 2009, Merchant 2009).
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Interestingly, for my purposes, the major difference between Morzycki’s and
GY’s account is that each try to capture categorizing comparatives more or less
in terms of an attitude expressed by the speaker: whether that is a judgment of
(im)precision, or of preference. In Morzycki’s case, ‘measures’ of imprecision are
invoked, but GY’s account does not appeal to measures, just an ordering on prefer-
ences.
In the next section, I offer an analysis of the categorizing comparative con-
struction in which I suggest that, indeed, it is a distinct construction in a particular
sense: it has a particular form and meaning that distinguishes it from commensu-
rating comparatives. However, the interpretations of the relevant functional expres-
sions are nonetheless no different from those assigned throughout this dissertation.
The difference, I suggest, is that categorizing comparatives represent measures of
speakers’ belief states.
6.5. Measuring beliefs
We saw that contrasting adjectives such as tall and wide are amenable to an
interpretation by commensuration: these adjectives associate with a scale of length
which provides common degrees for comparison. As we’ve seen, commensurating
readings are (as their name suggests) impossible if one cannot construe a common
scale for measurement across the two clauses. This is expected given the analysis
discussed for comparatives in this dissertation: permissible ‘’s are defined only for
sets of degrees of the same ilk.
I now argue that categorizing comparatives are instances of the same general
comparative form and meaning, but they represent measurement and comparison of
different things than does the class we’ve been calling ‘commensurating’.
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6.5.1. The idea
On the theory proposed in this dissertation, consonant with the tradition going
back to Cresswell (1976), the semantics of comparatives requires a common scale
for measurement across the two clauses of the comparative. This type of theory
accounts for commensurating comparatives like (483a): Al’s height-measure and his
width-measure are comparable, as they are both measured by degrees on a scale
of length. It also correctly predicts the anomaly of (483b): whatever ‘prettiness-
measures’ are, they are not degrees on the same scale as degrees of length.
(483) a. Al is taller than she is wide.
b. ? Al is taller than she is pretty.
But what to say about the examples in (484)? Here the dimensionality of
the adjectives is irrelevant; in fact, it seems that the precise extent to which Al
instantiates any of the relevant properties is unimportant, but rather, what is at
issue is the extent to which the categories tall and wide apply to her at all. If
this more is the same in (483) and (484), and if that expression has the semantics I
have assigned it, then what is being measured and compared in such examples?
(484) a. Al is more tall than she is wide.
b. Al is more tall than she is pretty.
Discussion in the previous literature suggests that categorizing comparatives
do involve degree comparison, whether between degrees of appropriateness (Embick
2007), precision (Morzycki 2011), or preference (Giannakidou & Yoon 2011). This
variability in the scales for comparison that are available is familiar from our dis-
cussion of expressions like more coffee and run more, which could suggest that a
common analysis is available. In what follows, I will present a plausible morphosyn-
tax for categorizing comparatives that can facilitate measurement and comparison,
and then speculate on how the semantics might look.
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I build primarily on the morphological analysis of Embick (2007), embedding
it within a syntax more favorable to Giannakidou & Yoon’s compositional interpre-
tation. That is to say, I will appeal to a silent morpheme κ, and sentential-level
modification for the interpretation of categorizing comparatives. On this account,
the ambient morphology and syntax will differ between sentences like (484) and
(483), but the morphemes much and -er appearing in both have a uniform seman-
tics.
In brief, Embick (2007) was interested to capture the distribution of the syn-
thetic comparative form -er from the analytic form more. He is primarily concerned
with basic comparative sentences like those in (485a,b), as well as the fact that
(485b) can alternate with the analytic form in the correlated ‘metalinguistic’ com-
parative (485c). He argues that (485a,b) is explained by his theory of ‘blocking’ in
the application of morphological rules on a Distributed Morphology-style approach,
and that (485b,c) show that the linear adjacency requirement on such rules is, while
necessary, not sufficient.
(485) a. Al is more intelligent than Bill is.
b. Al is smarter than Bill is.
c. Al is more smart than Bill is.
I will not go into the finer details of Embick’s morphosyntactic derivation of
forms like smarter, and the blocking effects that he posits may be overcome as in
(485c). That would require refinement to (re-)accommodate the Bresnan (1973) idea
that even forms such as (485b) contain a covert much (though see Dunbar & Well-
wood, in prep). Instead, I will simply adopt his idea that “the syntax of such ‘met-
alinguistic’ [‘categorizing’—AW] comparatives differs from that found with normal
comparatives. The absence of synthetic comparatives follows from this structural
difference in such a way that... the metalinguistic comparative Deg and a poten-
246
tial host are never adjacent in the relevant sense” (Embick 2007:12).21 Building on
Bresnan’s (1973) account of MCs, more than stupid as a unit combines with lazy.
However, Embick posits that there is an additional element which has the effect of
destroying any linear adjacency between the comparative head and the adjective,










On this account, one might pin the fact that prosodic prominence on the
adjective/noun/verb/&c indicates (i) the optional realization of κ as a kind of stress,
or (ii) some interaction with a focus licensing element, such that focusing the element
would force one to interpret it along with a κ or equivalent element (thanks to E.
Dunbar for clarifying these possibilities to me). It is unclear at present which of
these options would be more explanatory.
I adopt the basic structure of this account, but with a few semantically-
motivated modifications, since whatever the structure of κ-marked comparatives,
they have to be interpretable. It seems that sentences like Al is more dumb than
George is crazy express an attitude on the part of the speaker. Attitudes are gen-
erally understood as relations between attitude-holders, and propositions. However,
with the scope of comparison in (486), the κ-comparative has no access to the rele-
21It is worth noting that it is not ultimately clear whether the analytic and synthetic forms (where
it is possible for these to alternate) absolutely distinguish a commensurating from categorizing
comparatives. Bartsch & Venneman 1972, Kennedy 1999, are tentative in this conclusion; as
Bale 2006 puts it: “in certain constructions -er tends to only allow direct comparisons whereas
more tends to allow only [non-direct] comparisons” Embick’s morphosyntactic account, or my
semantic proposal, may need refinement in the details if both types of interpretation are possible
with the synthetic comparative. It may just be easier to get the categorizing reading using the
synthetic form with prosodic cues, but it is not clear that even the examples in (471) can’t be
made interpretable by reanalysis as categorizing comparatives.
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vant proposition-denoting nodes.22 The (simplified; see below) structure I propose












Syntactically, this analysis renders categorizing comparatives structurally sim-
ilar to sentences like that in (488), or to Japanese examples discussed by Sawada
(2007), cited by Morzycki (2011). In that language, categorizing comparatives are
expressed with a morpheme iu (homophonous with the verb ‘to say’) affixed to the
than-clause head yori, (489). The interpretation of such sentences seem adequately
captured by paraphrases like I’d be more likely to say that p than to say that q. The
question is, what does it mean to be more likely to say that p than to say that q?









‘Taroo is more a scholar than a teacher.’
I propose that categorizing comparatives express comparison of degrees of
credence: i.e., that the speaker’s confidence in the truth of one proposition is
22It will be worthwhile in future work to explore accounts that invoke ‘local’ interpretations of
what are normally thought of as sentence-level adverbials; for example Schein to-appear, Nouwen
2011, or Bogal-Allbritten 2013b, 2014. My preliminary attempts at extending these accounts to
the present case were not successful.
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greater than their confidence in the truth of another proposition.23 A speakers’
confidence can presumably have many sources, whether it is based on evidence or
self-deception (I have in mind here that the “desirability” of a proposition’s being
true could influence one’s confidence in how likely it is to be true). It could be that
such a notion is more bleached than the alternatives that have been proposed, and
consequently could give rise to the variety of intuitions about what sorts of degrees
are compared in these constructions.
I propose that categorizing comparatives like that in (490a) have an interpre-
tation similar to that of the sentence in (490b). κ, then, on this account, has an
interpretation similar to that of the expression confidence. Extending the theory
developed in Chapter 4, this will be a predicate of states. I propose that we under-
stand these as mental states of speakers, states with intentional content (building
on ideas in Hacquard 2006 and Kratzer 2006).
(490) a. Al is more lazy than George is dumb.
b. I have more confidence that Al is lazy than that George is dumb.
Such an analysis can capture the fact that categorizing comparatives are more
permissive in the types of lexical categories they can combine with: allowing for
comparisons over incommensurable GAs, and a freedom of expressions of different
syntactic categories in the comparanda. That is, neither much nor -er impose any
restrictions on the internals of the two sentences that ultimately act as input to
κ—they measure the mental states introduced by that morpheme, not any part of
the content associated with those states.
23Importantly, while talk of ‘credence’ is related to ‘belief’, I am not sure that it is reducible to
it; the idea that belief simpliciter is gradable is controversial (cf. Villalta 2008, Anand & Hacquard
2013), while the idea that speakers assign different likelihoods to propositions being true has been
gaining foothold (e.g. Davis et al. 2008, Swanson 2011).
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6.5.2. Composition
In this brief section, I only spell out what I propose for the logical form of
categorizing comparatives, and provide suggestions as to the truth-conditional con-
tribution of the various pieces. My goal in what follows is merely to sketch the
possibility of an account on which much and -er retain a uniform semantics with
that otherwise provided in this dissertation; the finer points of the semantics will
need to be spelled out in much more detail in future work, as noted below.
The interpretation I propose for κ is as in (491). This morpheme is inten-
sional, first combining with a propositional argument (via Intensional Functional
Application; Fintel & Heim 2002). So combined, it returns a function from credence
states of the speaker A(s) to truth values. Here I understand credence states to
be sets of beliefs that have propositions (type 〈ω, t〉, with ω the type of worlds24)
as their contents, along with an ordering relation over those contents analogous to
{〈p, p′〉 : A(s) has as much credence with respect to p as with respect to p′}.25 The
relation R between such states and a proposition (the denotation of the internal
argument of κ) may be understood as the relevant ‘with respect to’; the precise
nature of this relation awaits future work.
(491) JκKA,w = λpλs′.credenceA(s),w(s′) & R(s′)(λw.p(w))
type 〈〈ω, t〉, 〈s, t〉〉
After combining with its propositional argument, κ is a predicate of credence
states, analogous to tall and happy being predicates of states of tallness or hap-
piness. Such entities are what much requires, and since they are different sorts of
entities, they may be measured in different ways. In previous chapters, I posited
24It is more standard to use type s for worlds, but the suite of variable names with s in this
dissertation is quite busy already.
25Hacquard 2006 (also Kratzer 2006), combining the traditions of Hintikka 1962, Lewis 1983, and
Stalnaker 1984, with that stemming from Davidson 1967, proposes that attitudes are (Davidsonian)
states borne by individuals. They are different than e.g. sitting on the wall states in that they
have associated intentional content.
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that measuring the states predicated of by hot led to different measures than did
measuring the portions of matter predicated of by coffee, and so I posit that mea-
suring the states predicated of by credence licenses yet other sorts of measures.
One intriguing possibility is to link credence states plus muchµ to the ‘credence mea-
sures’ defined in Davis et al. (2008) (also cf. Swanson 2011), with credence states
approximating subjective probability spaces.26
Turning to the compositional details, I posit that the surface constituency of a
sentence like that in (492) is considerably different from that of its LF counterpart,
whose matrix clause is given in (493). As I have posited for nominal, verbal, and
adjectival comparatives, the complex of more than... is a phrasal adjunct, in this
case adjoining to κP .










The internal structure of the than-clause I posit is as in (494), expanded from
the sketch provided in the preceding section to show the relative positionings of op
and abs that I assume.
26The question of monotonic measurement appears to be addressable straightforwardly on such
an interpretation; that is, probability spaces are algebraic structures which admit of lattice-
theoretic description. So long as the structure of the probability space is preserved in the mapping
to degrees, measurement by much will be monotonic. The question of mereological structure is
raised again, perhaps with the same suspicion as it was in Chapter 4; I leave these important











For simplicity, I will not go through the composition of the S1 and S2 nodes;
they are represented as in (495a) and (495b), respectively. In what follows, I will
abbreviate these propositions as Al-is-dumb and Bill-is-crazy.
(495) a. JAl is dumbKA,w = > iff ∃s′[Holderw(s′)(Al) & dumbw(s′)]
b. JBill is crazyKA,w = > iff ∃s[Holderw(s)(Bill) & crazyw(s)]
The derivation of the matrix clause is given in (496), with the than-clause
abbreviated as δ. The result is a predicate of credence-states of the speaker A(s)
at world w, the content of which is the proposition JGeorge is crazyK, and which
measures greater than δ.
(496) i. Jκ2PKA,w =
λs′′.credenceA(s),w(s
′′) & R(s′′)(λw′.Al-is-dumb(w′)) (495i),FA
ii. JDeg2’KA,w = λdλα.A(µ)(α)  d FA
iii. JDeg2PKA,w = λs′′.A(µ)(s′′)  δ (ii),FA
iv. Jκ2P’KA,w =
λs′′.A(µ)(s′′)  δ & credenceA(s),w(s′′) & R(s′′)(λw′.Al-is-dumb(w′))
(i),(iii),PM
The derivation of the than-clause is given in (497).
(497) i. Jκ1PKA,w = λs′.credenceA(s),w(s′) & R(s′)(λw′.Bill-is-crazy(w′)) (495ii),FA
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ii. JDeg1’KA,w = λdλα.A(µ)(α) < d FA
iii. JDeg1PKA,w = λα.A(µ)(α) < A(i) (ii),FA
iv. Jκ1P’KA,w =




∃s′[A(µ)(s′) < A(i) & credenceA(s),w(s′) & R(s′)(λw′.Bill-is-crazy(w′))]
(iv),∃
vi. JopPKA:i→d,w =
λd.∃s′[A(µ)(s′) < d & credenceA(s),w(s′) & R(s′)(λw′.Bill-is-crazy(w′))]
(v),PA
vii. JthanPKA,w =
ιd[∃s′[A(µ)(s′) < d & credenceA(s),w(s′) & R(s)(λw′.Bill-is-crazy(w′))]]
(vi),FA
Putting (496) and (497) together, the interpretation is as in (498). The result
is that an utterance of (492) is predicted to be judged true just in case the speaker is
in a state of credence with respect to the proposition denoted by Al is crazy, which
is measured greater than the measure of their state of credence with respect to the
proposition denoted by George is crazy. In other words, that the speaker has more
confidence in the truth of the first proposition over the second.
(498) JAl is more dumb than Bill is crazyKA,w = > iff
∃s′′[credenceA(s)(s′′) & R(s′′)(λw′.A-is-dumb(w′)) & A(µ)(s′′) 
ιd[∃s′[credenceA(s)(s′) & R(s′)(λw′.B-is-crazy(w′)) & A(µ)(s′) < d]]]]
In sum, it is possible to maintain a uniform analysis of expressions like -
er, much, and than (in fact, the basic architecture of comparison constructions
in English) even in the face of what appears to be a radically different class of
comparisons. Building on an independently motivated morphosyntactic analysis
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(Embick 2007), and with a nod to independently motivated semantico-pragmatic
analysis (e.g. Davis et al. 2008), one has only to posit a bit more structure than
at first appears. There is not necessarily the need to posit that degree words are
ambiguous.
6.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I first elaborated on what appears to be a robust distinction
between two kinds of comparatives: those I labeled ‘commensurating’, and those I
labeled ‘categorizing’. The two appear to differ with respect to the flexibility of the
lexical and syntactic categories they combine with, and with respect to the licensing
of a kind of conditional inference discussed by Bale (2006).
I then compared the distribution and interpretation of these to other types of
comparatives that have been proposed in the literature: metalinguistic comparisons,
comparisons of deviation, and indirect comparisons. I argued that the implicational
profiles of these varieties do not distinguish them from regular commensurating
comparatives ((in)direct comparisons) or categorizing comparatives (comparisons of
deviation, and metalinguistic comparisons).
Next, I discussed two previous proposals for the semantics of metalinguistic
comparatives, evaluated as proposals about the categorizing class. Both accounts
appealed to a distinct morpheme moreML, which is somewhat less than consonant
with the fact that, in English and other languages, the same string ‘more’ is used
in sentences with these readings.
Offering my own account of categorizing comparatives that did not appeal to
ambiguity, I assimilated them to regular commensurating comparisons that operate
over credence states rather than the states denoted by the gradable adjectives ap-
pearing in the matrix or than-clauses. A complete comparison of this proposal with
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that of Morzycki (2011) and Giannakidou & Yoon (2011), and a precisification of
its details, awaits future research.
This chapter accomplished two things, then. It reduced the number of possible
comparative types from four (or so) to one. I claimed that, at root, there is only one
kind of comparative in English, constructed out of two pieces that are univocal across
their various occurrences: much and -er. Secondly, this chapter showed how the very
different-seeming interpretation of the categorizing variety might be constructed out
of those pieces. As in previous chapters, the differences in dimensionality (now
expanded to include more pragmatic dimensions for comparison) arise due to the
properties of what much measures.
The next chapter concludes the dissertation with some speculative discussion
about how the present theory might be applied in closely related empirical areas,
and the bigger-picture consequences the account suggests.
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Chapter 7: Prospects
In this dissertation, I have argued that the only avenue for introducing the
notion of ‘measurement’ into comparative constructions in English is via the mor-
pheme much. This argument was based primarily on the interpretation of that
expression when it appears overtly in comparative constructions with nouns and
verbs, but was applied to comparatives with adjectives and adverbs on the basis of
three major sources of evidence: semantic, compositional, and morphosyntactic.
I argued that the same analysis could be maintained in two further empirical
domains, even in the face of suggestions that a fundamentally different semantics
was there involved: comparatives restricted to expressing comparisons by number,
and comparatives that give rise to a flavor of metalinguistic comparison. In each of
these areas, I suggested ways in which the analysis by much could be maintained,
while capturing the clear interpretive differences that nevertheless obtain, in terms
of differences in what much measures.
This concluding chapter has one major goal, which is to show how the work
developed in this dissertation provides clear avenues for future investigation. I
discuss three such avenues, roughly corresponding to the empirical, the theoretical,
and the experimental/typological.
On the empirical front, there are at least two closely-related empirical domains
that I have not yet said anything about, wherein an appeal is made to composition
with lexically-specified measure functions. One is so-called ‘verbs of scalar change’,
which include ‘degree achievement’ verbs like cool and ‘path of motion’ verbs like
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ascend. Another is apparently ‘gradable’ nouns like fool (see esp. Bolinger 1972). I
discuss here how my hypothesis about pre- and post-adjectival comparatives, as well
as my speculations about layered stative and eventive nodes with gradable attitude
verbs, might find parallels here.
Theoretically, this study raises questions regarding how natural languages
package meaning into compositional units. The question, as I posed it at the outset,
is why the meaning of much isn’t simply incorporated into the meaning of -er, as,
etc., but rather composes independently. Considering some of the traditional and
non-traditional thought on the nature of primitives in syntax and their relation to
meaning, I suggest that language might fail to do this because it can’t do it.
This theoretical discussion leads to interesting questions regarding language
acquisition, psycholinguistics, and the expectation of cross-linguistic variation in
the domain of comparative constructions. I address each of these briefly. In broad
strokes, I speculate that: (i) the restriction on “how much” meaning can be packed
into a single compositional primitive would be a boon for the language learner; (ii)
that decompositional analyses can be tested using ‘psychosemantic’ approaches to
language comprehension and production; and (iii) that the heavy reliance on a single
expression like much could lead to large gaps in the lexical and syntactic inventories
of languages.
I keep discussion of each of these points brief, but, I hope, suggestive.
7.1. Related domains
7.1.1. ‘Scalar change’ verbs
Several authors have profitably appealed to ‘degree scales’ to spell out the
truth-conditional contribution of certain verbs. If such verbs did have a degree-
semantics, the question from the perspective of this dissertation would be whether an
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expression like much somehow figures into their compositional semantics. However,
I think it more plausible that the mappings between degrees and events that such
theories posit in fact reflect mappings between states and events, or even times. If
such an approach could be made to work, it dispenses with the idea that these verbs
associate with degrees at all.
Rappaport Hovav (2008) suggests that (at least) two kinds of verbs relate to
degree scales: those involving ‘property scales’ (e.g., lengthen, shorten, dim; see
Dowty 1979 for discussion in terms of ‘degree achievements’; also Hay et al. 1999,
Kennedy & Levin 2008) and those involving ‘path scales’ (e.g., ascend, descend,
enter).1 Part of the motivation for this classification is that use of such verbs implies
that an entity is in a state at time t′ that is ‘degrees different’ from a qualitatively
similar antecedent state at t.
(499) a. The tailor lengthened the dress.
b. The balloon ascended.
First, observe that such verb phrases do not combine directly with comparative
morphemes; like other verbs, they require much, (500). As Rett (2013) also notes, if
these verbs associate with degree scales, it is in a much different fashion than GAs
(on the standard theory) do (see discussion in Chapter 4).
(500) a. The pants were lengthened as *(much) as the dress was.
b. The balloon ascended as *(much) as the kite did.
Degree-theoretic accounts of such verbs first assume an analysis of GAs in
terms of measure functions, look towards verbal predications to see if they have
GA-like properties, and, detecting such properties, analyze the relevant verbs as
denoting (at least in part) measure functions. As should be clear, the same reasoning
1There are also those involving ‘extent scales’. See discussion in Hay et al. 1999, Caudal &
Nicolas 2005, Piñón 2008, Bochnak 2010, and Henderson 2013.
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can be applied with a different starting assumption about GAs, namely, that they
predicates of states; then, we can ask what it is about the states in the extension of
e.g. lengthen that makes them measurable.
Moreover, the examples in (500) have (in addition to their ‘degree’ readings)
the kinds of readings we have come to expect from eventive comparatives. That
is, consider the sentences in (501), with for-adverbials included to ensure an atelic
interpretation of the verb phrase. Taking these sentences to be true, and knowing
nothing else about to what extent the pants or the skirt became longer, I believe
that there is a reading of (502) that is intuitively judged true in such a situation.
(501) a. The pants were lengthened for an hour.
b. The skirt was lengthened for 45 minutes.
(502) The pants were lengthened more than the skirt was.
One might hypothesize, then, that the verbal-form masks a stative and even-
tive component, each of which (provided the relevant states and events meet the
definedness conditions of JmuchK) may be targeted by µ. For example, measuring
the stative component in (500a) results in a comparison by degrees-of-length, and
measuring the eventive component in (502) results in a comparison by temporal
duration.
7.1.2. ‘Gradable’ nouns
So far in this dissertation, I have mainly considered comparisons involving
nouns like coffee and rock. Both of these types of nouns give rise to the (by now)
expected dimensions for measurement with mass nouns, e.g. volume and weight.
Yet, there is a class of nominals that, much like verbs of scalar change, seem to have
a more plainly ‘gradable’ component to their meaning.
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Consider first that, using combination with more as a diagnostic, both fool and
person pattern like count nouns. That this, they do not retain their ‘usual’ meaning
here, but must be coerced into a mass-type interpretation.
(503) a. ? Bill is more fool than Al is.
b. ? Bill is more person than Al is.
With the indefinite article and/or partitive of, (504a) expresses something
apparently equivalent to more foolish, while (504b) is interpretable, so long as we
agree that there are degrees of personhood. If Bill and Al were robots, but Bill was
more lifelike than Al, perhaps (504b) could be truly uttered.
(504) a. Bill is more (of) a fool than Al is.
b. Bill is more (of) a person than Al is.
Bolinger (1972) observed that, with an expression like such, a clear interpretive
difference emerges. In (505a), what is expressed is that someone who is foolish to that
great an extent will likely be unsuccessful. In contrast, the most natural reading of
(505b) is as expressing that a person of that type/category will likely be unsuccessful.
(505) a. Such a fool as that will never get ahead in life!
b. Such a person as that will never get ahead in life!
Morzycki (2005) analyzes sentences like the closely related (506), wherein ad-
jectives like big appear ambiguous with nouns like fool (having both a ‘size’ and a
‘degree’ reading).2
(506) a. Al is a big idiot.
b. Al is a big person.
2Such cases are related to Kennedy’s 1999 discussion of a large city.
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To analyze these, he posits that expressions like idiot contain a mapping to
degrees as part of their denotation, which is lexically related to a standard degree,
(507a); s+dim here indicates the ‘standard for dim’ in the context. As this degree is
not freely available in the syntax, yet seemingly modifiable as in (506a), Morzycki
posits a null operator that can ‘reveal’ that variable for modification by expressions
like big, (507b). big itself remains univocal; what derives the ambiguity of (506a)
is whether or not the expression deg-size in (507c) offers up the lexical degree
variable of idiot.
(507) i. Jidiotd,s+idiocyK = λx.dim+idiocy(x) = d & d > s+idiocy
ii. Jbigs+sizeK = λx.dim+size(x)  s+size
iii. Jdeg-sizeK = λN〈d,〈,et〉〉 λA〈e,t〉 λx.A(ιd[N(d)(x)])
I will not go through the details of Morzycki’s account here. For my purposes,
it suffices to point out the similarities in form of this kind of analysis, and that of-
fered for e.g. gradable verbs or degree achievements. The observation is that some
expressions seem to give rise to degrees along a property dimension in addition to
their more ‘regular’ nominal or verbal dimensions. In the case of verbs, I have specu-
lated that structural ambiguity may be involved. Such an explanation is potentially
more far-fetched in the case of nouns. However, given that the ingredients of Morzy-
cki’s semantic analysis are analogous to those often offered for nominal gradability,
it seems to me that the present account could be tailored to accommodate them,
modulo the complications attending any account of variable dimensionality: i.e.,
what idiot is true of denotes in more than one ordering.
7.2. Theoretical issues
Sentences have parts, and the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings
of its parts. While compositionality is a generally accepted principle of semantic
261
interpretation, there is not yet consensus on what counts as the primitive or small-
est units that feed compositional interpretation. In traditional generative grammar,
the primitives are ‘words’, including both the semantically simple do and the se-
mantically complex redo (i.e., do+again; e.g. Chomsky 1965, di Sciullo & Williams
(1987)). An alternative view holds that the smallest formal units and the smallest
units of linguistic meaning are in fact inseparable, so that forms like redo are syntac-
tically, as opposed to merely morphologically, complex (e.g. Halle & Marantz 1993,
Embick & Noyer 2007, a.o.; see Borer 2005a,b,c for a view in which most distinctions
often thought lexical are in fact syntactic).
On the standard theory in degree semantics, gradable adjectives are not amenable
to further morphological analysis (i.e., they are morphemes), yet they are assigned
a complex semantics that distinguishes them from morphemes of other syntactic
categories such as nouns and verbs.3 That is, tall contains both the information
that the height property is under discussion, and the information that a measure of
that property is under discussion.
In this dissertation, I separated out the property information from the mea-
sure function information, assigning the latter task to much in comparative contexts.
This appears compatible with the DM-type view that there is only “so much” mean-
ing the primitives of syntax can bear, though precisely what this hypothesis is sup-
posed to amount to has not, to the best of my knowledge, been worked out from a
semantic perspective. The question we might ask, then, is: once the interpretative
contribution of much is ‘severed’ from the adjective, why is it not just included
as part of the meaning of comparative morphemes themselves? Why the separate
morpheme?
Two considerations suggest the answer to this question is: language packages
3This statement applies only to the ‘simple’ nouns and verbs that we’ve seen, which uncontro-
versially have a property-type semantics. I continue to restrict my attention to distinctions related
to degree semantics only.
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meanings into morphemes in this way because it can’t do things otherwise. Making
this argument would take another dissertation, perhaps, but there is some suggestive
evidence that such a conjecture is true. The first concerns recent semantic analyses
of negation in comparatives, which are currently thought to form a syntactically-
separable part of negative adjectives like short and the negative comparative less; the
second concerns recent morphological analyses of superlatives, which suggests that
(universally) superlative meanings are constructed out of comparative meanings.
To help answer this question, we might consider the role of negation in com-
parative contexts. Recent proposals in semantics suggest that the negative compar-
ative less and negative antonyms like short in English are syntactically, as opposed
to merely morphologically complex. For instance, suppose that the negative com-
parative less in English decomposes as it does in German (wenig-er, little-er),
and short into little tall (Rullmann 1995, Heim 2006, Büring 2007). Positing
a silent little as part of the English expressions correctly predicts that more/less
and tall/short are semantic duals, just as they are in German. One consequence of
this view is that the sentences in (508) are equivalent as a matter of logical syntax.
(508) a. The building is taller than the ladder is.
b. The ladder is shorter than the building is.
c. The ladder is less tall than the building is.
Decompositional approaches are well-suited to explain patterns of cross-polar
anomalies, as well. Kennedy (2001) explains the oddity of (509a) as due to tall and
short taking (incommensurable) perspectives on those degrees-of-height, “positive”
and “negative” (Kennedy’s constraint). As Büring (2007) points out, however,
such an account incorrectly predicts that (509b) should be odd as well, since short
is negative and wide positive. On Büring’s decompositional approach, the antonyms
short and tall share a common lexical core, whereas the non-antonymous short and
wide do not. Moreover, the pronunciation of the form shorter is ambiguous: one
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parse of is [little-er] tall (on this, (509b) expresses a licit less-than comparison
between positive degrees), and another parse is -er [little tall] (a greater-than
comparison of positive and negative degrees, barred by Kennedy’s constraint).
(509) a. ?? The ladder is shorter than the building is tall. ??height
b. The ladder is shorter than the building is wide. length
Here, on either parse, (509a) is problematic: analyzing short as -er [little tall]
results in a greater-than relation between tall and little tall (barred by Kennedy’s
constraint), and [little-er] tall results in a less-than relation between two in-
stances of tall (barred for (509a) by obligatory Comparative Deletion, Bresnan
1973).
Büring’s account naturally extends to account for ambiguities evidenced equally
by forms like less high and lower (cf. Seuren 1973, Rullmann 1995), by positing (with
Heim 2006) that the silent little can QR from its base position. However, Heim
(2008) points out that there are contexts where slower does not show the same scope
possibilities as e.g. less fast. Wanting to maintain Büring’s other results, however,
Heim ultimately ends up positing two distinct littles, one for the decomposition
of less (scopally-mobile little), and another for short (scopally-immobile little).
Future work in this vein should examine cross-linguistic data and see what light
it may shed on this issue. For example, in Hixkaryana the antonym of an adjective
like long is formed by two pieces (kawo-hra long-not; Bobaljik 2012). Considering
facts like these, short may not spell out little long (i.e., [not much] long) but
not long. This analysis is made possible by the fact that the theory proposed in
this dissertation (unlike other approaches) provides a non-trivial meaning for much.
If syntactic operations target parts of lexical items, then those lexical items
cannot be syntactic primitives. As typological and semantic work in various areas
deepens, the idea that word meanings are decomposable in ways that are not nec-
essarily transparent becomes more plausible. Moreover, it suggests a very strong
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constraint on a language learner’s hypothesis space, and stringent constraints on
what we should expect to find when we look to new languages.
7.3. Languages and learning
It would be quite interesting if the standard picture, on which gradable adjec-
tives are unique in lexicalizing measure functions, were correct. It would suggest a
strong syntax-semantics mapping that children could use in acquiring the meanings
of novel words. That is, if a child were able to categorize an expression as a gradable
adjective, she would immediately know that it can be used in the array of compara-
tive constructions.4 In this dissertation, I have argued that gradable adjectives are
not linguistically so very different from mass nouns and atelic verbs.
There is suggestive crosslinguistic evidence that the category of ‘gradable ad-
jective’ is not very robust. Some languages appear to fail to instantiate the syntactic
category ‘Adjective’ at all.5 If only a subset of adjectives denote measure functions,
then it is unclear to me what should be predicted for such languages. Will they lack
words that express concepts like those underlying (English) tall or intelligent? Or
will they have words with similar meanings that just have a different logical type?
And what would the consequences of such variation be?
On the theory I offer, the gradability of adjectives and adverbs is not funda-
mentally different from that of nouns and verbs. Rather, that intuition tracks a
felt difference between the “sorts of things” that much measures, which are, to be
sure, quite different. From a formal perspective, however, hot/fast express things
that come in various levels/extents along the relevant dimensions, as do coffee/run
4This is already a difficult problem, as opposed to merely determining that the expression is of
the category Adjective. See Waxman & Lidz 2006 and Syrett 2007 for discussion of the acquisition
of expressions of this category.
5A summary discussion of such languages appeared on the Linguist List, 4.442, Wed 09 June
2013, “Sum: Languages without adjectives”.
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express things that come in various levels/extents along the relevant dimensions.
What “sorts of things” they are doesn’t play a crucial role in the logical form.
Because the functional vocabulary (much, -er, etc) place restrictions on what
the expressions they combine with can apply to (namely, those things must be
ordered or orderable), the theory could be used to test syntactic bootstrapping
theories in language acquisition (Gleitman 1990; see a.o. Borer 2004 for pertinent
discussion). Once a child has acquired the meanings of comparative morphemes,
this knowledge can guide their hypotheses about the meaning of novel adjectives,
nouns, etc., that occur in this environment. For instance, if a child can isolate the
relevant property as one they represent as gradable when presented with This is a
dax-y one, they should immediately understand what is meant when presented with
This one is as dax-y as that one.
These thoughts suggest a bold conjecture about what we should expect to see
in the crosslinguistic picture: no language should lexicalize open-class expressions
as measure functions. This runs contrary to the hypothesis of Beck et al. (2010),
in which languages can vary parametrically this (they can also vary with respect to
whether they allow degree abstraction in than-clauses, though see Shimoyama 2012
for criticism). The idea that languages parametrically vary with respect to whether
GAs lexicalize measure functions is taken up by Bochnak (2013), specifically to
argue that languages like Washo lack lexical measure functions unlike English.
My alternative conjecture would be that if a language lacks a morpheme like
much in English, the expression that introduces measures, then it would not be
possible to express direct measurements using expressions like those that depend on
it—-er, as, etc. Moreover, if those languages lack not only adjectival, but nominal
and verbal comparatives as well, this would provide strong support for the idea that
it is not adjective meanings, but much, that introduces degrees.
Finally, the view on which there is only “so much” meaning a morpheme can
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bear is an interesting one, and with potentially interesting implications for language
acquisition and typological investigation. But how might it ultimately be tested?
Recent work in psycholinguistics has begun to explore the idea that the logical
representations we assign as the interpretations of expressions constitute psycholog-
ical hypotheses about the representational format of linguistic meanings. Results so
far have been very interesting, and suggestive that this mode of investigation will be
very promising for the future, both with children (Halberda et al. 2008, Odic et al.
in-press, Wellwood 2012b) and adults (Pietroski et al. 2009, Hackl 2009 Lidz et al.
2011, Odic et al. in prep, Tomaszewicz 2011, Kotek et al. m.s., 2011).
A strong hypothesis is that, each symbol proposed in the logical representation
of the meaning of a sentence corresponds to a hypothesis about the class of cognitive
operations that will be invoked during linguistic understanding (and production). I
look forward to investigating this hypothesis further, in the context of the present
theory.
7.4. Conclusion
This dissertation examined comparative constructions with the comparative
morphemes -er, as and others across their adjectival, adverbial, nominal, and verbal
occurrences. I first discussed a way of analyzing the cross-categorial data in which
GAs denote measure functions, unlike nouns and verbs. I then proposed an alter-
native, in which much alone introduces measure functions. The resultant theory
provides, among other things, an account of why much appears everywhere with
comparative morphemes in English (even when it doesn’t appear so on the surface):
it is required to introduce degrees for elaboration by expressions like -er and as.
A consequence of the theory is that the interpretation of gradable adjectives (the
original impetus for the degree-theoretic analysis of comparative morphemes) is ren-
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dered much like that of nouns and verbs: all denote properties, just of different sorts
of entities. The theory was extended to two areas that posed a challenge to the idea
that the language of measurement and comparison was univocal: comparatives that
only give rise to comparisons by number, and a variety of constructions that have
been thought about as somewhat “meta” in their interpretation. It was shown that
these constructions, too, fit within the same analytic framework as the others. Fi-
nally, a variety of further directions were explored. A strong conjecture about why
language should look the way it does in the domain of comparative was offered, and
its implications for the theoretical, typological, and experimental landscape were
briefly explored. The picture that emerged was that, even within a broader frame of
reference, thinking about things the way this dissertation lays out will potentially
be quite fruitful for the linguistic enterprise.
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Bale, Alan, Michaël Gagnon & Hrayr Khanjian. 2010. Cross-linguistic
representations of numerals and number marking. In Proceedings of
Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20, 1–15.
Barner, David, Amanda Libenson, Pierina Cheung & Mayu Takasaki. 2009. Cross-
linguistic relations between quantifiers and numerals in language acquisition: Ev-
idence from japanese. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 103. 421–440.
Barner, David & Jesse Snedeker. 2005. Quantity judgments and individuation:
evidence that mass nouns count. Cognition 97(1). 41–66.
Bartsch, Renate & Theo Vennemann. 1972. Semantic structures: A study in the
relation between semantics and syntax. Frankfurt am Main: Athenaum.
Barwise, John & Robin Cooper. 1981. Generalized quantifiers and natural language.
Linguistics and Philosophy 4. 159–219.
Beck, Sigrid. 2000. Star operators episode 1: defense of the double star. In Kiy-
omi Kusumoto & Elisabeth Villalta (eds.), Unviersity of massachusetts occasional
papers in linguistics: Issues in semantics(23), 1–23. Amherst, Massachusetts:
Graduate Linguistic Student Association.
Beck, Sigrid. 2011. Comparison constructions. In C. Maienborn, K. von Heusinger
& P. Portner (eds.), Semantics: An international handbook of natural language
meaning vol. 2, chap. 53, 1341–1390. Mouton de Gruyter.
Beck, Sigrid, Sveta Krasikova, Daniel Fleischer, Remus Gergel, Stefan Hofstetter,
Christiane Savelsberg, John Vanderelst & Elisabeth Villalta. 2010. Crosslinguis-
tic variation in comparison constructions. In Jeroen van Craenenbroeck (ed.),
Linguistic variation yearbook 2009, 1–66. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publish-
ing Company.
Beck, Sigrid & Uli Sauerland. 2000. Cumulation is needed: a reply to Winter (2000).
Natural Language Semantics 8(4). 349–371.
Berka, Karel. 1983. Measurement: its concepts, theories, and problems Boston
studies in the philosophy of science. Boston MA: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Bhatt, Rajesh & Roumyana Pancheva. 2004. Late merger of degree clauses.
Linguistic Inquiry 35(1). 1–46.
Bierwisch, Manfred. 1989. The semantics of gradation. In Manfred Bierwisch
& Ewald Lang (eds.), Dimensional adjectives: Grammatical structure and
conceptual interpretation, 71–261. Springer-Verlag.
270
Biswas, Priyanka. 2012. Reanalyzing the Default Classifier in Bangla. Handout for
FASAL II at MIT.
Bochnak, M. Ryan. 2010. Quantity and gradability across categories. In Proceedings
of Semantics and Linguistic Theory XX, 251–268. Ithaca, NY: CLC publications,
Cornell University.
Bochnak, M. Ryan. 2013. Cross-linguistic variation in the semantics of comparatives:
University of Chicago dissertation.
Bogal-Allbritten, Elizabeth. 2013a. Decomposing notions of adjectival transitivity
in Navajo. Natural Language Semantics 21. 277–314.
Bogal-Allbritten, Elizabeth. 2013b. Modification of DPs by epistemic modal ad-
verbs. In Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, .
Bogal-Allbritten, Elizabeth. 2014. Interpreting DP-modifying modal adverbs. Ab-
stract, Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24.
Bolinger, Dwight. 1972. Degree Words. The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton.
Boolos, George. 1984. To be is to be the value of a variable (or some values of some
variables). Journal of Philosophy 81. 430–450.
Borer, Hagit. 1998. Deriving Passive without Theta Roles. In S. Laponte, D. Brentari
& P. Farell (eds.), Morphology and its relation to phonology and syntax, Stanford,
CA: CSLI Publications.
Borer, Hagit. 2004. The grammar machine. In Artemis Alexiadou, Elena Anagnos-
topoulou & Martin Evereart (eds.), The unaccusativity puzzle: Explorations of
the syntax-lexicon interface, 288–331. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borer, Hagit. 2005a. In name only vol. 1 Structuring Sense. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Borer, Hagit. 2005b. The normal course of events vol. II Structuring Sense. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Borer, Hagit. 2005c. Structuring Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bowers, John. 2010. Arguments and Relations. MIT Press.
Bresnan, Joan. 1973. Syntax of the comparative clause construction in English.
Linguistic Inquiry 4(3). 275–343.
Bunt, Harry C. 1985. Mass terms and model-theoretic semantics (Cambridge Studies
in Linguistics 42). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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Camacho, José. 2012. ‘ser’ and ‘estar’: Individual/stage level predicates or as-
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